Essays on financial integration, natural disasters, and commercial banks in East Asia by Nguyen, Dung Thi Thuy
 
Essays on Financial 
Integration, Natural 
Disasters, and Commercial 
Banks in East Asia 
 
by 
Dung Thi Thuy Nguyen 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the 





Department of Accountancy and Finance 
Otago Business School 






The thesis examines the impact of financial integration on commercial banks in East 
Asia. The thesis comprises three essays examining the relationship between financial 
integration and bank cost efficiency, financial integration and bank default risk, and the 
moderating role of financial integration on the impact of natural disasters on bank 
performance.  
More specifically, the first essay tests whether there is a non-monotonic 
relationship between financial integration and bank cost efficiency. A sample of 
commercial banks from nine East Asian countries over the period 1997–2014 is 
examined. This is the first study to apply the non-monotonic stochastic frontier model to 
this relationship. The essay consistently reports a non-monotonic impact of financial 
integration on bank cost efficiency. Financial integration contributes to the improvement 
in bank cost efficiency up to a threshold. The model suggests that when the foreign claims 
are greater than 100% of GDP and when more than 40% of banks are non-domestic, a 
further increase in financial integration becomes efficiency-impeding. 
The second essay examines the impact of different forms of financial integration 
on bank default risk. Using the system generalized method of moments (GMM) and 
sampling eight East Asian countries during 1999–2014, the essay finds that financial 
integration lowers bank default risk in the recipient countries. The impact is primarily 
driven by the foreign claims extended by Asian lenders and the foreign claims extended 
via local affiliates. These results show that close proximity of lenders and borrowers or 
‘local’ knowledge via an affiliate presence alleviates information asymmetry, allowing 
for effective monitoring and disciplining of the loan relationship. The result supports the 
fostering of financial integration, promoting deeper intra-regional connectedness 
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throughout East Asia. Where foreign claims come from outside East Asia, policy makers 
should encourage presence through local affiliates, as this has an equivalent impact.  
The third essay analyses the impact of natural disasters on commercial bank 
performance and the moderating impact of financial integration on the relationship. 
Commercial banks from seven East Asian countries during 1999–2014 are sampled. The 
system GMM regression reveals that natural disasters significantly lower the deposits 
ratio but have no contemporaneous relationship with liquidity, credit risk, profitability, 
and default risk. The essay also shows that foreign banking claims, specifically those 
extended by Asian lenders, help to alleviate the deposits decline in the aftermath of 
natural disasters. These results highlight the role of commercial bank deposits and foreign 
banking claims as sources of finance for post-disaster recovery. The resilience of the 
Asian foreign claims in the event of local shocks also provides evidence to support deeper 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
1.1.1 Research background 
Financial integration is the term used to refer to the phenomenon of closely linked 
financial markets at the sub-national, national, regional, or global level. It encapsulates 
concepts such as financial openness, free movement of capital, and integration of 
financial services (Agénor, 2001; Fung et al. 2008). The key expected benefits of 
financial integration are efficient capital allocation and international risk-sharing; 
however, financial integration also carries substantial costs, including capital volatility 
and the transmission of shocks across markets (Agénor, 2001; Allen et al., 2011). The 
dual nature of financial integration means that academic researchers, financial sector 
practitioners, and policy makers have all been challenged by the long-standing question: 
“How can a country maximize the benefits and mitigate the costs of financial 
integration?” 
Across the finance industry, financial integration in the banking sector best 
illustrates both the potential benefits and the costs of financial integration (World Bank, 
2018). The key driver of the banking integration process are international banks- banks 
that do business outside the country they are headquartered. From theoretical perspective, 
the international expansion of these banks could be explained by the eclectic and 
internalization theories (see William (1997) for a detailed review of these theories). Both 
theories relate the motives for international expansion of banks to that of the non-
financial multinational corporations.  
The eclectic theory suggests that multinational firms possess ownership 
advantage and location advantage (Dunning, 1977). Specifically, ownership advantage 
2 
 
(i.e. access to the endowments of the parent company at costs below market price) 
enables a firm to profit from extending its operations into other markets. Location 
advantage (i.e. barriers to trade or institutional arrangements) help a firm to decide on 
the destination of its foreign investment. The internalization theory emphasizes that 
multinational enterprises overcome international market barriers (i.e. taking the forms of 
tariffs, restrictions on capital flows, differences in taxation regimes, and legal framework) 
and avoid excessive transaction costs by developing internal markets across national 
boundaries (Buckley, 1988; Buckley and Casson, 1991). Yannopoulos (1983) specified 
these advantages in the context of banking sector. He argued that the locational 
advantages (i.e. follow-the-client, country-specific regulations, and entry restrictions), 
the ownership advantages (i.e. product differentiation), and internalization advantages 
(i.e. informational advantages, and access to local deposit bases in order to exploit 
maturity transformation) are the key motives for banks to undertake multinational 
operations.   
Using a similar approach that relates foreign direct investment with banks’ 
oversea expansion, Grubel (1977) and Gray and Gray (1981) emphasize that banks 
establish facilities in locations where they have some type of comparative advantage. On 
the one hand, home-country customers with business abroad may generate demand for 
banking services abroad. Accordingly, banks following their customers abroad to seek 
new profits. On the other hand, a domestic bank has a comparative advantage (i.e. due to 
its greater familiarity with domestic procedures) in servicing foreign firms doing business 
in its home country. Therefore, openning a foreign branch is largely to market its services 
to the firm's foreign parent. 
International banks are involved in two main types of international activities, 
namely cross-border lending and foreign participation in domestic banking systems via 
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brick-and-mortar operations (World Bank, 2018). These activities could bring both 
benefits and risks to the host countries. Research dedicated to understanding these 
impacts has produced a substantial literature; however, the existing evidence is 
inconclusive. On the positive side, foreign capital channelled by international banks 
could serve as an alternative source of external financing to ease the financial constraint 
in host countries in times of local crisis (Agénor, 2001). De Hann and Van Lelyveld 
(2010) empirical validated this argument; their evidence confirms that when a host 
economy is hit by a banking crisis, parent banks can inject funds in their subsidiaries in 
order to maintain their levels of credit supply. Additionally, the receipt of foreign capital 
may pressure policy makers in host countries to adopt good policies and better 
governance practices so they can attract foreign lending and to maintain those policies to 
avoid capital flight (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2009). 
Similarly, foreign bank presence could improve the efficiency of host countries’ 
banking system via transferring technological know-how and management expertise, and 
via changing the local market’s structure (Goldberg, 2009). The study of Claessens et al. 
(2001) suggests the presence of the former channel. Specifically, foreign banks operating 
in developing countries have lower overhead costs, higher interest margins, and higher 
profitability, which may suggest that foreign banks, in general, bring better technologies 
to less developed banking sectors (Claessens et al., 2001). The latter channel is evident 
in the study of Jeon et al. (2011), who examined banks in 17 developing countries and 
found that foreign banks improve competition in the banking sector of host economy. 
The increased competition from new foreign players puts pressure on local banks to 
increase their efficiency by, for example, reducing their costs and offering products of 
higher quality. The positive impact is found to be more pronounced particularly when 
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more efficient and less risky foreign banks enter markets with less concentrated banking 
systems.  
On the negative side, banking globalization could pose threats to the local 
financial stability. Excessive liquidity caused by foreign capital inflows induces local 
banks to take risks (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012) and fuels credit booms in the host 
countries (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). Besides, if foreign banks are not efficient 
in their oversea markets, the technology and management spill-over effect and efficiency 
improvement may not happen. This could be the case when banks fail to overcome the 
‘liability of foreignness’ which is defined as the extra-costs of doing business abroad 
(Miller and Parkhe, 2002). These costs include monitoring from a distance, staff turnover 
in overseas postings, diseconomies of operation in the retail sector, and barriers to entry 
such as language, culture, market structure, and regulations (Miller and Parkhe, 2002). 
Additionally, foreign banks could also change the local market structure in a negative 
manner; for instance, local market consolidation following fierce competition with 
foreign banks can lower overall bank efficiency (Casu and Girardone, 2009). Finally, 
foreign banks could also destabilize host economies by transmitting shocks from their 
home country (Goldberg, 2009). Specifically, Jeon et al. (2013) reveal the existence of 
an active cross-border internal capital market whereby global banks reallocate funds 
across their branches and subsidiaries to buffer shocks to the parent bank’s balance sheet. 
The study shows how a monetary policy shock in the home country can spill over to other 
countries through a reduction in lending by global banks’ subsidiaries.  
On balance, some research suggests that economic development (Lensink and 
Hermes, 2004), institutional quality (Mian, 2006; Detragiache et al., 2008), and financial 
development (Kose et al., 2011) serve as essential prerequisites for a country to reap net 
benefits from international banking. For instance, Lensink and Hermes (2004) confirm 
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that the short-term impact of foreign bank presence on domestic banks depend on the 
economic development of the host country. Specifically, at lower levels of economic 
development, foreign bank entry is associated with higher costs for domestic banks while 
at the higher level of economic development, the impact is less clear. In the former case, 
there exists a large gap between foreign banks’ and domestic banks’ level of management 
and technology; accordingly, domestic banks are under pressure to make investment to 
upgrade their systems, leading to higher operation costs. In the latter case, the gap as well 
as the room for improvement is not pronounced; therefore, banks are less motivated to 
improve their operations.  
Studying the behaviour of foreign banks in developing countries, Mian (2006) 
and Detragiache et al. (2008) underscore the role of institutional quality to tackle the 
‘cherry picking’ behaviour of foreign banks in host countries. To explain, in weak 
institutional environments with poor information and contract enforcement, international 
banks may focus on large corporations and governments, leaving the less transparent and 
more risky group of customers for domestic banks. Kose et al. (2011) empirically 
validated the existence of certain ‘threshold’ levels of financial and institutional 
development which could help an economy to attain the net benefits of financial 
integration.  A deep and well-supervised financial sector is essential for an efficient 
allocation of foreign capital into local productive investments. Similarly, countries with 
better institutions could attract and maintain the stable inflow of foreign capital to avoid 
the adverse impact of capital volatility.  
The global financial crisis has certainly led to a re-evaluation of the potential 
benefits and costs of bank globalization. Section 1.2 describes the evolution of 
international banking landscape before and after the global financial crisis with emphasis 
on the post-crisis change. The section, then, highlights the need for understanding the 
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benefits and cost of integration and addressing the long-standing question from new 
perspectives.  
1.1.2 Research motivation 
The decade before the GFC was characterised by a significant increase in banking 
globalization. The increase is partly explained by the deregulation in several countries, 
especially with emerging and developing further opening their capital account 
(Fernandez et al., 2015). The change was manifested in both a rise in cross-border lending 
and a growing participation of foreign banks around the world (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2001 and 2007). Figure 1.1 best illustrates the former point; BIS data shows that the 
foreign banking claims (on all counterparty regions) were on a sharply increasing trend 
just before the crisis. Furthermore, international banks from advanced countries play the 
key role both as the providers and recipients of foreign claims (Claessens, 2017). With 
regard to the latter, Claessens and Van Horen (2014a) presented evidence of the large 
increase in foreign bank presence especially in emerging and developing market. Foreign 
bank presence became very large in some emerging markets, with market shares (in terms 
of the number of banks) in 2007 exceeding 80% in 14 countries and more than 50% in 
63 out of 118 countries. This trend was triggered by the removal of foreign banks entry 
restrictions and banking system privatization in many regions such as East Asia, Latin 
America, and Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990s (Goldberg, 2009). In contrast, 
foreign bank presence remained low (i.e. less than 25%) in many advanced countries. 
During the post-crisis period, banking globalization reversed. Regulatory change 
also affects international banks’ expansion. Among the key regulatory reforms  were the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)’s new and stringent capital and 
liquidity requirements for banks under the third Basel framework, Basel III. Accordingly, 
both foreign bank presence and foreign banking claims experienced retrenchment and 
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shift in their structure. While banks based in high-income countries began a retreat or 
reversal from foreign operations, developing country banks continued their international 
expansion, accounting for nearly 60% new entry into foreign markets (Claessens and Van 
Horen, 2014a). Cross-border bank claims also experienced significant retrenchments, but 
transactions from developing countries to other developing countries started growing 
(though these were likely dominated by regional expansion heralding a push towards 
regionalization). These changes in the international banking landscape are further 
described below and provide further motivation for this thesis.  
The latest reversal and regionalization trends in the international banking 
landscape following the global financial crisis further motivate the examination of the 
long-standing research concern from two new perspectives, namely the level of financial 
integration and the types of financial integration. Specifically, the first trend is the 
reversal in international banking activities that is mainly observable among developed 
countries (World Bank, 2018). Figure 1.1 documents the substantial decline experienced 
by foreign banking claims on high-income Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries during the post-crisis period. Further, a series of 
financial crises in the 1990s made multinational organizations, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), soften their insistence on full financial liberalization 
(International Monetary Fund, 2012). Taken together, the recent reversal following the 
global financial crisis increases the attention given to the level of financial integration 
and, in particular, identifying the point beyond which the costs of financial integration 







Source: Compiled from Bank for International Settlement (BIS) Consolidated Banking 
Statistics on Immediate Counterparty basis (CBS-IC), bank type “All excluding 4C banks, 
excluding domestic position”. 
Figure 1.1: The foreign banking claims on counterparty regions in the world (in 
US$ billions) 
In contrast to the retrenchment among developed countries, the post-crisis period 
has witnessed the expansion of international banks among developing and emerging 
country banks in other regions (World Bank, 2018). For instance, referring to Figure 1.1, 
the East Asia Pacific region emerges as a region witnessing large growth in foreign 
banking claims after the crisis, contrasting markedly with other developed and 
developing regions of the world. More importantly, emerging international banks have 
started expanding primarily within their region of origin (Claessens and Van Horen, 
2015). For example, Asian banks stepped in to take up the gaps created by the 
retrenchment of European banks in Asia (Remolona and Shim, 2015). This is described 
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Bank, 2018). As the potential benefits and costs of financial regionalization remain 
largely unknown (World Bank, 2018), a thorough examination should take into account 
the impact of different types of financial integration with regard to their origination.   
Thus, an examination of foreign banking capital by its geographical source is 
critical in the contemporary international banking context. A further related lens to view 
foreign banking capital through is its methods of extension. Specifically, foreign claims 
can be extended either via local affiliates set up by international banks in the recipient 
countries or extended by international banks across borders. Local claims, which carry 
more ‘local’ knowledge than their counterparts, were resilient during the global financial 
crisis (World Bank, 2018). As clearly depicted in Figure 1.2, in high-income OECD 
countries, the cross-border claims were much higher in the pre-crisis period but fell 
substantially in the post-crisis, while the local claims exhibited much less fluctuation. In 
the East Asia Pacific region, the local claims were the main type of claims during the 
whole period; interestingly, this region was less affected by the global financial crisis. 
This further motivates studying the impact of different types of financial integration with 





Source: Compiled from BIS CBS on Ultimate Risk basis (CBS-UR), bank type “Domestic 
banks, excluding domestic position”. 
Figure 1.2: The foreign banking claims (classified by methods of extension) on 
high-income OECD and East Asia Pacific region (in US$ billions) 
Following the recent reversal and regionalization trend of international banking 
activities, this thesis examines the impact of financial integration on the banking sector 
with a focus on the level and different types of financial integration. Specifically, the first 
essay explores the non-monotonic relationship between financial integration and bank 
cost efficiency. The second essay examines the differential impact of different types of 
financial integration (i.e. classified by their geographical origin and methods of 
extension) on bank default risk. 
Over the past 20 years, the devastating impact of natural disasters has been felt 
globally; however, Asia has borne a considerable share of the associated damage caused 
(see Figure 1.3). This is of increasing concern because there is evidence that climate 
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on Climate Change, 2014). Given the realized damage of past disastrous events, together 
with a current rising concern about climate change, the thesis brings together issues of 
the impact of disasters and financial integration in the third essay. This essay investigates 
the impact of natural disasters on a broad range of bank performance measures and, in 
particular, explores whether financial integration moderates these impacts.  
 
Source: Compiled from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). 
Figure 1.3: The global economic damage of natural disasters (in US$ billions) and 
the Asian share of those damages (%) 
1.1.3 Approach to measure financial integration in banking sector 
There are several approaches to measure the level of financial integration. Quinn 
et al. (2011) categorise financial openness and integration into three types of de jure, de 
facto and hybrid indicators. De jure indicators are law-based indicators to proxy for the 
degree of legislated capital account openness. De facto indicators are quantities-based 
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other countries. Hybrid indicators are the combination of the two previous types. Some 
examples of these indicators are listed in Table 1.1.  
Table 1.1: Review of financial openness indicators 





De jure measure of financial currents and 
capital accounts openness. It provides 
information about ‘multiple exchange rates’, 
‘current account’, and ‘surrender of export 
proceeds’. 









De jure measure of economic freedom. It 
provides information about ‘rule of law’; 
‘government size’, ‘regulatory efficiency’, 
and ‘market openness’ (including trade 











Hybrid  measure. It is based on ‘actual flows’ 
of trade, FDI, portfolio, and remittances, plus 
restrictions on imports, tariffs, taxes on trade 








De facto measure. Its key measure is a 
country’s aggregate assets and liabilities over 
GDP ratio. Several types of integration 
including FDI, equity investment, external 





(Source: Adapted from Quinn et al. (2011)) 
De jure indicators have wide coverage both in terms of sampled countries and 
time period. However, they are quite static in nature and therefore may not closely reflect 
the actual levels of financial integration. This limitation is raised by Quinn et al.’s (2011, 
p. 494) noting that de jure indicators “do not necessarily reflect a country’s actual degree 
of financial integration, highlighted by the fact that even countries with relatively closed 
capital accounts became substantially more financially integrated over the past decades”. 
Therefore, the thesis uses the de facto approach to measure financial integration in 
banking sector.   
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Quantity-based de facto indicators are popular to measure different types of 
financial integration, ranging from trade in financial service, foreign direct investment to 
portfolio investment, and foreign bank claims (i.e. Pongsaparn and Unteroberdoerster 
2011; Australian Centre For Financial Studies (ACFS) 2015). ACFS (2015) review 
different type of measures with emphasis on their sources of data and limitations (see 
Table 1.2); most of these measures face data limitations on the Asian context. 
Table 1.2: De facto measures of financial integration, data sources, and limitations 
Measures Data Sources Key limitations 




Poor coverage of trade in 
service and bilateral trade 





Data is aggregated. 
Therefore, it is not able to 
track whether FDI flows 
into manufacturing or 
financial sector.    
Portfolio investment IMF coordinated portfolio 
investment survey 
Not cover some large 
holders of external assets  
Foreign banking 
claims 
Bank for international 
settlements (BIS) 
 
BIS cover 44 reporting 
countries, poor coverage of 
Asia (notably China only 
started reporting to BIS in 
2015) 
(Source: Adapted from ACFS (2015)) 
As the thesis focuses on financial integration in banking sector, the measure based 
on foreign banking claims data provided by Bank for International Settlement (BIS) is 
the most relevant one. As seen in Table 1.2, no single source of data is perfect; BIS data 
is not an exception (see Section 5.1. for further discussion on BIS’s limitations). 
Accordingly, the thesis is motivated to use foreign bank penetration ratio as another 
measure of financial integration in banking sector. These two measures could provide a 
complementary assessment on the level of banking integration. Furthermore, they also 
reflect the two main types of international activities conducted by international banks, 
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namely cross-border lending and foreign participation in oversea banking systems 
through brick-and-mortar operations (World Bank, 2018). 
In shorts, the thesis analyses the impact of financial integration from the 
perspective of countries that receive foreign capital extended by international banks and 
host foreign affiliates of these international banks. The former aspect refers to the receipt 
of foreign banking claims, while the latter refers to foreign bank penetration. Data on the 
receipt of foreign banking claims are sourced from BIS.  Data on the foreign bank 
penetration are sourced from the foreign bank database developed by Claessens and Van 
Horen (2015) (see Section 2.3.3. in Chapter 2 for further description of these measures).  
1.1.4 The sampled East Asian countries 
All three essays focus on commercial banks in East Asia.  Specifically, 
commercial banks from China, Hong Kong, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam are sampled. The 1997 Asian financial crisis led to 
high-profile bank defaults and a painful economic contraction in these East Asian 
economies, notably Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea (Asian 
Development Bank, 2008). Despite this troubled history, these countries are integrating 
further into the global financial markets, with China standing out as the newly emergent 
key player in the international banking markets (World Bank, 2018). More interestingly, 
the last six countries in the list, which belong to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), are pro-actively promoting intra-regional integration with several 
cooperative initiatives such as  the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000, the Asian Bond 
Markets Initiative in 2003, and the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community in 
2015 (Asian Development Bank, 2018). Furthermore, there exists considerable 
heterogeneity in the degree of economic and financial development as well as financial 
integration among these sampled countries (see Section 2.4 in Chapter 2), which would 
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potentially affect the process of intra-regional co-operation. In shorts, these features 
highlight these countries as an important group to examine and are an ideal match with 
the research focus of the thesis.  
The following three sub-sections outline the motivation, methodology, and 
findings of each of the three essays, respectively. The last section highlights the overall 
contributions and outlines the structure of this thesis. 
1.2 THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION ON BANK COST 
EFFICIENCY 
A thorough examination of the impact of financial integration should take into 
account the level of financial integration. Accordingly, the first essay (Chapter 2) tests 
whether a non-monotonic relationship between financial integration and bank cost 
efficiency exists. 
             There have been arguments, theoretical models, and propositions advanced in 
the literature that suggest a non-monotonic impact of financial integration on bank 
performance. For example, based on portfolio diversification theory, Allen et al. (2011) 
hypothesize that the marginal benefits of integration diminish while its marginal costs 
rise as the level of financial integration increases. Following this hypothesis, there is an 
optimal level of financial integration such that additional integration efforts adversely 
impact capital allocation efficiency and international risk-sharing benefits. A 
mathematical model developed by Bacchetta and Wincoop (2016) shows that when a 
country passes a certain threshold of financial integration, it exposes itself to greater risks 
from financial integration. 
Empirical findings from the bank efficiency literature suggest the existence of a 
non-monotonic relationship between financial integration and cost efficiency. For 
instance, Fries and Taci (2005) suggest that the association between a country’s progress 
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in banking reform and cost efficiency is non-linear. Casu et al. (2016) find that financial 
liberalization improves bank cost efficiency; the effect is more evident in countries with 
pronounced regulatory change and less so in the case of limited liberalization. 
Unfortunately, these studies only highlight the potential existence of the non-
monotonicity but do not formally test it. Additionally, these studies focus on the impact 
of financial reforms and financial liberalization, which are considered as a prerequisite 
for financial integration (Vo and Daly, 2007; Kim and Lee, 2008).  This essay addresses 
this important gap in the literature by formally testing, for the first time, the non-
monotonic impact of financial integration on bank cost efficiency.   
The essay applies the non-monotonic efficiency effect model developed by Wang 
(2002). The model uses stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), which allows a single-step 
approach to estimate the best-practice cost frontier and the determinants of the 
inefficiency term. More specifically, in Wang’s (2002) model, the marginal impact of an 
environmental variable, such as financial integration, on inefficiency could change 
direction depending on the values of the variable. Using a sample of commercial banks 
from nine East Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) over the period 1997–2014, the first essay 
focuses on two aspects of financial integration: foreign bank penetration and the receipt 
of foreign banking claims. 
The essay consistently reports the non-monotonic impact of financial integration 
on bank cost efficiency. Specifically, greater financial integration contributes to higher 
cost efficiency up to a point; thereafter, additional financial integration becomes 
efficiency-impeding. The essay documents the turning points in cost efficiency when 
more than 40% of banks are non-domestic and the foreign claims of international banks 
exceed 100% of GDP. In short, the finding confirms the need to consider the level of 
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financial integration in examining the impact of financial integration on the banking 
sector.  
1.3 DIFFERENT FORMS OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND THEIR 
IMPACTS ON BANK DEFAULT RISK 
  A comprehensive examination of the impact of financial integration on banking 
systems should consider different types of financial integration in terms of lenders’ 
nationality and the form of the foreign claims extension. The second essay (Chapter 3) 
explores these issues in the context of bank default risk. While the first essay studies two 
aspects of financial integration, the second essay focuses on the receipt of foreign 
banking claims. More specifically, it first examines the impact of foreign banking claims 
on bank default risk. Then, it investigates whether the types of foreign banking claims 
moderate that relationship. 
With regard to the impact of foreign banking claims on bank default risk, the 
existing literature provides limited and contrasting findings. For instance, Dinger and 
Kaat (2017) report that inflows of foreign capital lead to higher impaired loans, while 
Karolyi et al. (2018) show that cross-border banking flows lower bank systemic risk. To 
shed more light on the impact of foreign banking claims on bank default risk, the second 
essay provides additional evidence from East Asian countries, a dynamic and growing 
region, which relies increasingly on foreign claims from international banks.  
            After establishing the baseline result, the essay explores the impact of different 
types of foreign banking claims classified by their lenders’ nationality and methods of 
extension. Based on the former, foreign banking claims are extended either by regional 
(Asian) lenders or by distant (non-Asian) lenders. Based on the latter, foreign claims are 
extended via local affiliates set up by international banks in the recipient countries or 
extended by international banks across borders. The second essay proposes that each type 
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of capital is associated with different levels of information asymmetry. Specifically, 
regional (Asian) claims face less information asymmetry in comparison with their non-
Asian counterparts due to the geographical, cultural, and institutional proximity between 
Asian lenders and their regional borrowers (Mian, 2006; Claessens and Van Horen 
2014b).  Similarly, the extension of funds via local affiliates rather than across borders 
involves some forms of foreign direct investment (García-Herrero and Martínez 
Pería, 2007), which also helps to obtain ‘local’ knowledge. Therefore, the information 
advantage associated with regional (Asian) claims and local claims arguably creates an 
effective discipline mechanism and a strong competitive pressure over banks in the 
recipient countries, thus leading to lower risk-taking behaviour. Although the rationale 
for expecting the preferential impact of regional (Asian) claims and local claims is highly 
intuitive, there is currently no research that has investigated this possibility. Therefore, 
the essay addresses this important gap in the literature. 
A dynamic panel data model of bank default risk measured by the distance to 
default z-score is constructed. The overall and component measures of financial 
integration as well as other important determinants of bank default risk, such as bank-
level characteristics, macroeconomic condition, regulation, and supervision, are included 
in the model. The two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) developed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is used to estimate the 
dynamic model. The sample consists of commercial banks from eight East Asian 
countries during the period 1999–2014.1  
 
1 Bank regulation and supervision are among important determinants of bank risks (Laeven and Levine, 
2009), thus the sample of the second essay greatly relies on this data availability. Accordingly, the 
examined period starts from 1999, which is the first available year of regulation data. In comparison with 
the first essay’s country sample, Vietnam is dropped out due to the unavailability of regulation data. Other 
than that, the sample remains unchanged. 
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The second essay finds that financial integration lowers bank default risk in the 
recipient countries. As hypothesized, the impact is primarily driven by the foreign claims 
extended by regional (Asian) lenders and the foreign claims extended via local affiliates. 
The preferential impact of regional claims points to the benefit of financial 
regionalization since close proximity between lenders and borrowers alleviates 
information asymmetry, allowing for effective monitoring and disciplining of the loan 
relationship. The presence of international banks through local affiliates in the recipient 
countries and the extension of funds via this channel also leads to an equivalent impact. 
In short, the essay concludes that foreign banking claims from these two ‘neighbouring’ 
sources are the preferred types of financial integration. Therefore, the essay confirms that 
the types of integration, measured by lenders’ nationality and the nature of the foreign 
claims extension, needs to be considered when examining the impact of financial 
integration. 
1.4 THE MODERATING ROLE OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATURAL DISASTERS AND BANK 
PERFORMANCE 
Rather than examining the direct impact of financial integration (on bank 
efficiency as in the first essay and on bank default risk as in the second essay), the third 
essay (Chapter 4) studies the mediating role of financial integration in the context of 
natural disaster damages. The third essay, therefore, not only contributes to the literature 
on the impacts of financial integration but also to the growing literature on the impact of 
natural disaster on the banking systems.  
More specifically, the third essay first examines the impact of natural disasters on 
a broad range of bank performance measures. Then, it investigates the moderating effect 
of financial integration (measured via the receipt of foreign banking claims) on that 
20 
 
relationship. Finally, it explores whether the moderating role varies by several types of 
foreign banking claims classified by lenders’ nationality and methods of extension, as in 
the second essay. 
Cross-country analyses are rare in studying the impact of natural disasters on the 
banking sector. Discernible prior studies include Klomp (2014) and Brei et al. (2019), 
which report the negative impact of disasters on the aggregated country-level measures 
of bank performance. The third essay augments these studies by examining the impact of 
disasters on various measures of bank-level performance (including deposits ratio, 
liquidity, credit risk, profitability, and default risk).     
The unconstrained and relatively immediate access to finance is essentially 
important for post-disaster recovery. Bank deposits and credit, insurance, and 
governmental support are key domestic sources of finance post-disaster; additionally, 
foreign capital could serve as an alternative post-disaster funding source in times of local 
shocks (Noy, 2009). However, the literature provides opposing predictions on the 
potential moderating role of financial integration. On the one hand, foreign capital could 
compensate for the volatility of domestic credit (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006; Allen 
et al., 2011), thus assisting the post-disaster recovery. On the other hand, the likelihood 
of associated international capital outflows (Yang, 2008; David, 2011) could amplify the 
shortage of funds, thereby slowing down the recovery process. Therefore, this essay aims 
to confirm which effect is present (or is dominant) for the case of commercial banks 
located in the disaster-prone region of East Asia. 
As shown in the second essay, each type of the foreign banking claims is 
associated with a different level of information asymmetry. More specifically, the 
‘neighbouring’ claims which are either regional (Asian) claims or local claims are 
associated with lower information asymmetry. The information advantage is crucial to 
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maintaining the credit supply, as lenders face severe information asymmetry when 
disasters destroy customer information as well as collateral (Chavaz, 2014; Cortés and 
Strahan, 2015). Relying on this line of argument, the third essay (Chapter 4) re-
investigates the preferential effect of ‘neighbouring’ claims in moderating the 
relationship between disasters and bank performance. 
Similar to essay two, a dynamic panel data model of bank performance ratios is 
constructed to reveal the short-term and contemporaneous response of banks toward 
disasters. The two-step system GMM method is used to estimate this dynamic 
relationship. The essay measures the disaster damages via the ratio of economic loss 
caused by all disaster events to the one-year lagged GDP of a country. The sample draws 
on commercial banks from seven countries in East Asia during the period 1999–2014.2  
The essay finds that natural disasters significantly lower the bank deposits ratio. 
Further, it shows that foreign banking claims, specifically those extended by regional 
(Asian) lenders, help to alleviate the deposits decline in the aftermath of natural disasters. 
These results highlight the role of commercial bank deposits and foreign banking claims 
as sources of finance for post-disaster recovery. The resilience of regional (Asian) foreign 
claims in the event of natural disasters provides further evidence to support the 
importance of financial regionalization.   
1.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis contributes to the debate about the benefits and costs of financial 
integration with the evidence from East Asia, which has seen a growth in integration but 
also a change in the nature of that integration since the Asian financial crisis. The thesis 
generally points to the benefits of financial integration. Specifically, the first essay finds 
 
2 In comparison with the second essay, the list of countries remains unchanged except for Singapore, as no 
natural disasters were recorded for that country. 
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that financial integration helps to improve bank cost efficiency up to a certain point. The 
second essay reports that financial integration helps to lower bank default risk; more 
specifically, it highlights the benefits of ‘neighbouring’ foreign claims which are either 
extended by regional lenders or via local affiliates. The third essay confirms the 
alleviating effect of financial integration, as the foreign banking claims serve as an 
alternative source of finance to support post-disaster recovery. Furthermore, it also 
reinforces the beneficial impact of receiving regional foreign banking claims, which are 
resilient in times of local shocks. 
Existing research, notably Mian (2006), Detragiache et al. (2008), and Kose et al. 
(2011), suggests that countries should meet a certain threshold of institutional quality and 
financial development to reap the net benefits of financial integration. Placed in the 
context of the recent reversal and regionalization trends in the international banking 
landscape (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2), the thesis highlights the importance of the level of 
financial integration and the types of financial integration. Specifically, the thesis finds 
that a healthy amount of financial integration is likely to be beneficial for bank efficiency. 
Additionally, ‘neighbouring’ foreign capital is associated with lower information 
asymmetry and is also beneficial to financial stability in the recipient countries. This 
conclusion holds even during the periods of local shocks following natural disasters. 
Overall, in response to the long-standing question of “How could a country maximize 
benefits and mitigate the costs of financial integration?”, policy makers and practitioners 
can find their answers by considering the level of financial integration and the types of 
financial integration. 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 present the 
three essays, respectively. Chapter 5 provides an overall conclusion and outlines some 
research limitations and potential avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE NON-MONOTONIC RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND COST 
EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE FROM EAST ASIAN 
COMMERCIAL BANKS  
2.1 INTRODUCTION3  
The global financial crisis of 2008–2009 triggered a discussion about a potential reversal 
in the global expansion of international banking that had begun in the 1960s (European 
Central Bank, 2012). Further, since the 1990s, policy makers such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have softened their insistence on full financial liberalization and 
have allowed more space for the employment of macro-prudential policies and capital 
account management tools (International Monetary Fund, 2012). In practice, after the 
global financial crisis, a major change in the international banking landscape was the 
retrenchment of European banks in terms of international intermediating activities 
(World Bank, 2018). The changes described above have ensured that there is continued 
academic and policy interest in studying the impact of financial integration with regard 
to the level of financial integration.  
There have been arguments, theoretical models, and propositions advanced in the 
literature that suggest a non-monotonic impact of financial integration on bank 
performance. For example, based on portfolio diversification theory, Allen et al. (2011) 
hypothesize that the marginal benefits of integration diminish, while its marginal costs 
rise as the level of financial integration increases (see Figure 2.1). Given the declining 
marginal benefits but increasing marginal costs, an optimal degree of integration is given 
 
An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Financial Markets and Corporate Governance 
Conference (FMCG 2018, Melbourne, Australia) and the Vietnam Symposium in Banking and Finance 




by the point at which the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits. A mathematical 
model developed by Bacchetta and Wincoop (2016) also shows that when a country 
passes a certain threshold of financial integration, it exposes itself to greater risks from 
financial integration.  













Figure 2.1: The optimal level of financial integration (Source: Adapted from Allen 
et al., 2011, p. 55) 
Notes: In the context of bank cost efficiency, benefits of integration include 
diversification of funds and investments, knowledge, and technology spill-overs from 
foreign banks, whereas costs of integration take the form of financial contagions and 
higher input prices due to cross-border movement and fierce competition with foreign 
banks, respectively. Given the declining marginal benefits but increasing marginal costs, 
an optimal degree of integration is given by the point at which the marginal costs equal 
the marginal benefits. 
 
Empirical findings from the bank efficiency literature suggest the existence of a 
non-monotonic relationship between financial integration and cost efficiency. For 
instance, Fries and Taci (2005) suggest that the association between a country’s progress 
in banking reform and cost efficiency is non-linear. Casu et al. (2016) find that financial 
liberalization improves bank cost efficiency; the effect is more evident in countries with 
 Marg. benefits 

































 Marg. Costs 
           
 
          Degree of integration Optimal point 
25 
 
pronounced regulatory change and less so in the case of limited liberalization. 
Unfortunately, these studies only highlight the potential existence of the non-
monotonicity but do not formally test it. Additionally, these studies focus on the impact 
of financial reforms and financial liberalization, which are considered as a prerequisite 
for financial integration (Vo and Daly, 2007; Kim and Lee, 2008). 
Given the above practical and academic context, this chapter formally tests 
whether the non-monotonic relationship between financial integration and bank cost 
efficiency exists.4 Cost efficiency (or inefficiency) is measured by the distance of a 
bank’s costs relative to the best-practice bank’s costs in producing the same bundle of 
outputs, given its input prices of financial, physical, and human capital (Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997). Financial integration is measured in terms of foreign claims of 
international banks to the country and foreign bank penetration. An unbalanced sample 
of East Asian commercial banks from China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam during the period 1997–2014 is 
used to test the relationship. 
The key contribution of this chapter is to be the the first study to apply the non-
monotonic efficiency effect model developed by Wang (2002) to the relationship 
between financial integration and bank cost efficiency. Hitherto, this relationship has 
been assumed to be accurately captured by monotonic efficiency effect models. The 
model is built upon the framework of stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), which allows a 
single-step approach to estimate the best-practice cost frontier and model the impact of 
 
4 Bank efficiency is an established filed of research but continues to generate contemporary interest from 
researchers from a range of perspectives, including income diversification, technology gaps, ownership 
structure, or cost of credit (Lin et al., 2016; Haque and Brown, 2017; Lee and Huang, 2017; Doan et al., 
2018; Shamshur and Weill, 2019). 
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environmental variables (Zit) through an inefficiency term.
5 More importantly, the 
employment of Wang’s (2002) model has a threefold benefit: (i) the model formally tests 
for a non-monotonic impact of financial integration on cost efficiency; (ii) it can examine 
the impact of financial integration on both the mean and variance of the inefficiency term; 
and (iii) it accounts for the heterogeneity in the degree of financial integration in East 
Asia. To elaborate on the first (also the key) advantage, the model allows the 
environmental variable (Zit) to have a non-monotonic impact on the inefficiency term 
measured by its marginal effect. In other words, depending on the values of the 
environmental variable, the marginal impact on inefficiency can change direction (from 
positive to negative or vice versa) in the sample. In linear efficiency effect models, the 
impact of Zit is necessarily monotonic, being either efficiency-enhancing or -impeding, 
but not both. It is the accommodation of the non-monotonic efficiency effect that makes 
Wang’s (2002) model unique and the best specification among eight well-known SFA 
models as supported by Lai and Huang (2010). 
Another contribution of this chapter relates to the measurement of financial 
integration. Two measures are used, namely the receipt of foreign banking claims and 
foreign bank penetration. Bank for International Settlement (BIS) data on the foreign 
claims of international banks on the sampled countries to the GDP of the respective 
country are used to measure the former aspect. The number of foreign banks to total 
number of banks in a country is used to measure the latter aspect. With this approach, the 
chapter chooses quantities-based de facto indicators to represent a country's realized 
outcomes of financial integration rather than law-based de jure indicators to proxy for 
 
5 Alternatively, under the two-step approach, the observation-specific efficiency measure is estimated in 
the first step, then regressed on a vector of determinants in the second step. As the two-step procedure 
suffers from several criticisms, the preferred approach to studying the impacts of exogenous factors on 




the degree of legislated capital-account openness, such as the KAOPEN index (Chinn 
and Ito, 2008) and the Index of Economic Freedom (from the Heritage Foundation). 
Moreover, by using de facto measures, the chapter adopts a broader concept of financial 
integration, which encompasses multiple aspects, such as financial liberalization, free 
movement of capital, and integration of financial services (Fung et al., 2008). In this 
sense, financial liberalization could be considered as a prerequisite for international 
financial integration (Vo and Daly, 2007). This is especially true for the case of emerging 
markets where financial deregulation and capital account liberalization open doors to 
capital inflows (Kim and Lee, 2008), but the actual level of integration may evolve 
subsequently to the doors opening. Therefore, the chapter provides more comprehensive 
evidence of the impact of financial integration in comparison with almost all existing 
studies that examine the single facets of financial liberalization on bank efficiency, 
namely financial deregulation and capital account liberalization (such as Casu et al., 2016 
and Luo et al., 2016). Further, the chapter also contributes to the international banking 
literature more generally by examining the impact of foreign banking capital on bank 
efficiency, contrasting with the existing empirical focus on the impact of financial 
contagion, crisis, and bank stability (for instance Jeon et al., 2013; Le and Dickinson, 
2016; Ghosh, 2016). 
The final contribution comes from the important context examined. The chapter 
explores the relationship between integration and bank cost efficiency in the context of 
East Asia, an economically dynamic region of growing importance to the international 
financial system and the global economy. During the past decade, financial integration 
in East Asia has continued to advance. The foreign banking claims going to East Asia 
Pacific increased notably, which is in contrast to the decline among high-income OECD 
countries and substantially higher than other regions, as depicted in Figure 1.1. However, 
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there is considerable heterogeneity in the degree of financial integration among countries 
in Asia. The region is the home of two highly sophisticated global financial centres, 
namely Hong Kong and Singapore. Other countries in the region, such as Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam, have also been integrating, but to a lesser extent (see Section 
2.4). Finally, it is worthwhile examining whether the revision of the need for full financial 
liberalization by international policy makers is also relevant to East Asia – particularly 
since the region was less affected by the global financial crisis (see Section 1.1).  
The baseline result as well as a battery of robustness tests find strong evidence of 
the non-monotonic impact of financial integration on cost efficiency for the sample of 
East Asian commercial banks. Specifically, greater financial integration contributes to 
higher cost efficiency up to a point; thereafter, higher financial integration becomes 
efficiency-impeding. The turning points of this non-monotonicity occur when more than 
40% of banks are non-domestic and the foreign claims of international banks exceed 
100% of GDP. In the case of the sub-sampled countries with low integration (i.e. 
excluding the two financial centres, namely Hong Kong and Singapore), these turning 
points are approximately at 40% and 55%, respectively. The country-level analysis 
strengthens the non-monotonicity.  Banks operating in the least financially integrated 
countries (such as China and Vietnam) experience efficiency benefits from integration, 
while banks in highly integrated countries (Hong Kong and Singapore) do not.   
These findings imply that excessive financial integration adversely affects bank 
performance. The results are strongly aligned with the arguments put forward by Allen 
et al. (2011, p. 55) that “some degree of integration is beneficial, but an excessive degree 
is not”.  The result has implications about the degree to which countries should become 
financially integrated, especially in the context of ongoing further and deeper financial 
integration in East Asia. This is not to say financial integration should be halted; the 
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chapter’s results indicate that several countries in the sample would benefit from further 
financial integration, notably China, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
related studies and highlights some existing gaps in the literature. Methodology and data 
are described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 and 2.5 present and discuss the descriptive and 
empirical results, respectively. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 2.6.  
2.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, HYPOTHESIS, AND RELATED 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Financial integration taking the form of either foreign banking capital or foreign 
bank penetration could be either beneficial or detrimental to bank cost efficiency. As 
hypothesized by Allen et al. (2011), the effect depends on the level of financial 
integration.  
At the low level of integration, the marginal benefits of integration on cost 
efficiency are large (see Figure 2.1). The benefits come from various sources. With 
regard to foreign banking capital, thanks to the movement of capital across borders, banks 
could diversify their sources of deposits, thus becoming less susceptible to domestic 
shocks and channel investments toward countries with more productive opportunities 
(Baele et al., 2004). With regard to foreign bank penetration, knowledge spill-overs from 
foreign banks to domestic counterparts, such as better managerial practices and 
techniques, could enhance efficiency (Lensink et al., 2008).  Additionally, both foreign 
capital and foreign banks intensify competition among the different providers of funds 
(Agénor, 2001; Jeon et al., 2011). The increased competition, thereby, could put pressure 
on local banks to increase their efficiency by managing their costs and offering products 
of higher quality. Finally, banks could take advantage of reduced transaction, overhead, 
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and information costs because input price differences across integrated markets could be 
reduced or eliminated over time (Weill, 2009).  
As the extent of integration increases, the additional gains from these above-
mentioned sources diminish and the marginal costs of integration on cost efficiency 
increase (see Figure 2.1). Specifically, the domestic banking system could be 
increasingly vulnerable to external financial shocks or crises since foreign banking flows 
could open channels for the transmission of financial contagion (Le and Dickinson, 2016; 
Ghosh, 2016). Further, foreign banking flows are often more volatile than other types of 
capital, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) (Levchenko and Mauro, 2007). 
Therefore, it follows that banks could contribute additional financial and human 
resources to manage their cost performance in an open and volatile environment.  
Similarly, the higher level of foreign bank penetration could induce fierce 
competition which makes banks incur additional operating costs. For instance, as a 
consequence of competition between banks for deposits, deposit rates would rise and the 
bank price of funds increase accordingly (Wu et al., 2017). Additionally, foreign banks 
also tap into local fields of expertise (Cantwell, 1995); their competition for hiring a 
productive and talented workforce could push up the price of personnel. As illustrated by 
Kwan (2003), the average wage rates in the financial service industry in Asian highly 
integrated financial centres, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, were two to three times 
higher than those in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines during the period 1992–
1999. Finally, local banks are forced to merge to have better competitive ability, which 
could create monopoly power and reduce the overall efficiency of the banking sector 
(Casu and Girardone, 2009).   
Given the declining marginal benefits but increasing marginal costs, an optimal 
degree of integration is given by the point at which the marginal costs equal the marginal 
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benefits (see Figure 2.1). Based on this theoretical background, Hypothesis 1 (H1) states: 
“Financial integration improves bank cost efficiency up to a point, then becomes 
efficiency-impeding”. 
The existing empirical literature focuses on the impact of financial liberalization 
(taking the forms of deregulation, banking reforms, and foreign bank entry) and bank 
cost efficiency. The findings are quite inconclusive. In the earliest contribution, Kwan 
(2003) uses a sample of seven Asian countries during the period 1992–1999 and finds 
that operating efficiency, measured by operating cost per unit, is unrelated to banking 
sector openness, which is assessed via various entry barriers to foreign competition. 
Similarly, Berger (2003) does not find positive efficiency effects of a single market for 
financial services in Europe. He attributes this finding to the consolidation of the banking 
sector which disrupted the supply of relationship credit and led to the loss of relationship 
information. The later literature finds evidence of a significant relationship, but there is 
no consensus in the direction of the relationship. Chortareas et al. (2013, 2016) support 
a positive association between economic freedom and bank cost efficiency in the case of 
commercial banks from European countries and the US, respectively. Similarly, as found 
by Lin et al. (2016), in the case of 12 Asian developing economies, foreign bank presence 
improves bank efficiency in countries with higher financial freedom. In contrast, 
sampling global commercial banks, Lensink et al. (2008) find that foreign ownership 
lowers bank cost efficiency, though the negative effect is less pronounced in countries 
with good governance.   
More interestingly, examining banks from 15 post-communist East European 
countries, Fries and Taci (2005) highlight that the association between a country’s 
progress in banking reform and cost efficiency is non-linear. Specifically, in the early 
stage of reforms, banks take advantage of liberalized interest rates and credit allocation; 
32 
 
at a more advanced phase, improvement in service quality and innovation to develop 
banks’ market share results in higher costs. In the context of Asia, Casu et al. (2016) 
suggest the potential existence of a non-linear relation between financial liberalization 
and cost efficiency. Deregulation of interest rates, removal of restriction on activities, 
and foreign bank entry generally improves cost efficiency. The effect is more evident in 
countries with pronounced regulatory change and less so in the case of limited 
liberalization.  The linear efficiency effect model of Battese and Coelli (1995) used by 
Casu et al. (2016) does not, however, formally test for the existence of a non-linear 
relationship.  
 The empirical evidence of foreign banking capital mainly focuses on its impact 
on bank stability rather than cost efficiency. Some empirical evidence shows that 
international banking activities can lead to financial contagion. For example, Jeon et al. 
(2013) present consistent evidence that internal capital markets in multinational banking 
contribute to the transmission of financial shocks from parent banks to foreign 
subsidiaries. However, Ghosh (2016) reports that banking sector globalization (indicated 
by cross-border volume of deposits and loans) significantly reduces the probability of 
banking crises.  
This empirical review highlights some gaps in the literature. First and foremost, 
there have not been any studies that formally examine the non-monotonic relationship 
between financial integration and bank cost efficiency. Second, the existing literature, 
which mainly studies the impact of financial liberalization (in the form of deregulation 
and foreign bank entry) on bank cost efficiency, provides inconclusive evidence. 
Addressing the potential non-monotonic relationship between financial integration and 
bank efficiency would help to explain these mixed empirical findings. Third, foreign 
banking capital is mainly examined in terms of bank stability. Hence, there is a lack of 
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empirical evidence concerning the impact of foreign banking capital on bank cost 
efficiency. The chapter addresses these gaps in the literature. 
2.3 METHODOLOGY, VARIABLES AND DATA 
2.3.1 Estimation Method  
Bank efficiency is defined as the distance to a best-performance frontier which is 
not explained by statistical noise. SFA is a well-established empirical approach 
developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977) to measure 
efficiency. SFA distinguishes between statistical noise and an inefficiency component. 
This feature explains for its popularity compared to other approaches to measure 
efficiency and productivity in the literature (Berger and Humphrey, 1997).  
Cost efficiency is measured based on the comparison between the minimum costs 
and the actual costs that produce the same bundle of outputs with the given input price 
(Berger and Mester, 1997). The cost efficiency could be estimated from a cost function. 
A stochastic cost frontier for panel data can be specified as given by Equation (2.1). 
                                        TCit = f (Wit; Qit) + vit + uit                                                                           (2.1) 
vit ∼ N (0, σ2v) 
uit ∼ N+ (μit, σ2it), 
where TCit is the total cost for bank i at time t; Wit and Qit are, respectively, vectors of 
input prices and outputs; vit is a normally distributed error term with zero mean and 
variance (σ2v); and the non-negative component uit follows a truncated normal 
distribution with an observation-specific mean (μit) and variance (σ
2
it) that measures the 
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inefficiency term.6 The parameters of the model are estimated by the maximum 
likelihood (ML) method. 
To study how environmental variables (in addition to input prices and outputs 
variables) affect inefficiency, either the mean (μit) or the variance (σ
2
it) of the pre-
truncated distribution is parameterized. The decision about parameterizing only μit or 
σ2it would become arbitrary without specific assumptions on the impact of the 
determinants. Thus, Wang (2002) combines features of the two approaches as stated in 
Equations (2.2) and (2.3).7 
        μit = δ0 + δZit                                                                    (2.2) 
                 σ2it = exp (γ0 + γZit)                                                             (2.3) 
The model allows both the mean and variance of the pre-truncated 
distribution to be expressed as the function of some environmental variables (Zit). In 
particular, the model is able to accommodate the non-monotonic impact of a Zit variable 
measured by its marginal effect on the inefficiency term. This means that an 
environmental determinant can positively (negatively) affect the mean and variance of 
the inefficiency term when its values are within a certain range, and then change to 
negative (positive) for values outside the range. In linear efficiency effect models, the 
impact of Zit is either positive or negative, but not both. 
 
6 In his original study, Wang’s (2002) presented his model with a production function. The chapter adopts 
his approach of parameterizing both the mean and variance of inefficiency term and apply to the cost 
function as presented in Equation 2.1.  
7 Wang (2002) is also described as heteroscedastic efficiency model since the model parameterises the 
variance of the inefficiency term as presented in Equation 2.3. 
Wang’s (2002) model was originally designed for cross-sectional data. Sun and Chang (2011) adapted this 
model to panel data in examining the impact of risks on bank cost efficiency. The chapter follows Sun and 
Chang (2011) to apply the model to study the impact of financial integration on bank cost efficiency. The 
limitation of the model in confounding the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and inefficiency terms 




The non-monotonic efficiency effects on E(uit) of the kth element of Zit are 
estimated as stated in Equation (2.4). 
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where ϕ and ɸ are the probability and cumulative density functions of a standard normal 
distribution, respectively; Ʌ = μit /σit; z[k] is the kth element of Zit; and δ[k] and γ[k] are 
the corresponding coefficients in Equations (2.2) and (2.3).  
The marginal effect of Zit on V(uit) is shown in Equation (2.5). 
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where m1 and m2 are the first two moments of uit (see Wang, 2002). 
To make statistical inferences, the standard error and confidence interval of the 
marginal effect are obtained by bootstrapping. 
2.3.2 Model Specification and Variables  
The underlying cost structure of the banking industry (i.e the f function in 
Equation 2.1) is represented by the trans-log functional form.8 Equation (2.1) is specified 
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8 A translog function was introduced by Christensen et al. (1973). This functional form is typically 
employed in the parametric approach to estimate inefficiency as it is found to be more reliable and flexible 
than the generalized and extended generalized Cobb-Douglas forms (Coelli et al., 2005). The general form 
of the trans-log functional form is specified as follows:  
Ln(TCit) = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘 
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 𝛽14𝑙𝑛(𝑞1) 𝑙𝑛(𝑞2)+ 𝛽15 T +𝛽16 𝑇
2 +𝛽17 HIGH+  vit + uit                                                                                      (2.6)                                                                                                                    
μit = δ0 + δ1 SIZEit + δ2 CRERISKit  + δ3 CAPit  + δ4 CONt + δ5 INTEGt + δ6 IFLt + δ7 PRICREt + 
δ8YEAR1997+ δ9 YEAR1998 + δ10YEAR1999 + δ11YEAR2007 + δ12YEAR 2008+ δ13YEAR 
2009                                                                                                                                         (2.7)                                                                                                             
σ2it = exp (γ0 + γ1 SIZEit + γ2 CRERISKit + γ3 CAPit + γ4 CONt + γ5 INTEGt + γ6 IFLt +γ7 PRICREt 
+γ8YEAR1997 + γ9YEAR1998 + γ10YEAR1999 + γ11YEAR2007 + 12YEAR2008 + 
γ13YEAR2009)                                                                                                                           (2.8) 
To specify the input prices and outputs of the cost frontier function given by 
Equation (2.6), the chapter uses the intermediation approach. This approach refers to the 
banks as financial intermediaries that borrow money from units of surplus or use inputs, 
such as labour and capital, to transform these resources into loanable funds and other 
investments as outputs (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
indicate that the intermediation approach is an appropriate way to estimate a bank’s level 
of efficiency. 
In line with previous literature, such as Lensink et al. (2008), the chapter 
constructs its variables for the cost frontier as follows. The total costs (TC) consist of 
total interest expenses and total non-interest expenses. The two outputs are gross loans 
(Q1) and total securities (Q2).9 The three input prices are price of funds (W1), estimated 
by the ratio of total interest expenses to total customers deposits; price of physical capital 
(W2), estimated by the ratio of overhead expenses net of personnel expenses to total 
assets; and price of labour (W3), estimated by the ratio of personnel expenses to total 
 
9 The literature suggests using “net fees and commissions” as the third output variable to account for the 
increasing proportion of banks’ income stemming from fee-based activities. Unfortunately, there are a lot 
of missing data reported for the sampled countries. The chapter excludes banks with less than three years 
of available financial data to compute input prices and outputs. The inclusion of this third output will 
increase the number of excluded banks, leaving a small sample size to run the complex ML estimation.  
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assets.10 Among the inputs, the third input (W3) is used to normalize the dependent 
variable and other input prices to ensure the price homogeneity condition. First- and 
second-order time trends (T and T2) are included in Equation (2.6) to account for the 
effect of technological changes. As a common best-practice frontier is constructed for all 
banks in the sample, a dummy variable to account for the heterogeneity in the country 
level of financial integration is included in Equation (2.6).11 Specifically, a dummy 
variable (HIGH) is added to control for the difference between two groups, namely most 
countries in the sample and the two financial centres, Hong Kong and Singapore, which 
are highly financially integrated  compared with the rest of the sample (see Section 2.4 
for further discussion).  
With respect to the function of the level and variance of the inefficiency term 
given by Equations (2.7) and (2.8), following Fiordelisi et al. (2011), Barth et al. (2013b) 
and Luo et al. (2016), the environmental group of variables Zit, is included. Specifically, 
several bank-specific variables are included such as SIZE (the natural logarithm of total 
assets) to proxy for economies of scale, CRERISK (the ratio of reserves for impaired 
loans to total loans) to proxy for assets quality, and CAP (the ratio of total equity to total 
assets) to proxy for leverage level. CON (the ratio of the top three biggest banks’ assets 
to total banks’ assets) is used to measure banking market concentration. As predicted by 
the ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis’, banks with market power are less motivated to control costs; 
 
10 With regard to the price of physical capital (W2) and price of labour (W3), their denominators are often 
constructed from the book value of fixed assets and the number of employees, respectively. As these data 
are missing for most of the sampled banks, the chapter uses the value of total assets in both denominators, 
instead. Besides, Ngo and Tripe (2016) suggest that W2 should be measured as the ratio of occupancy 
expenses to the value of fixed assets to reflect the core cost structure of banks. However, the data for 
‘occupancy expenses’ are not available in Bankscope, the chapter could not follow Ngo and Tripe’s (2016) 
approach.  
11 Empirical studies, such as Fu et al. (2014) and Luo et al. (2016), which use the SFA approach to measure 
cost efficiency in a cross-country setting also construct a common cost frontier for all sampled banks. To 
account for the cross-country differences, these studies include a dummy variable to proxy for the level of 
economic development in the cost frontier. As this chapter examines the impact of financial integration on 
cost efficiency, it is more relevant to include a dummy variable to proxy for the level of financial integration 
in the cost frontier function. 
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therefore, increased market concentration could lead to a decrease in efficiency (Hicks, 
1935). By contrast, a positive relationship between efficiency and market concentration 
could be explained by the ‘Efficient Structure Hypothesis’. Specifically, efficient firms 
with lower costs could earn higher profits; therefore, the most efficient firms could 
increase their market share, resulting in higher concentration (Demsetz, 1974). Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas (2000) and Berger (2007) conclude that macro-economic variables are 
important determinants of cost efficiency in cross-country analysis. Accordingly, 
macroeconomic variables such as IFL (inflation rate), PRICRE (the ratio of private sector 
credit to GDP), and financial integration indicators (INTEG)- the variable of interest are 
included.  These variables could shape the demand for banks products and services and 
represent for the cross-country macro-economic differences, which could affect the cost 
inefficiency term. Year dummy variables are also included to account for the effects of 
the Asian and global financial crisis, which could negatively affect cost efficiency. Table 











Table 2.1: Definition and specification of variables  
Variables Definition Source 
Cost frontier 
Dependent variable 




Cost frontier’s variables 
W1 Prices of funds = Total interest expenses/ 
total customer deposits 
Bankscope and 
author’s calculation 
W2 Price of physical capital = Overhead 








Q1 Output = Gross loans  Bankscope 
Q2 Output = Total securities  Bankscope 
Determinants of inefficiency 
CLAIM Foreign claims extended by international 
banks on counter-party country to GDP of 
that country (%) 
BIS CBS-IC 
FOR Numbers of foreign banks to Total number 
of banks (%) 
Claessens and Van 
Horen (2015) 
SIZE SIZE= Natural logarithm of total assets Bankscope and 
authors calculation 
CRERISK Credit risk = Reserves for impaired loans/ 
total loans (%) 
Bankscope and 
authors calculation 
CAP  Equity ratio = Total equity/ total assets (%) Bankscope and 
authors calculation 
CON Market concentration = Assets of three 
largest banks/ Total commercial bank 
assets in the country (%) 
Bankscope and 
authors calculation 
IFL Inflation = Annual % change of average 
consumer price index (%) 
Global Financial 
Development (GFD) 
PRICRE Private sector’s credit = Bank credit to 
private sector/ GDP (%) 
Global Financial 
Development (GDF) 
HIGH  A dummy variable equals 1 for countries 
with high level of integration (Hong Kong 
and Singapore); otherwise 
The descriptive 
analysis of the sample 
Year dummies  Dummies variables for the years of the 
Asian and global financial crisis  





Variables in robustness tests   
TOTAL Stocks of foreign assets and liabilities = the 
sum of the gross stocks of foreign assets 
and liabilities to GDP 
Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) 
KAOPEN  Capital account openness Chinn and Ito (2008) 
ODUM Foreign ownership equals 1, otherwise Claessens and Van 
Horen (2015) 
REGQ Quality of regulation: The indicator 
measures the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote 
market competition and private sector 
development. The “estimate” score is used. 





ACTR  Overall restrictions on banking activities: 
The index measures the degree to which 
banks are allowed to engage in securities, 
insurance, real estate investment, and 
ownership of non-financial firms. Higher 
values indicate more restrictiveness.  
Barth et al. (2013a) 
 
2.3.3 Financial Integration’s Measure and Data  
The chapter chooses quantity-based de facto indicators to represent a country's 
realized outcomes of financial integration rather than law-based de jure indicators to 
proxy for the degree of legislated capital-account openness.12 The level of financial 
integration (i.e. INTEGjt in Equations 2.7 and 2.8) is measured by foreign bank 
penetration and the receipt of foreign banking capital. Specifically, to proxy for the 
former, the percentage of foreign banks relative to the total number of banks in a country 
(FOR) is used. The data for foreign bank ownership are sourced from Claessens and Van 
 
12Another approach to measure financial integration is price-based (Baele et al., 2004). The price-based 
approach captures the discrepancies in prices or returns on assets caused by the geographic origin of the 
assets. This approach is mainly used to examine the stock or bond markets integration (as in Rughoo and 
You, 2016; Billio et al., 2017). 
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Horen (2015). This measure has been widely studied as a determinant of bank efficiency 
(Lensink et al., 2008; Pasiouras et al., 2009).  
For an individual country, international banking activities can take place in two 
directions. First, banks of the country may hold claims to the assets of other countries. 
Second, banks from other countries may invest in assets of the country in question. Being 
defined as the foreign claims of international banks on a country to the GDP of that 
country, CLAIM helps to measure the second aspect with the sampled countries acting 
as the recipients of funds.13  
The data of foreign claims are sourced from the Consolidated Banking Statistics 
(CBS) on Intermediate Counterparty basis (IC) published by the Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS).14 In detail, foreign claims are reported in their outstanding amount (in 
million USD) on a quarterly basis. The chapter constructs the annual claims by using the 
stock data on the last quarter of each year in the sampled period. Bilateral claims of a 
source-recipient country pair are then aggregated by the recipient country. After these 
steps, the year- and country-level claims on each of the sampled countries are obtained. 
The foreign claims are then scaled by the GDP of the corresponding sampled countries 
to construct the variable CLAIM.  In short, CLAIM is relevant to assess the size of the 
international banking activities of one country in comparison with its GDP. Higher values 
 
13 As there are few countries in the sample that report bank foreign asset holdings to the Bank for 
International Settlement (BIS), the chapter could not measure the first aspect.  
14 BIS CBS provides the credit exposures (termed as ‘foreign claims’) of banks headquartered in 31 BIS-
reporting (source/lender) countries to over 200 counterparties (recipient) countries on a bilateral basis. The 
CBS are structured on the nationality of reporting banks and on a consolidated basis, excluding intra-group 
transactions (i.e. capital injection, equity investment, intra-group loans, etc.) between offices of the same 
banking groups. The foreign claims reported in CBS could take the form of direct loans, syndicated loans, 
and interbank lending (Bank for International Settlement, 2015). Please refer to Appendix B1 in Chapter 
3 for further information about CBS’s structure. 
Though not originally designed with the borrower perspective in mind, BIS CBS statistics are one of the 
few publicly available sources to provide information on the reliance of a borrower country on foreign 
bank credit (Cerutti et al., 2012). However, one limitation of CBS is that its data are subject to break-in-
series and exchange-rate adjustment. To rule out this concern, following Karolyi et al. (2018), the chapter 
checked and ensured that the reported statistics for the sampled countries do not exceed 100% increase in 
their absolute values.  
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of CLAIM are associated with more participation in international banking activities and 
greater financial integration.   
The construction of CLAIM follows the approach of a popular de facto measure 
in the international finance literature, namely TOTAL to proxy for financial integration. 
TOTAL is the ratio of the sum of the gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, 
which is based on the External Wealth of Nations Database (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2007). With regard to the construction approach, being similar to TOTAL, CLAIM is a 
stock measure.15 With regard to the scope of measurement, while TOTAL is an 
aggregated index reflecting the overall integration (in various aspects, such as FDI, equity 
investment, external debt, and official reserves), CLAIM focuses on the international 
banking activities with its data sourced from BIS CBS.  
In comparison to de jure indicators of financial liberalization, such as the 
KAOPEN index from Chinn and Ito (2008) or the Index of Economic Freedom from The 
Heritage Foundation, the quantity-based de facto indicator (i.e. the foreign claims of 
international banks obtained from BIS) is more dynamic and updated more frequently.16 
CLAIM is particularly relevant to this study, as the sampled countries have experienced 
rapid growth in financial integration (see Figure 1.1) and are highly divergent in the level 
 
15 Some studies, such as Houston et al. (2012) and Karolyi et al. (2018), also use BIS CBS to construct a 
flow measure. Specifically, international banking flow is measured as the difference in the natural 
logarithm of outstanding foreign claims between year t and t-1. As the chapter measures the level of 
financial integration in the banking sector, it follows the approach of TOTAL to construct a stock measure. 
More importantly, stock measures capture the progress of financial integration better than flow measures 
(Kose et al., 2009). To explain, the latter can fluctuate markedly due to changes in short-term market 
conditions (García-Herrero and Wooldridge, 2007) and investor sentiment (Agénor, 2001) and is also 
prone to measurement errors (Kose et al., 2009). 
16 The de jure indicators are more static. For instance, the KAOPEN index for China remains the same 
during the period 1993–2014 despite some of its liberalized milestones, such as joining the World Trade 
Organization in 2001 or the full openness to foreign bank entry in 2007. The Index of Economic Freedom 
scores of some countries, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, are also quite static during the sample 
period (the associated statistics and analysis are available upon request). 
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of financial integration; thus, CLAIM better captures this growth and this heterogeneity 
(see Section 2.4).   
2.3.4 Bank Sample  
An unbalanced sample of 3,628 bank-year observations (about 386 banks) from 
nine countries in East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) during the period 1997–2014 is examined. 
Bank-level data are obtained from Bankscope. The chapter starts with all bank 
specialisations in the database, then excludes non-commercial banks. The chapter also 
excludes banks with less than three years of available financial data to compute input 
prices and outputs of the cost frontier as well as bank-specific variables. During the 
period, a number of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and bank failures took place, 
which are taken into account in the dataset. Specifically, both active and inactive banks 
were included in the dataset so as to avoid selection bias. Unconsolidated statements are 
preferred in order to reduce the possibility of aggregation bias in the results (if 
unconsolidated statements are unavailable, then consolidated data are used instead). All 
monetary values were deflated by using a GDP deflator, with 2010 as the base year. 
Finally, all bank-level data are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5th percentile to 
account for extreme values and unobservable data errors.  
2.4 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. Most variables have 
high variation, as the reported standard deviations are much higher than the mean values. 
The examined period of 1997–2014 spans the two financial crises. The sample also 
includes nine countries that have differences in their national banking systems, adding to 
the variability in the data.  
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Cost frontier variables     
TC (total cost, $bill.) 99.25 366.86 0.00 2,900.00 
Q1 (total loans, $bill.) 861.90 3,333.44 0.01 27,000.00 
Q2 (total securities, $bill.) 280.44 1,073.41 0.00 8,200.00 
W1 (price of funds %) 9.57 33.26 0.49 474.68 
W2 (price of physical capital %) 1.17 1.04 0.07 8.82 
W3 (price of labour %) 0.95 0.73 0.05 5.89 
Inefficiency terms     
CLAIM (integration %) 34.31 42.74 3.36 290.07 
FOR (financial integration %) 28.26 15.82 0.00 76.00 
CRERISK (credit risk %) 4.74 7.14 0.09 52.26 
CAP (equity ratio %) 10.80 8.25 -15.40 56.00 
SIZE (size) 6.25 6.00 -4.49 17.58 
IFL (inflation %) 5.55 7.55 -3.95 58.39 
PRICRE (private credit %)  86.77 46.74 19.85 233.66 
CON (concentration %) 65.68 15.23 35.98 100.00 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. There are 3,628 
bank-year observations for nine sampled countries (including China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) during 1997–2014. Variables TC, Q1, and 
Q2 are reported in their absolute values (in US$ billions, deflated by the US GDP deflator with base 
year 2010). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Other variables are reported in their relative 
values (%). For the definition and construction of the variables, see Table 2.1. 
 
  Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3 provide detailed statistics for financial integration 
variables (CLAIM and FOR). As clearly seen, there exists heterogeneity in the level of 
financial integration among the sampled countries. In terms of CLAIM (see Panel A, 
Figure 2.2), Hong Kong and Singapore, being the regional financial hubs, have a large 
percentage of foreign claims to GDP (above 150%). Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, and the 
Philippines have a relatively high proportion of foreign claims (under 50%), while the 
ratios in Indonesia and Vietnam are lower (under 20%) and China’s is the lowest (8.3%). 
In terms of foreign bank penetration (see Panel B, Figure 2.2), Hong Kong and Singapore 
are the most open countries toward foreign banks, accounting for 70% and 54% of the 
total number of banks, respectively. For the remaining sampled countries, foreign banks 
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penetration is more evident in Malaysia and Indonesia (about 30%) than in Thailand, 
China, Vietnam (around 17%), and the Philippines and Korea (about 14%). Based on the 
descriptive summary of CLAIM and FOR in Table 2.3, Hong Kong and Singapore are 
grouped together. Both countries have a higher level of financial integration. The 
remaining countries in the sample are assigned to the low-financial-integration group. In 
the low-group countries, China and Vietnam are the least financially integrated.  
Table 2.4 reports the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients of the variables. 
There are no concerns regarding multi-collinearity, since none of the correlations exceed 
80%. This is also confirmed by the reported variance inflation factors (VIFs) tests.17  
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of financial integration indicators by country 
  CLAIM FOR 
   Mean Std. Min Max Mean    Std.     Min  Max 
China 8.30 2.41 3.36 12.36 17.56 4.87 6.00 21.00 
Hong Kong 187.83 38.05 147.63 290.07 71.71 2.53 67.00 76.00 
Indonesia 19.77 9.8 13.04 51.66 38.05 9.27 26.00 50.00 
Malaysia 50.41 6.62 34.01 58.81 32.47 5.65 25.00 42.00 
Philippines 21.39 5.28 14.19 29.44 13.77 1.84 11.00 17.00 
Korea 23.05 6.87 13.67 37.74 14.03 5.29 6.00 19.00 
Singapore 147.59 27.92 123.44 231.35 54.07 3.96 43.00 58.00 
Thailand 28.78 8.1 19.16 50.65 18.13 5.96 0.00 25.00 
Vietnam 16.04 5.1 6.68 22.07 17.52 5.58 9.00 24.00 
Full sample 34.31 42.74 3.36 290.07 28.26 15.82 0.00 76.00 
High group 171.52 39.58 123.44  290.07 64.65 9.21 43.00 76.00 
Low group 23.32 14.79 3.36 58.82 25.18 11.96 0.00 50.00 
The table reports the descriptive statistics (by country and by group of countries) for the financial 
integration indicators as CLAIM (the ratio of foreign claims of international banks to GDP) and FOR (the 
ratio of number of foreign banks to total number of banks). The high-group countries include Hong Kong 
and Singapore. The remaining countries are in the low group. Std. refers to standard deviation, Min and 





17 The VIF test is based on the linear regression with the dependent variable being Total Cost and the 
independent variables being other environmental variables. 
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Table 2.4: The pairwise correlation among variables 
 SIZE CRERISK CAP CON IFL PRICRE CLAIM FOR    VIFs 
SIZE 1.0000        
 
   1.05 
CRERISK -0.0861** 1.0000       
 
   1.18 
CAP -0.1290*** -0.0412** 1.0000      
 
   1.01 
CON -0.1120*** 0.0348** -0.0299* 1.0000     
 
   1.55 
IFL  0.0783*** 0.3125*** -0.0840*** -0.1857*** 1.0000    
 
   1.28 
PRICRE -0.0837*** -0.1619*** -0.0644*** 0.2428*** -0.3225*** 1.0000   
 
   1.69 
CLAIM -0.1223*** 0.0513*** 0.1238*** 0.4936*** -0.0974*** 0.3899*** 1.0000  
 
   3.81 
FOR -0.0349** -0.0370** 0.2303*** 0.1434*** -0.0558*** -0.0062 0.6709*** 1.0000 
 
   2.58 
The table reports the Pearson rank correlation coefficients between environmental variables as determinants of inefficiency term. Additionally, the table also reports variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) for these variables. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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2.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
2.5.1 The Cost Frontier and Cost Efficiency Score  
Table 2.5 presents the coefficients and their significance level based on Equations 
(2.6) to (2.8).18 The models estimate the cost frontier and the effects of environmental 
variables on μit and σ
2
it at the same time. To proxy for financial integration, CLAIM is 
used in Model 1, while FOR is used in Model 2. In general, the results of the two models 
are quite consistent in terms of the sign and significance of the coefficients.  
Regarding the cost frontier, all coefficients for the outputs and input prices as well 
as their squared terms are positive and highly significant in both models. This implies 
that higher input prices and higher outputs lead to an increase in total costs. Additionally, 
the significant impact of technological change is also found in the cost frontier. A 
negative and significant time trend is followed by a positive and significant quadratic 
time trend. This implies that at first, total costs are decreasing due to technological 
progress, then increasing as the consequence of technological regress later. The dummy 
variable HIGH is negative and insignificant.  
In the non-monotonic efficiency effect models, the coefficients from the function 
of μit and σ
2
it cannot be used to interpret the economic significance of the determinants 
of bank inefficiency.19 In fact, coefficient estimation is more relevant to making decisions 
about the inclusion or exclusion of the variable to improve the fit of the model. The 
marginal effects should be used to draw an economic interpretation from the analysis 
 
18 Before running the SFA model, a Fisher test developed by Maddala and Wu (1999) is used to check for 
the time series stationarity (T=19 years). The test is based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and could 
be used for unbalanced panel data. With regard to the (unreported) unit root test, the null of non-stationary 
is rejected at the 1% level for all variables used in the model. 
19 Equations (2.4) and (2.5) show that the marginal effect depends on the slope coefficients from both the 
mean and the variance functions (expressed via δ[𝑘] andγ[𝑘]) and an adjustment function. Thus, the signs 
of the marginal effects do not necessarily coincide with the signs of either of the slope coefficients obtained 




(see Section 2.3.1), bearing in mind that the marginal effects of each determinant depend 
on both the mean and variance functions and do not necessarily have the same sign as 
the coefficient estimates.  
Berger and Mester (1997) indicated that cost efficiency is represented as the 
percentage of efficient usage of costs. As reported at the back of Table 2.5, the average 
cost efficiency score of the sample is 66.54% and 69.76% for Models 1 and 2, 
respectively. This implies that banks, on average, can improve their costs by about 30% 
relative to the best-performance bank in the sample. These estimates are broadly 
comparable with those reported in cross-country analysis studies of Asia banks, such as 
Sun and Chang (2011). 
Table 2.5: Estimation results for the cost frontier 
The dependent variable (TC) frontier 
    Model 1      Model 2  
Coefficients Coefficients 
Ln(Q1) 0.6980*** 0.6807*** 
Ln(Q2) 0.2961*** 0.3093*** 
Ln(W1/W3) 0.5591*** 0.5400*** 
Ln(W2/ W3) 0.2060*** 0.1926*** 
Ln(Q1)2 0.0661*** 0.0647*** 
Ln(Q1) ln(Q2) -0.1332*** -0.1316*** 
Ln(Q2)2 0.0662*** 0.0658*** 
Ln(W1/W3)2 -0.0554*** -0.0569*** 
Ln(Q1) ln(W1/W3) 0.0265*** 0.0205*** 
Ln(Q2) ln(W1/W3) -0.0211*** -0.0155 
Ln(W2/W3)2 0.0419*** 0.0508*** 
Ln(Q1) ln(W2/W3) -0.0377*** -0.0337*** 
Ln(Q2) ln(W2/W3)  0.0407*** 0.0346*** 
Ln(W1/W3) ln(W2/W3) 0.0248 0.0356** 
t -0.1062*** -0.1367*** 
t2 0.0026*** 0.0037*** 
HIGH  -0.0412 -0.0162 
cons 0.6927*** 0.9135*** 
effects on μit   
CLAIM -0.0190***  
FOR  -0.0416*** 
SIZE  0.0045 0.0412* 
CRERISK -0.0723*** -0.1637*** 
CAP -0.0250*** -0.0382*** 
CON -0.0091*** 0.0028 
50 
 
IFL 0.0757*** 0.1167*** 
PRICRE 0.0082*** -0.0032 
year1997 -0.0825  -0.7984 
year1998 -1.8905*** -4.4281*** 
year1999  0.3239 0.0101 
year2007 -0.2264 -0.1455 
year2008 -0.5896*** -1.2142*** 
year2009  0.0350 -0.0017 
Constant 0.3260 0.3481 
effects on σ2it   
CLAIM 0.0130***  
FOR  0.0218*** 
SIZE -0.0295*** -0.0479*** 
CRERISK 0.0409*** 0.0489*** 
CAP 0.0172*** 0.0092* 
CON 0.0124*** 0.0039 
IFL -0.0278*** -0.0099 
PRICRE -0.0029** 0.0076*** 
year1997 -0.6429**  -0.1368 
year1998 1.1129*** 1.0366*** 
year1999 -0.0502 0.1042 
year2007 0.6072*** 0.3609 
year2008 0.5641*** 0.5170*** 
year2009  -0.2038 -0.0955 
Constant -2.0656*** -1.9421*** 
σv -2.8058
*** -2.7133*** 
Log-likelihood -1944.21 -1832.78 
Efficiency mean  0.6654  0.6976 
Efficiency std. 0.1831 0.1828 
The table reports the stochastic cost frontier estimated from Equations 2.6–2.8. The dependent 
variable is Total Costs comprising interest expenses and non-interest expenses for each sample 
bank. The output variables include Q1 (total loans) and Q2 (total securities). The input prices 
include W1 (price of funds), W2 (price of physical capital). These variables are scaled by W3 
(price of labour) to ensure the price homogeneity condition. Determinants of μit and σ2it are 
defined as in Table 2.1. CLAIM and FOR are used as the indicator of the financial integration in 
Models 1 and 2, respectively. It is noted that in the non-monotonic SFA models, the coefficients 
from the function of μit and σ2it typically do not have a good interpretation for the economic 
significance of the inefficiency’s determinants. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
2.5.2 The Marginal Effects of Determinants of the Inefficiency Term  
In Table 2.6, the (average) marginal effects are reported for both the mean and 
variance of the inefficiency term. The mean function illustrates the impact of the 
environmental Zit variable on the expected level of inefficiency, while the variance 
function explains its contribution toward the cost performance’s uncertainty. Model 1 
and Model 2 are quite consistent across all the variables in terms of sign and significance 
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level, suggesting the results are robust for different measures of financial integration. 
Sections 2.5.2.1 and 2.5.2.2, respectively, discuss in detail the marginal impact of 
financial integration indicators (CLAIM and FOR) and credit risk (CRERISK) across 
their average and other percentile values to highlight their non-monotonic impact on the 
inefficiency term. Section 2.5.2.3 analyses the marginal impact of other variables (only 
at their average value) on the inefficiency term.20   




The marginal impact 
Model 2 
The marginal impact 
on E(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u) 
CLAIM -0.0036** 0.0004   
FOR   -0.0021** 0.0010 
CRERISK -0.0157*** 0.0001 -0.0190*** -0.0035* 
SIZE -0.0055 -0.0049* -0.0054* -0.0064*** 
CAP -0.0047** 0.0006 -0.0051*** -0.0013 
CON -0.0002 0.0013 0.0017 0.0010 
IFL 0.0201*** 0.0027 0.0207*** 0.0076*** 
PRICRE 0.0022*** 0.0003 0.0015*** 0.0013** 
year1997 -0.1840** -0.1263 -0.2005 -0.0943 
year1998 -0.4015** 0.0104 -0.5967*** -0.1542 
year1999 0.1026 0.0240 0.0320 0.0223 
year2007 0.0660 0.0881** 0.0742 0.0621 
year2008 -0.0730 0.0430 -0.0968 0.0056 
year2009 -0.0367 -0.0338 -0.0277 -0.0198 
This table reports the (average) marginal impact of determinants (Z) on the mean and variance of the 
inefficiency term, i.e. E(uit) and V(uit), respectively. The marginal effect is calculated based on 
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) after the estimation of cost frontier and is observation-specific. The marginal 
effect measures how an increase in the Z variable changes the expected inefficiency and cost uncertainty. 
A positive sign indicates that the Z variable increases cost inefficiency, suggesting a decrease in cost 
efficiency. The significance levels are calculated based on the bootstrapping confidence intervals and 
standard errors produced from 1,000 replications. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
20 By graphing the marginal effect of Zit variables and their own value (for instance “the marginal effect of 
CLAIM” against “CLAIM”), the non-monotonic impact of CLAIM, FOR and CRERISK on the 




2.5.2.1 The non-monotonic impact of financial integration on the inefficiency term 
Table 2.7 reports the sample mean of the marginal effect of financial integration 
indicators on the inefficiency term, as well as the average marginal effect of the 25th, 50th, 
75th, and 90th percentile (ordered by value of the marginal effect). The impact on the 
mean of the inefficiency term is shown by the significant and non-monotonic relationship 
reported in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 2.7. The marginal effect of CLAIM holds its 
negative value through to the 75th percentile, but then becomes positive at the 90th 
percentile (for the case of FOR, the 50th and 75th percentile, respectively). Specifically, 
at the 25th percentile, a 1-percentage-point increase in CLAIM reduces total cost 
approximately by 0.67%.21 As we move from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile, 
the benefit diminishes substantially. At the 90th percentile, an increase in CLAIM 
increases total cost approximately by 0.18%. In the case of FOR, the efficiency reduction 
starts at the 75th percentile. To assist the interpretation of the findings, the top left-hand 
panel of Figure 2.3 roughly points out the turning point of the marginal effect when the 
value of CLAIM reaches 100% (interpreted as the ratio of the foreign claims to the GDP 
country; see Section 2.3.3). This means that policy makers should be concerned when 
the foreign banking claims reach this level, as they may become detrimental to cost 
efficiency. Similarly, when more than 40% of banks are owned by foreign investors, the 
level of inefficiency rises (see the bottom left-hand panel of Figure 2.3).  
 
21 The negative sign of the marginal effect of the Z variable on E(u) implies that Z does not cause an 
overuse of inputs, which in turn helps to lower costs (and vice versa). In other words, the negative sign 
indicates the decrease in inefficiency level, which suggests an increase in cost efficiency. With regard to 
the economic impact, the percentage increase in costs due to inefficiency could be obtained based on the 
approximation formula: u=ln(actual cost/minimum cost). For instance, the average marginal effect of the 
first quantile is (-0.0067); this means that a 1-percentage-point increase in CLAIM is translated into a 





To summarise, the results imply that at first, the foreign banking capital and 
foreign bank presence provide competitive incentives for managers to be cost-effective 
(Lin et al., 2016; Casu et al., 2016). Further, the significant impact of technological 
change found in the sample’s cost frontier suggests that financial integration induces 
technological and managerial spill-overs that transform the cost efficiency of the 
domestic banking sector. However, at higher levels of financial integration, additional 
costs will be incurred from updating bank products and services to keep up with greater 
competition or managing excess risk-taking behaviour due to the open financial market 
(Fries and Taci, 2005; Lensink et al., 2008; Casu and Girardone, 2009). These findings 
lend support to H1 and the theoretical prediction of Allen et al. (2011) on the non-
monotonic impact of financial integration on bank cost efficiency (see Section 2.2). 
Regarding the impact of CLAIM (FOR) on the variance of the inefficiency term, 
only the positive impact is significant. Cost performance becomes more variable for 
banks operating in more competitive and financially integrated systems.  
Table 2.7: The non-monotonic impact of financial integration indicators on the 
inefficiency term 
Statistics 
The marginal impact of CLAIM The marginal impact of FOR 
on E(u) on V(u)     on E(u) on V(u) 
Average -0.0036
** 0.0004 -0.0021** 0.0010 
25th per. -0.0067
** -0.0009 -0.0042*** -0.0009 
50th per. -0.0024
** -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0002 
75 per. -0.0003 0.0002 0.0018
** 0.0013** 
90 per. 0.0018
** 0.0016*** 0.0045*** 0.0037*** 
This table reports the marginal impact of financial integration indicators (at the average, 25th, 50th, 75th, 
and 90th percentile levels ordered by the value of the marginal effect) on the mean and variance of the 
inefficiency term, i.e. E(uit) and V(uit), respectively. The change in the sign of the marginal effect across 
the percentiles illustrates the non-monotonic impact of financial integration on cost efficiency. The 
significance levels are calculated based on the bootstrapping confidence intervals and standard errors 






Panel A: CLAIM (Model 1) 
                      Marginal effect on E(uit)             Marginal effect on V(uit) 
  
Panel B: FOR (Model 2) 
                      Marginal effect on E(uit)            Marginal effect on V(uit) 
  
Figure 2.3: The non-monotonic impact of financial integration indicators on the 
mean and variance of the inefficiency term 
2.5.2.2 The non-monotonic impact of credit risk on the inefficiency term  
Although not central to the chapter’s analysis, the potential for a non-monotonic 
impact of credit risk on the inefficiency term is also explored, thereby shedding light on 
a related literature. There is a significant and non-monotonic effect of credit risk on the 
mean of the inefficiency term. From Table 2.8, CRERISK exercises a negative influence 
at the 75th percentile and below; the impact becomes positive at the 90th percentile. Figure 
2.4 identifies the turning point when CRERISK is around 30%. There is a positive 
relationship between credit risk and cost efficiency when CRERISK < 30%. This result 
is in line with the hypothesis of “skimming behaviour” (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
Under this hypothesis, cost efficiency can be achieved through less stringent loan 











































































































































problem loans.22 However, at a certain level of credit risk (our results suggest > 30%), a 
further increase in credit risk causes cost efficiency to deteriorate, as banks start 
allocating more resources to screen and deal with bad debts.   
As most of the previous studies employ the monotonic efficiency effect models, 
the negative association between credit risk and efficiency is often reported, as in 
Gardener et al. (2011) and Casu et al. (2016). The notable exception is Sun and Chang 
(2011), who also employ Wang’s (2002) model to examine the impact of bank risks on 
cost efficiency in emerging Asian countries during 1998–2008. Sun and Chang (2011) 
report an overall negative association between credit risk and cost efficiency. Further, 
they find a non-linear relationship; specifically, the magnitude (but not the sign as under 
the non-monotonic relationship) of the impact varies with the level of credit risk. 
Together with Sun and Chang (2011), the chapter highlights the importance of applying 
non-monotonic models to provide new insight into the existing relationship between 
variables.23 
With respect to the variance of the inefficiency term, CRERISK also exerts a non-
monotonic impact. Below the 75th percentile, an increase in credit risk leads to less 
variance in cost performance. After the 90th percentile, higher credit risk results in more 




22 Tests of the causal relationship between bank risk and bank efficiency (as in Berger and DeYoung, 1997, 
and Fiordelisi et al., 2011) are used to better understand the nature of this relationship. Both studies find 
that a decline in bank efficiency precedes an increase in bank risk. 
23 The chapter conducts the same robustness tests as described in Section 2.5.4 on the non-monotonic 
impact of credit risk on bank cost efficiency. Findings from these robustness tests are provided in Appendix 
A1. Most of the models confirm the existence of the non-monotonicity except for the first model (i.e. 
Column 1 in Table A1). 
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on E(u)      on V(u)     on E(u)       on V(u) 
Average -0.0157*** 0.0001 -0.0190*** -0.0035 
25th per. -0.0271*** -0.0045** -0.0265*** -0.0094*** 
50th per. -0.0109*** -0.0023** -0.0102*** -0.0033** 
75 per. -0.0031 -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0008 
90 per. 0.0042* 0.0046*** 0.0039* 0.0039** 
This table reports the marginal impact of credit risk (at the average, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile 
levels, ordered by the value of the marginal effect) on the mean and variance of inefficiency term, i.e. 
E(uit) and V(uit), respectively. The change in the sign of the marginal effect across the percentiles 
illustrates the non-monotonic impact of credit risk on cost inefficiency. The significance levels are 
calculated based on the bootstrapping confidence intervals and standard errors produced from 1,000 
replications. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: CRERISK (Model 1) 
                       Marginal effect on E(uit)                          Marginal effect on V(uit) 
  
Panel B: CRERISK (Model 2) 
                       Marginal effect on E(uit)                          Marginal effect on V(uit) 
 
 
Figure 2.4: The non-monotonic impact of credit risk on the mean and variance of 








































































































































2.5.2.3 The marginal impact of other determinants on the inefficiency term  
Table 2.6 reports the (average value of) marginal impact of other determinants on 
the inefficiency term. In detail, SIZE has a negative relationship with the mean of the 
inefficiency term. In other words, bigger banks taking advantage of economies of scale 
are more efficient than smaller banks. The result is consistent with the existing literature, 
such as Barth et al. (2013b) and Luo et al. (2016). Additionally, big banks also experience 
less variability in their cost efficiency because their market power enables them to 
manage the unfavourable external influence on cost structure. Further, economies of 
scope and scale may produce more stable incomes, as envisioned in the universal banking 
model. 
Regarding the equity ratio (CAP), there is a significant and negative relationship 
with the mean of the inefficiency term. In other words, banks holding more equity capital 
are more cost-efficient. From the viewpoint of depositors, these banks are considered less 
risky; thus, they are able to access funds at lower cost. Similarly, thinly capitalized banks 
may be charged a higher cost of funds, resulting in lower cost efficiency (Gardener et al., 
2011; Barth et al., 2013b). The impact of CAP on the variance of inefficiency is 
insignificant in both models.  
Inflation (IFL) has a significant and positive impact on both the mean and 
variance of the inefficiency term. Higher inflation leads to a higher and more variable 
cost efficiency because banks need to increase their interest rates on customer deposits 
in line with the increasing rate of inflation (Gardener et al., 2011). Inflation is also 
associated with higher transaction costs and uncertainty, thus contributing to greater 
inefficiency.  
Consistent with Pasiouras et al. (2009), higher private sector credit, PRICRE 
ratios, leads to greater bank inefficiency and more variability. The mean value of 
58 
 
PRICRE is 84%. The corporate sector of the sampled East Asian countries is highly 
reliant on bank loans. Banks are less motivated to control their cost structure relative to 
financial systems where they compete more with capital markets.  
The effect of a three-year window around the Asian and global financial crisis is 
quite consistent in both models. As the sample includes those countries worst hit by the 
Asian financial crisis, business shrinkage resulting in a material drop in bank output 
(synonymous with an increasing cost efficiency level) may have had an impact. However, 
Asia was less influenced by the global financial crisis, which only significantly increases 
the variance of cost performance in 2007.  
2.5.3 Country-level Analysis of Financial Integration’s Marginal Impact  
Table 2.9 reports the marginal impact of financial integration indicators on the 
mean of the inefficiency term at the country level. The impact is different for the sampled 
countries. The negative marginal impact of integration on the inefficiency level implies 
that the majority of banks operating in China, Vietnam, and Korea benefit from financial 
integration. CLAIM exerts an efficiency-impeding effect on most of the banks based in 
Hong Kong and Singapore (in the case of FOR, also for Malaysia).  The marginal impact 
is mixed in the rest of the sample, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
These results confirm that banks based in countries with a lower level of integration 
benefit from financial integration. In contrast, financial integration negatively affects the 
cost efficiency of banks operating in countries with higher levels of financial integration. 
These findings once again lend support to H1 and the proposition by Allen et al. (2011) 
that the marginal benefits of integration are likely to be large, while the costs are probably 
small at low levels of integration. 
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Table 2.9: A country-level analysis of financial integration indicators on the mean 
of the inefficiency term 
Panel A: Marginal impact of CLAIM on E(uit)  
Country mean p25 p50 p75 p90 
China -0.0094** -0.0130*** -0.0100** -0.0067** -0.0022 
Hong Kong 0.0066 0.0044** 0.0057** 0.0076  0.0100 
Indonesia -0.0028 -0.0040 -0.0025* -0.0011 0.0003 
Malaysia -0.0010 -0.0014* -0.0007 0.0005 0.0012 
Philippines -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0004 0.0005  0.0016** 
Korea -0.0054** -0.0073** -0.0058** -0.0035** -0.0020 
Singapore 0.0050*** 0.0032** 0.0040** 0.0056**  0.0080** 
Thailand -0.0017** -0.0033*** -0.0015** -0.0001 0.0009 
Vietnam -0.0103*** -0.0154*** -0.0097*** -0.0061*** -0.0030 
 
Panel B: Marginal impact of FOR on E(uit) 
Country mean p25 p50 p75      p90 
China -0.0030** -0.0049 -0.0024 -0.0006 0.0013 
Hong Kong 0.0094*** 0.0061*** 0.0076*** 0.0101***        0.0140*** 
Indonesia -0.0018 -0.0022** -0.0001 0.0011        0.0024*** 
Malaysia 0.0026 0.0011 0.0020 0.0032*        0.0053*** 
Philippines -0.0023 -0.0043** -0.0015 0.0005        0.0021*** 
Korea -0.0062*** -0.0084*** -0.0052*** -0.0022*   -0.0004 
Singapore 0.0044** 0.0027* 0.0038** 0.0055***        0.0080*** 
Thailand 0.0008 -0.0010 0.0011 0.0022**        0.0039*** 
Vietnam -0.0160*** -0.0218*** -0.0133*** -0.0066***     -0.0036** 
This table reports the marginal impact of CLAIM in Panel A and the marginal impact of FOR in Panel 
B on the mean of the inefficiency term at the country level. The significance levels are calculated based 
on the bootstrapping confidence intervals and standard errors produced from 1,000 replications. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
2.5.4 Robustness Tests of the Impact of Financial Integration  
This section provides findings from robustness tests on the non-monotonic impact 
of financial integration on bank cost efficiency. The first set of tests are conducted under 
a different sub-sampling strategy. The first test is conducted by applying Wang’s (2002) 
model only for the low-group countries (specifically, all sampled countries excluding 
Hong Kong and Singapore). This is to address the concern that the non-monotonic 
relationship between financial integration and cost efficiency may originate from the 
heterogeneity in the level of financial integration between the two groups of countries 
(low-integration and high-integration). The non-monotonic impact of CLAIM and FOR 
on the inefficiency level is observable in Columns (1) and (3) in Table 2.10, which reports 
Equations 2.6–2.8 for the low-integration countries. The magnitude of the marginal 
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impact of financial integration indicators, in general, is higher than the baseline model’s 
result. In other words, the impact of financial integration on cost efficiency in the low-
group countries is more evident than in the whole sample. Moreover, Panel A of Figure 
2.5 roughly shows that the turning point for the marginal impact of CLAIM on the 
inefficiency level occurs at 55%, while the turning point for FOR remains at 40%. 
Regarding other determinants of inefficiency, the impact of market concentration (CON) 
becomes positive and significant in both models, implying that the higher market 
concentration exerts a negative impact on cost efficiency in the low-group countries. The 
result is consistent with the ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis’, which suggests that banks with 
market power are exempt from the pressure of competition to control costs (Casu and 
Girardone, 2009; Lin et al., 2016). 
Financial crises may exert potential changes in banking technologies and 
structures.  Hence, the next robustness test splits the examined time horizon into two 
periods, specifically around the Asian (1997–2006) and the global financial crisis (2007–
2014). The non-monotonic relationship between the financial integration indicators and 
inefficiency as well as their turning points are consistently in line with the baseline result. 
However, when the global financial crisis is sampled separately (see Columns (9) to (12) 
in Table 2.10), its impact becomes more manifest. The crisis increases not only cost 
performance variability but also cost inefficiency in 2007. The result implies that banks 
in the sampled countries, though not being directly affected by the global financial crisis, 
still incurred certain costs to protect them against financial contagion as a result of their 





Table 2.10: Sub-sampling robustness tests for the impact of financial integration 
Statistics 
Low-group countries The Asian financial crisis period (1997–2006) The global financial crisis period (2007–2014) 
Model 1 (CLAIM) 
The marginal impact 
Model 2 (FOR) 
The marginal impact 
Model 1 (CLAIM) 
The marginal impact 
Model 2 (FOR) 
The marginal impact 
Model 1 (CLAIM) 
The marginal impact 
Model 2 (FOR) 



























            
Average -0.0069*** 0.0058*** 0.0020 0.0010* 0.0108*** -0.0019 -0.0011 0.0042** -0.0034*** 0.0016 -0.0021 0.0012 
25th per. -0.0320*** 0.0010*** -0.0038*** -0.0006 -0.0147*** -0.0057*** -0.0017 0.0001 -0.0083*** -0.0001 -0.0050* 0.0001 
50th per. -0.0060*** 0.0020*** 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0027*** -0.0009* 0.0035*** 0.0020** -0.0025** 0.0003 -0.0019 0.0005 
75th per. 0.0077*** 0.0042*** 0.0033 0.0021 0.0013* 0.0008* 0.0072** 0.0043*** -0.0002 0.0010*** -0.0003 0.0009* 
90th per. 0.0239*** 0.0172*** 0.0054** 0.0040** 0.0055*** 0.0038* 0.0137* 0.0121*** 0.0022** 0.0020*** 0.0015* 0.0016 
CRERISK -0.176*** -0.0011 -0.0184** -0.0049*** -0.0066* 0.0001 -0.0194** -0.0046 -0.0191** 0.0042 -0.0111 0.0040 
SIZE 0.0044* -0.0014 -0.0031 -0.0038** -0.0041 -0.0036 -0.0031 -0.0041* -0.0075 -0.0069* -0.0123 -0.0074*** 
CAP -0.0032** 0.0007 -0.0051*** -0.0011 -0.0055*** -0.0023 -0.0062** -0.0032** -0.0065*** 0.0032 -0.0081*** 0.0024 
CON 0.0022*** 0.0025*** 0.0029* 0.0015 0.0013 -0.0013 0.0021*** 0.0001** -0.0099*** -0.0050 -0.0086*** -0.0026 
IFL 0.0200*** 0.0021 0.0223*** 0.0086*** 0.0142*** 0.0049* 0.0092 0.0042 0.0201** -0.0005 0.0212*** 0.0032 
PRICRE 0.0016*** 0.0009 0.0026*** 0.0044*** -0.0006 0.0007* -0.0009* -0.0003 0.0046*** 0.0015*** 0.0053*** 0.0037*** 
year1997 -0.1220* -0.1311 -0.1913 -0.1022 -0.3993*** -0.3371*** -0.2702 -0.1856     
year1998 -0.0891 -0.1528* -0.6539*** -0.2069 -0.0621 -0.0918 -0.0076 -0.0079     
year1999 0.1049 -0.0253 0.0144 0.0157 0.0966 0.0205 0.0705 0.0442     
year2007 0.0200 0.0148 0.0466 0.0291     0.1710** 0.1669* 0.0960 0.1512** 
year2008 -0.0334 0.0218 -0.1203 -0.0221     0.0293 0.1020 0.01987 0.0584 
year2009 -0.0277 0.0119 -0.0420 -0.0124     0.0294 0.0029 -0.0123 -0.0116 
This table reports results from several robustness tests including the modelling on the sample of low-group countries (Columns 1 to 4), the Asian (Columns 5 to 8) and the global financial crisis 
(Columns 9 to 12). The table reports the marginal impact of financial integration indicators and other determinants on the mean and variance of the inefficiency term i.e. E(uit) and V(uit) 
respectively. The former is reported at the average, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile levels; the change in the sign of the marginal effect across the percentiles illustrates the non-monotonic 
impact of financial integration on cost efficiency. The marginal effect of other determinants is only reported at the average value; a positive sign indicates the Z variables increase cost 





Panel A: Low group country sampling Panel B: The Asian financial crisis (1997-2006) sampling 
Marginal effect of FLOW1 on E(uit) Marginal effect of FOR1 on E(uit) Marginal effect of FLOW1 on E(uit) Marginal effect of FOR1 on E(uit) 
 
 
   
Panel C: The global financial crisis sampling (2007-2014)  











In the second set of robustness tests, additional control variables are included in 
the inefficiency equations (Equations 2.7 and 2.8) to account for the cross-country 
difference in regulations and policies. After controlling for these variables, the non-
monotonic impact of CLAIM and FOR on the inefficiency level is still observable, as 
seen across columns in Table 2.11. The associated graphs illustrating the marginal impact 
of financial integration on the mean of the inefficiency term also consistently confirm the 
turning points of 100% (CLAIM) and 40% (FOR) obtained in the original results.24 The 
first variable (REGQ) is taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators to proxy for 
the country’s regulation quality. REGQ measures the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that promote market 
competition and the private sector environment. As reported in Columns (1) to (4), better 
regulation quality is associated with more bank efficiency. The second variable (ACTR) 
is extracted from Barth et al. (2013a) to proxy for the overall restrictions on bank 
engagement in fee-based activities and ownership of non-financial firms.25 As reported 
in Columns (5) to (8), stringent restrictions on activities negatively affect bank cost 
efficiency. The impact of REGQ and ACTR on the level of the efficiency term is 
consistent with the findings of Pasiouras et al. (2009), Barth et al. (2013b), and Haque 
and Brown (2017). More noteworthy, both REGQ and ACTR significantly increase the 
variance of the inefficiency term. Regardless of the impact of regulations and policies on 
the level of cost efficiency, they always come at the cost of increasing variability in the 
cost structure of banks. This finding highlights the advantage of Wang’s (2002) model, 
 
24 These graphs are available upon request. 
25 Other aspects of bank regulations and supervision to indicate the private monitoring and power of 
supervisory authorities (as in Barth et al., 2013b, and Luo et al., 2016) are also examined. The impact of 
financial integration on bank cost efficiency remains non-monotonic in these robustness tests. The results 
are not reported to save space, but available upon requests. Additionally, due to missing data, the 
simultaneous inclusion of all three regulation variables results in the substantial loss of data, which likely 
renders the running of the complex ML estimation. Accordingly, the chapter does not include the three 
variables at once in the model. 
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which provides additional insight into the impact of regulations and policies not only on 
the level but also on the variance of inefficiency.  
In Columns (9) to (12), the chapter directly addresses the concern that integration-
friendly policies could also exert a positive impact on bank efficiency by including the 
capital account openness measure (KAOPEN). At the same time, a dummy variable 
(ODUM) is included to proxy for foreign and domestic bank ownership in the 
inefficiency equation. Countries with integration-friendly policies are likely to have 
higher foreign bank presence. Foreign banks are generally more efficient than their 
domestic counterparts (Detragiache et al., 2008; Doan et al., 2018). Taken together, the 
banking system in countries which support integration will be more efficient. After 
controlling for this concern, the marginal impact of CLAIM and FOR on bank 
inefficiency remains non-monotonic. The negative marginal impact of KAOPEN on the 
level of inefficiency implies that higher capital account openness is associated with 
higher bank efficiency, although the impact is insignificant. This could be explained by 
the fact that the de facto measure of integration, such as CLAIM and FOR, already 
captures the realized benefit from the country’s opening of its capital account. 
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Table 2.11: Robustness tests with regulations and policies control variables (for the impact of financial integration) 
 Regulation quality  Activities restrictions  Capital account openness and bank ownership 
Model 1 (CLAIM) 
The marginal impact 
Model 2 (FOR) 
The marginal impact 
Model 1 (CLAIM) 
The marginal impact 
Model 2 (FOR) 
The marginal impact 
Model 1 (CLAIM) 
The marginal impact 
Model 2 (FOR) 



























            
Average -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0017 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0029*** 0.0026 0.0027*** 0.0002 0.0014 0.0040*** 0.0014*** 
25th per. -0.0032*    -0.0001 -0.0065 0.0001 -0.0016*** 0.0007*** -0.0014 0.0005 -0.0013 0.0003 -0.0020** 0.0003*** 
50th per. 0.0001     0.0001 0.0009 0.0008*** 0.0022*** 0.0014*** 0.0031*** 0.0017*** 0.007 0.0005 0.0041*** 0.0005*** 
75th per. 0.0008     0.0005* 0.0029*** 0.0019*** 0.0031*** 0.0024*** 0.0049*** 0.0034*** 0.0017*** 0.0010 0.0059*** 0.0010*** 
90th per. 0.0014*     0.0010** 0.0052*** 0.0039*** 0.0043*** 0.0038*** 0.0081*** 0.0076*** 0.0033*** 0.0023 0.0093*** 0.0023*** 
REGQ -0.4520 0.0440* -0.4296 0.0284*         
ACTR     0.0588*** 0.0329*** 0.0023 0.0097*     
ODUM         -0.0765 0.0041* -0.0793 -0.0073 
KAOPEN         -0.6756 -0.2241 -0.7244 -0.2545 
CRERISK -0.0103    0.0025* -0.0077 0.0033** 0.0025 0.0034** 0.0037** 0.0032** -0.0240*** -0.0014 -0.0244 -0.0017 
SIZE -0.0065   -0.0042 -0.0068 -0.0053 -0.0097 -0.0104 -0.0085 -0.0065 -0.0062*** -0.0063** -0.0064 -0.0060 
CAP -0.0051    0.0010 -0.0049 0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0011 -0.0041*** 0.0001 -0.00045 -0.0006 
CON -0.0015   -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0037* -0.0038 -0.0057 -0.0025* -0.0009* 0.0013* 0.0002* 0.0025*** 
IFL 0.0056*   0.0001 0.0054 0.0007 0.0085 0.0169* 0.0350*** 0.0155 0.0193*** 0.0027* 0.0196*** 0.0033** 
PRICRE 0.0031***   0.0006* 0.0031*** 0.0012***   0.0025*** 0.0021*** 0.0045*** 0.0029*** 0.0006** 0.0001* 0.0011*** 0.0005** 
Year 
control 
      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports results from adding additional control variables to Equations (2.7) and (2.8), specifically variables to indicate Regulation Quality (Columns 1 to 4), Activities restrictions 
(Columns 5 to 8) and Capital account openness and bank ownership (Columns 9 to 12). Other model specifications remain unchanged; dummies year countries are included but not reported. 
The table reports the marginal impact of financial integration indicators and other determinants on the mean and variance of the inefficiency term, i.e. E(uit) and V(uit), respectively. The 
former is reported at the average, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile levels; the change in the sign of the marginal effect across the percentiles illustrates the non-monotonic impact of financial 
integration on cost efficiency. The marginal effect of other determinants is only reported at the average value; a positive sign indicates the Z variables increase cost inefficiency. The significance 
levels are calculated based on the bootstrapping confidence intervals and standard errors produced from 1,000 replications. Significance level *10%; **5%, ***1%. 
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In the last set of robustness tests, the chapter addresses some arguments about the 
concept of financial integration. First, one may argue that CLAIM and FOR represent 
different aspects of financial integration. Both measures are now included in one model. 
The non-monotonic impact of both CLAIM and FOR is still observable (as seen in Panel 
A, Table 2.12). Lastly, a popular de facto measure, namely TOTAL, is used to proxy 
financial integration. TOTAL is the ratio of the sum of the gross stocks of foreign assets 
and liabilities to GDP, which is based on the External Wealth of Nations Database (Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). The result in Panel B (Table 2.12) also confirms the non-
monotonic relationship between TOTAL and cost efficiency. However, the marginal 
impact of TOTAL on the inefficiency level is approximately 0.0001 across the 
percentiles, translating into an increase or decrease of total cost by 0.01%. The negligible 
impact of TOTAL probably originates from its definition, since it includes all types of 
foreign assets, liabilities, and capital flows, including portfolio equity, debt, derivatives, 
and foreign exchange reserves. As such, CLAIM and FOR are much better measures of 
financial integration in the banking sector.  
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Table 2.12: Robustness tests on the measurement of financial integration (for the impact of financial integration) 
 Panel A: CLAIM and FOR   Panel B: TOTAL 









CLAIM    TOTAL   
Average -0.0057 -0.0009*  Average -5.9E-05    6.29E-06 
25th per. -0.0084    -0.0028  25th per.   -8.8E-05*    -2.03E-05* 
50th per. -0.0033    -0.0011  50th per.   -3.0E-05    -3.94E-06 
75th per. -0.0008*    -0.0002*  75th per.    1.35E-05     1.29E-05 
90th per. 0.0010*     0.0008  90th per.    6.39E-05*     5.62E-05* 
FOR       
Average -0.0019* 0.0015*     
25th per. -0.0043 -0.0009     
50th per. -0.005  0.0001     
75th per. 0.0018*     0.0011*     
90th per. 0.0041***     0.0032***     
CRERISK -0.0127     0.0005*  CRERISK   -0.0144    -0.0021*** 
SIZE -0.0059    -0.0087  SIZE -0.0072***    -0.0045* 
CAP -0.0042    -0.0006*  CAP   -0.0027    -0.0006* 
CON 0.0003*    -0.0004*  CON   -0.0012     0.0021*** 
IFL 0.0213***     0.0060**  IFL      0.0160***     0.0049*** 
PRICRE 0.0016***     0.0013***  PRICRE     0.0025***     0.0007 
Year control         Yes        Yes  Year control       Yes         Yes 
Panel A reports results from the inclusion of both CLAIM and 
FOR in Equations (2.7) and (2.8). Other model specifications 
remain unchanged. The table’s description is similar to the 
above-reported ones. Significance level *10%; **5%, ***1%. 
 Panel B reports results from the inclusion of TOTAL- another de 
facto measure of financial integration in Equations (2.7) and 
(2.8). Other model specifications remain unchanged. The table’s 
description is similar to the above-reported ones. Significance 




2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
This chapter explored how financial integration has affected bank cost efficiency 
by applying the non-monotonic stochastic frontier model developed by Wang (2002) on 
a sample of commercial banks from nine East Asian countries over the period 1997–
2014. The results can be summarised as follows. The marginal effect of the two financial 
indicators of integration (measured via the ratio of the foreign claims to GDP and the 
percentage of foreign banks) on the mean of the inefficiency term is non-monotonic. In 
other words, financial integration initially contributes to the improvement in cost 
efficiency, but eventually this reverses and financial integration reduces bank cost 
efficiency. The models suggest these turning points occur when more than 40% of banks 
are foreign and the foreign claims of international banks exceed 100% of GDP. In the 
sub-sample of low-integration countries, the turning point of the foreign banks ratio is 
40% and the foreign claims ratio is 55%. 
The change in the sign of the marginal effect of financial integration across its 
level has important policy implications. The revision by policy makers, such as the IMF, 
about the need for full capital financial liberalization would seem to be justified – crudely 
put, financial integration is a good thing but only up to a point and, increasingly, 
multinational organisations such as the IMF recognise this. As such, the chapter’s results 
provide robust empirical evidence to support their more nuanced policy stance since the 
1990s. This is relevant to Asia, as it increasingly becomes more financially and 
economically integrated. Policy makers should be aware that an ‘optimal’ level of 
financial integration exists. For example, policy makers in Malaysia and Indonesia 
should take a cautious approach in moving forward with further financial integration in 
terms of foreign bank penetration, as the current levels of FOR in these countries are 
quite close to the ‘optimal’ level of 40% (as reported by this study). On the other hand, 
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further integration should be beneficial for countries such as China, Vietnam, Thailand, 
and the Philippines, as their current ratios of foreign bank penetration are well below the 
40% ‘optimum’. 
Another important result from the chapter is that financial integration increases 
the variance of the inefficiency term. Higher financial integration is associated with 
greater cost performance variability. This is because banks are operating in more flexible 
and open financial systems.  
Overall, this chapter provides consistent and robust evidence of a non-monotonic 
impact of financial integration on bank cost efficiency. This has implications for others 








APPENDIX A1: ROBUSTNESS TESTS ON THE NON-MONOTONIC IMPACT OF CREDIT RISK ON BANK COST 
EFFICIENCY 
Table A1: Sub-sampling robustness tests (for the impact of credit risk) 
Statistics 
Low-group countries The Asian financial crisis period (1997–2006) The global financial crisis period (2007–2014) 
Model 1 (CLAIM) Model 2 (FOR) Model 1 (CLAIM) Model 2 (FOR) Model 1 (CLAIM) Model 2 (FOR) 
The marginal impact The marginal impact The marginal impact The marginal impact The marginal impact The marginal impact 
on E(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u) on V(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CRERISK             
Average -0.018*** -0.001 -0.018*** 0.005*** -0.007 0.000 0.019*** -0.005 -0.019** 0.004 -0.011 0.004 
25th per. -0.032*** -0.002*** -0.023*** -0.009*** -0.010* -0.004 -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.040*** -0.001 -0.024 0.000 
50th per. -0.015*** -0.001 -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.001 0.000 -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.014* 0.000 -0.010 0.001 
75th per. -0.007*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.003** 0.002*** -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.003 
90th per. -0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.003* 0.005 0.006* 0.004 0.006* 
This table reports results from several robustness tests including the modelling on the sample of low-group countries (Columns 1 to 4) and the Asian (Columns 5 to 8) and the global financial 
crisis (Columns 9 to 12). The table reports the marginal impact of credit risk (CRERISK) on the mean and variance of the inefficiency term, i.e. E(uit) and V(uit) at the average, 25th, 50th, 75th, 











Table A2: Robustness tests with regulations and policies control variables (for the impact of credit risk) 
  
Regulation quality  Activities restrictions  Capital account openness and bank ownership 
Model 1 (CLAIM) Model 2 (FOR) Model 1 (CLAIM) Model 2 (FOR) Model 1 (CLAIM) Model 2 (FOR) 
The marginal impact The marginal impact The marginal impact The marginal impact The marginal impact The marginal impact 
on E(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u) on V(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u) on E(u) on V(u) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
CRERISK             
Average -0.0103*** 0.0025* -0.0077**  0.0033*  0.0025 0.0034* 0.0037*** 0.0032** -0.0240*** -0.0014 -0.0244***   -0.0017 
25th per. -0.0261*** -0.0015*  -0.0190** -0.0012 -0.0014 0.0006 -0.0025* 0.0012* -0.0395*** -0.0071*** -0.0393*** -0.0072*** 
50th per. -0.0029 0.0001  -0.0006  0.0006  0.0024 0.0013 0.0035*** 0.0024** -0.0140*** -0.0031** -0.0137***  -0.0031*** 
75th per. 0.0028 0.0022*** 0.0035*  0.0027***  0.0038*   0.0026* 0.0049*** 0.0034** -0.0040** -0.0005  -0.0042**   -0.0004 
90th per. 0.0062** 0.0049*** 0.0073***  0.0056***  0.0055** 0.0049*** 0.0072** 0.0070***   0.0049*** 0.0043*** 0.0044**    0.0043*** 
This table reports results from adding additional control variables to Equations (2.7) and (2.8), specifically variables to indicate Regulation Quality (Columns 1 to 4), Activities restrictions 
(Columns 5 to 8), and Capital account openness and bank ownership (Columns 9 to 12). The table reports the marginal impact of credit risk (CRERISK) on the mean and variance of the 
inefficiency term, i.e. E(uit) and V(uit) at the average, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile levels. Other descriptions are similar to Table 2.11’s. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 












Table A3. Robustness tests on the measurement of financial integration (for the impact of credit risk) 
  
Panel A: CLAIM and FOR     Panel B: TOTAL 
The marginal impact   The marginal impact 
on E(u) on V(u)   on E(u) on V(u) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
CRERISK    CRERISK   
Average -0.0127*** 0.0005  Average -0.014*** -0.002 
25th per. -0.0208** -0.0061***  25th per. -0.019** -0.006*** 
50th per. -0.0066 -0.0018*  50th per. -0.009* -0.003** 
75th per. 0.0009 0.0010  75th per. -0.002 0.000 
90th per. 0.0073*** 0.0056***  90th per. 0.004** 0.004* 
Panel A reports results from the inclusion of both CLAIM and FOR in 
Equations (2.7) and (2.8). Other descriptions are similar to Table 2.12’s. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B reports results from the inclusion of TOTAL – another de 
facto measure of financial integration in Equations (2.7) and (2.8). 
Other descriptions are similar to Table 2.12’s. ***, **, and * indicate 






CHAPTER 3: LOANS FROM MY NEIGHBOURS: EAST ASIAN 
COMMERCIAL BANKS, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, AND 
BANK DEFAULT RISK  
3.1 INTRODUCTION 26 
East Asia is an economically dynamic region of growing importance to the international 
financial system and the global economy. Unsurprisingly, East Asia has become 
increasingly integrated with the global financial system (World Bank, 2018; Asian 
Development Bank, 2018). The trend is apparent from the large increase in foreign 
banking claims to East Asia for the period 1999–2014, depicted in Figure 3.1. The trend 
also stands against the backdrop of the Asian financial crisis that led to high-profile bank 
defaults and a painful economic contraction in many East Asian economies (Asian 
Development Bank, 2008). Thus, the current development of financial integration in East 
Asia has attracted continued academic and policy interest in studying the benefits and 
costs of financial integration with regards to financial stability. 
 
An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Vietnam Symposium in Banking and Finance (VSBF 
2019, Hanoi, Vietnam) and at the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) and Singapore Management 





This figure reports the total foreign claims (in US$ billions) extended to each recipient country 
in the sample during 1999–2014. The source (lender) countries include 31 countries who report 
to BIS (see Appendix B1). Types of reporting banks include (i) domestic banks (controlled by 
parent entities with the same country code as the reporting country); (ii) banks located in the 
reporting country, but controlled by parents entities located in non-reporting countries; (iii) 
banks controlled by parent entities located in the reporting country but not consolidated by 
their parent. Source: Compiled from BIS Consolidated on Immediate Counterparty basis 
(CBS-IC), bank type “All excluding 4C banks, excluding domestic position”. 
Figure 3.1: Total foreign banking claims on each country in the sample  
Further examination of the statistics of foreign banking claims to East Asia 
reveals two other interesting facts. When the source country of claims is considered, as 
seen in Figure 3.2, there is a steady growing share of foreign claims extended by Asian 
banks, especially after the global financial crisis. This fact, likely follows from efforts, at 
least in part, to promote intra-regional integration in East Asia (starting with the Chiang 
Mai Initiative in 2000, the Asian Bond Markets Initiative in 2003, and culminating with 
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This figure reports the foreign claims (in US$ billions) extended to all sampled countries and 
broken down by lenders’ nationality during 1999–2014. The source (lender) countries include 
31 countries who report to BIS (see Appendix B1). Reporting Asian lenders include Australia, 
Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and (South) Korea. Only one type of reporting 
bank is considered: domestic banks (controlled by parent entities with the same country code 
as the reporting country). Source: Compiled from BIS Consolidated on Immediate 
Counterparty basis (CBS-IC), bank type “Domestic banks, excluding domestic position”. 
 
Figure 3.2: The foreign banking claims on the sampled countries by lenders’ 
nationality  
Another decomposition of foreign banking claims is based on the methods of 
extension. International banks can extend claims locally through their branches and 
subsidiaries established in recipient countries; alternatively, they can extend claims 
across borders by financing and booking their claims from outside these recipient 
countries (García-Herrero and Martínez Pería, 2007). As seen in Figure 3.3, local claims 
account for the majority of claims. This fact represents efforts by international banks to 
obtain ‘local’ knowledge via affiliate presence. In short, these additional facts motivate 
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This figure reports the foreign claims (in US$ billions) extended to all sampled countries and 
broken down by methods of extension during 2005–2014. The source (lender) countries is 
similar to CBS-IC; except for the three countries including Brazil, Mexico, Luxembourg do 
not report in the CBS-UR. (see Appendix B1). These source countries could extend claims 
either via their local affiliates set up at the recipients countries (local claims) or across border 
(cross-border claims). Only one type of reporting banks are considered: domestic banks 
(controlled by parent entities with the same country code as the reporting country). Source: 
Compiled from BIS Consolidated on Ultimate Risk basis (CBS-UR), bank type “Domestic 
banks, excluding domestic position”. 
Figure 3.3: The foreign banking claims on the sampled countries by methods of 
extension  
Thus, this chapter investigates what impact financial integration has on bank 
default risk in recipient countries and explores whether that relationship is moderated by 
the type of financial integration. In the latter case, and as its title intimates, the chapter 
explores whether foreign banking claims from ‘neighbours’ have a preferential impact 
on bank default risk. Specifically, two definitions of ‘neighbours’ are adopted: (i) banks 
from other Asian countries and (ii) foreign banks’ presence via a full affiliate office in 
the recipient countries.  
More specifically, and considering East Asian countries as the foreign claims 
recipients, the first research question states: “How does financial integration affect 
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ambiguous. Lower bank default risk could be derived from monitoring and competition 
channels. Specifically, banks in the recipient countries are subject to the external 
monitoring exercised by international banks (Allen et al., 2011). Furthermore, banks in 
the recipient countries are also under pressure to improve their risk management and 
credibility to compete with international banks in providing funds to domestic borrowers 
(Agénor, 2001). However, it may also be the case that international capital flows generate 
excessive liquidity in the recipient countries, which could aggravate bank agency 
problems, leading to higher bank risks (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Acharya and 
Naqvi, 2012). Empirical evidence on the relationship is relatively scant. Existing research 
focuses on the impact of financial liberalization (notably Cubillas and González, 2014) 
and the effect of foreign bank presence (such as Claessens et al., 2001; Wu et al., 2017) 
on bank risks. Closely related work by Dinger and Kaat (2017) reports that inflows of 
foreign capital lead to higher impaired loans. This contrasts with Karolyi et al. (2018), 
who show that cross-border banking flows lower bank systemic risk. This chapter 
contributes to the empirical evidence on the relationship between financial integration 
and bank default risk using a sample of commercial banks in East Asia, a dynamic and 
growing region that relies increasingly on foreign claims from international banks.  
The study then decomposes the measure of total foreign claims based on lenders’ 
nationality. The second research question explores the difference between the impact of 
the foreign claims extended by Asian neighbours and non-Asian lenders on bank default 
risk. Thus, the second research question states: “Does regional lending affect recipient 
country bank default risk differently to non-regional lending?” Evidence of information 
asymmetry associated with the distance between lenders and borrowers is well 
documented in the literature (Brennan and Cao, 1997; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; and 
Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2012). Prior studies also specify the concept of ‘distance’ as 
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being either cultural and geographic distance (Detragiache et al., 2008) or institutional 
distance between home and host countries (Mian, 2006). Therefore, the a priori 
expectation is that Asian international banks possess an informational advantage due to 
the geographical, cultural, and institutional proximity with their regional borrowers. This 
informational advantage creates an effective discipline mechanism and a strong 
competitive pressure over banks in the recipient countries, thus leading to lower risk-
taking behaviour. Although the rationale for expecting regional banking claims to lead 
to lower bank default risk relative to non-regional claims is highly intuitive, there is 
currently no research that has examined this possibility.  
The third research question tests if the methods of claims extension affect bank 
default risk differently. This relates to the second definition of ‘neighbours’ – namely, 
the term applies when an international bank has a fully functioning affiliate in the 
recipient country. This leads to the third research question: “Do local claims affect 
recipient country bank default risk differently to cross-border claims with no-local 
presence?” Foreign claim extension via local affiliates involves foreign direct 
investment in the host country’s financial sector (García-Herrero and Martínez Pería, 
2007). This type of investment incorporates ownership, lessening the information 
asymmetry and facilitating closer borrower monitoring (Neuman, 2003). Additionally, 
the presence of foreign banks also engenders competition in the recipient countries’ 
banking market, which is demonstrated to lower bank risk-taking (Faia and Ottaviano, 
2017). A priori, it is reasonable to expect that local claims from foreign banks should 
lower bank default risk in the recipient countries. Again, despite this expectation being 
highly intuitive, there is no empirical evidence testing the differential impact of cross-
border versus local claims of foreign banks on bank default risk. This study addresses 
this gap in the literature.  
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The chapter constructs an unbalanced sample of commercial banks from eight 
countries in East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, 
Singapore, and Thailand) during the period 1999–2014. Each research question is tested 
using a dynamic panel data model of bank default risk. The two-step system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) is used to estimate this dynamic relationship. The dependent variable, bank 
default risk, is measured by the z-score, which is interpreted as the number of standard 
deviations by which returns must decrease to wipe out all equity owned by the bank (Roy, 
1952).  
This chapter sources data to construct its measures of financial integration from 
the Consolidated Banking Statistics (CBS) published by the Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS). Data for the first two research questions rely on the Intermediate 
Counterparty (IC) version of CBS. To address the first research question, the chapter 
constructs the overall measure of financial integration from the total foreign claims that 
are extended by all international banks (regardless of their nationality and methods of 
extension) to the sampled East Asian countries. Actually, this measure is the variable 
CLAIM previously employed in Chapter 2. To address the second research question, the 
total foreign claims are decomposed into the foreign claims extended by international 
banks whose nationality are Asian and non-Asian. The classification, based on the 
nationality of international banks, captures geographic closeness and cultural and 
institutional similarity between lenders and borrowers. Data for the third question draw 
on the break-down of foreign claims into cross-border claims and local claims from the 
Ultimate Risk (UR) version of CBS.  
The main result from this chapter is that financial integration (measured via the 
total foreign claims of international banks) lowers bank default risk in the recipient 
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countries. This effect is primarily driven by the foreign claims extended by Asian lenders 
and the foreign claims extended via local affiliates. The findings remain robust when an 
alternative measure of bank risk (i.e. profit volatility) is employed or a different sub-
sampling strategy (i.e. domestic banks or low-financial-integration countries) is 
conducted. Overall, this chapter reports robust evidence that the foreign claims extended 
by Asian lenders and the foreign claims extended via local affiliates contribute to the 
stability of the banking system in the East Asian recipient countries.  
The chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. The first 
research question sheds light on the debate about the impact of financial integration and 
international capital on financial stability. Research by Cubillas and González (2014) and 
Wu et al. (2017) confirm that financial liberalization and foreign bank presence increase 
bank risk-taking in emerging countries. Similarly, several empirical studies establish the 
connection between international capital flows, credit growth, and lower credit quality or 
even the incidence of financial crisis (e.g. Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Acharya and 
Naqvi, 2012; Dinger and Kaat, 2017). In contrast, this chapter focuses on the impact of 
financial integration measured via the foreign claims extended by international banks and 
documents a positive effect on banking stability (lower bank default risk) in the recipient 
countries. This finding complements Karolyi et al. (2018), who find that cross-border 
banking flows help to lower bank systemic risks at the country level.  
The second and third research questions relate to the literature on the distance 
constraint between providers and recipients of funds. In the context of international 
equity portfolio investment, the theoretical model and empirical evidence of Brennan and 
Cao (1997) suggest that foreign investors are less informed about the foreign markets 
than the local investors, which could affect their investment returns. Similarly, foreign 
banks lending in poor countries face severe information asymmetry due to the 
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geographic, cultural, and institutional distance between home and host countries (Mian, 
2006; Detragiache et al., 2008). In the bank loan market, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012) 
report higher loan spreads between distant borrowers and lenders due to the costs of 
gathering soft information. Evidence from these studies implies that information 
asymmetry decreases when the borrowers’ and lenders’ proximity increases. This chapter 
uses the context of foreign claims extended from international banks, taking the 
viewpoint of the recipient countries, to make the definition of ‘closeness’ or ‘neighbours’ 
more direct. Specifically, ‘closeness’ refers to the fact that foreign claims are extended 
by regional lenders or via local affiliates established in the recipient countries.  
The findings are useful in guiding important policy decisions affecting the design 
of a financial integration strategy within East Asia, and potentially in other regions. To 
maintain the financial stability of their banking systems, these countries should favour 
either the foreign claims extended by Asian lenders or foreign claims extended via local 
branches of international banks established in their countries. The former option is 
synonymous with the promotion of intra-regional financial integration. This implication 
is meaningful because intra-regional finance still lags behind trade, both in terms of the 
level of integration and the benefits of risk-sharing (Ng and Yarcia, 2014). The latter 
option implies that where foreign claims come from outside East Asia, policy makers 
should encourage presence through local affiliates, as this has an equivalent impact.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3.3 outlines the empirical methodology. 




3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The first research question examines the impact of financial integration 
(measured via the total foreign claims from international banks) on bank default risk in 
the recipient countries. The existing theoretical and empirical literature suggests that 
financial integration can both lower and increase bank default risk.  
On the one hand, lower bank default risk could arise from different channels, 
including funding diversification, competition, monitoring, and regulation self-
improvement. With regard to the first channel, domestic banks can be funded by either 
retail deposits or international interbank borrowing. The latter may serve as an alternative 
source of funding in the event of local shocks (Allen et al., 2011). Second, foreign capital 
could create healthy competition among the different providers of financing, leading to 
the threat of ‘flight to quality’ (Agénor, 2001). In other words, banks in the recipient 
countries are under pressure to improve their risk management and credibility to compete 
with international banks who provide another source of finance for domestic borrowers.  
The third channel relates to the monitoring of international banks. East Asian 
borrowers received large volumes of foreign claims from international banks, especially 
after the global financial crisis (World Bank, 2018). The substantial exposure to the 
region encouraged international banks to monitor their interbank loans, contributing to 
the improved recipient country bank stability. Recent empirical evidence documenting 
this monitoring channel is provided by Karolyi et al. (2018). The authors attribute the 
stabilizing impact of cross-border banking flows to the oversight provided by lending 
banks located in countries with better regulatory quality relative to banks in recipient 
countries with weaker regulatory and supervisory systems.  
The last channel leading to lower bank default risk relates to the improved 
prudential bank regulation and supervision implemented by the recipient countries on 
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their own accord. A theoretical framework of capital mobility and reform, developed by 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2005), shows that the receipt of foreign capital may pressure 
policy makers in host countries to adopt better governance practices. These actions can 
also attract foreign lending and support policies to avoid capital flight. Similarly, 
international banking flows are greater and more beneficial for countries meeting certain 
‘thresholds’ of macroeconomic and institutional quality (Kose et al., 2011; Claessens, 
2017). In a similar vein, recipient countries are motivated to improve their own regulatory 
requirements to capitalise on the benefits of financial integration.  
On the other hand, financial integration can increase recipient country bank 
default risk via excessive liquidity and regulation arbitrage. International capital inflows 
(as a result of capital account openness and financial liberalization) may generate 
excessive liquidity in the recipient countries (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). Acharya 
and Naqvi (2012) further posit that this excessive liquidity aggravates bank agency 
problems, leading to the relaxation in lending standards, and higher bank risks. Houston 
et al. (2012) conjecture that banks tend to transfer funds to countries with fewer 
regulations. Consistent with this regulation arbitrage motive, Ongena et al. (2013) find 
that banks operating in countries with tighter bank restrictions and higher capital 
requirements tend to make riskier loans abroad. This behaviour has the potential to 
destabilize the recipient countries’ financial system. 
The sampled East Asia countries in this chapter are developed (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Korea) and emerging (Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Thailand, and the 
Philippines). The former group already have a developed regulatory system in place; the 
latter, induced by the lessons from the Asian financial crisis, also have formed an 
improved system to regulate international banking capital flows (Asian Development 
Bank, 2008). This helps to alleviate the concern over the regulation arbitrage and excess 
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liquidity. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 (H1) states: “Financial integration significantly 
lowers bank default risk in the recipient countries.” 
 The following two research questions address whether the impact of financial 
integration on bank default risk is moderated by the type of foreign claims. In this 
context, and more generally, it is worth observing that the empirical evidence on the 
relationship between financial integration and bank default risk is relatively scant. The 
existing literature mainly studies the relationship between financial liberalization or 
foreign bank presence and bank risks (such as Claessens et al., 2001; Cubillas and 
González, 2014; and Wu et al., 2017). Notably, Cubillas and González (2014) find that 
financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed and developing 
countries via improved competition and more risk-taking opportunities. Similarly, Wu et 
al. (2017) document that the risk of domestic banks increases with the presence of foreign 
banks in the emerging host economy. In contrast to the de jure indicator of financial 
liberalization (i.e. the capital account openness or the Index of Economic Freedom) used 
in Cubillas and González (2014) or the foreign bank penetration ratio used in Wu et al. 
(2017), this chapter measures financial integration via the total foreign claims extended 
by international banks, and this provides a new de facto approach to examine the impact 
of financial integration on bank risks.  
Contrasting evidence from working papers directly examining the impact of 
international capital on recipient country bank risks highlights the need for further 
research. Dinger and Kaat (2017), using a sample of 11 countries in the Eurozone area, 
find that inflows of foreign capital (measured via a country’s negative account balance) 
lead to higher loan-to-asset ratios and impaired loans. In contrast, Karolyi et al. (2018) 
document evidence that heightened cross-border banking flows lower bank systemic 
risks in 114 recipient countries. This chapter contributes to the current literature by 
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providing additional evidence on the impact of foreign claims from international banks 
on default risk at the individual bank level for a sample of East Asian banks.  
More specifically, the second research question addresses whether the impact of 
financial integration on bank default risk differs due to the source countries of the foreign 
claims. International banks that extend claims to East Asia will seek to monitor and 
discipline the recipients of funds. However, informational disadvantages and higher 
monitoring costs mean that non-Asian international banks will exercise less effective 
monitoring power compared with their Asian counterparts. This is confirmed by several 
seminal studies, such as Brennan and Cao (1997), Petersen and Rajan (2002), and 
Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2012). These studies purport that lenders face greater 
information asymmetry and costly monitoring for distant borrowers. Large institutional, 
cultural, and geographic distances also heighten the loss of relationship lending between 
loan officers and management (Mian, 2006; Detragiache et al., 2008). Conversely, Asian 
international banks are informationally advantaged. The information advantage results 
from their familiarity with the cultural, legal, political, and economic environments of 
the recipient countries (Mian, 2006; Claessens and Van Horen 2014b). In addition to the 
regional specific knowledge, the information advantage is inherent to the local business 
relationship (Buch et al., 2012).27  
Information advantage allows Asian lenders to do a better job of monitoring 
claims extended to regional borrowers. Furthermore, regional knowledge enables Asian 
lenders to compete better with banks in the recipient countries as providers of finance. 
Therefore, the benefit of the monitoring and competition channel in lowering bank 
 
27 To explain, Asian international banks follow the footsteps of domestic corporate customers going abroad 
to set up their foreign branches (Molyneux et al., 2013). Due to the lending relationship set up in home 
countries, Asian international banks have the informational advantage to serve these customers in new host 
markets. This informational advantage become greater when the trade and FDI linkage within the region 
is increasingly strengthened (Asian Development Bank, 2018). 
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default risk outlined in the first hypothesis becomes stronger in the case of Asian claims. 
In other words, the receipt of Asian claims is expected to lead to lower bank default risk. 
Hence, Hypothesis 2 (H2) states: “Foreign claims extended by Asian banks, as distinct 
from claims extended by non-Asian banks, significantly lower bank default risk in the 
recipient countries.”  
The third research question aims to test whether the impact of financial 
integration on bank default risk is different across methods of extension, namely local 
claims and cross-border claims. Neumann (2003) argues that portfolio debt flows 
(relative to equity flows and FDI) do not incorporate ownership and thus augment 
manager control, increasing the severity of information asymmetry. This also holds true 
in the context of local claims and cross-border claims; the former involves some forms 
of FDI in the host country’s financial sector, while the latter does not (García-Herrero 
and Martínez Pería, 2007). In short, the asymmetric information is more pronounced for 
cross-border claims. Therefore, the monitoring and discipline of international banks over 
cross-border claims will be less effective, meaning that banks in recipient countries are 
likely to take on more risks than they might otherwise.   
If international banks set up their affiliates to extend their claims to the recipient 
countries, there are additional benefits arising from the competition between domestic 
and foreign banks. Claessens et al. (2001) empirically show that multinational banks 
stimulate healthy competition among local banks in host countries. The dynamic 
multinational banking model of Faia and Ottaviano (2017) specifically links tougher 
local competition from global bank entry in retail banking to less risk-taking for the host 
banking system. Following this line of reasoning, the a priori expectation is that claims 
extended via local affiliates will lower recipient country bank default risk in the recipient 
countries. Thus, Hypothesis 3 (H3) states: “Foreign claims extended via local affiliates 
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of international banks, as distinct from cross-border claims, significantly lower recipient 
country bank default risk.” 
As previously noted, there is limited empirical evidence on the impact of foreign 
banking claims on recipient country bank default risk. Moreover, there is no study testing 
the differential impact of different types of foreign banking claims on bank default risk. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 addresses this gap in the literature.  
3.3 METHODOLOGY, VARIABLES, AND DATA  
3.3.1 Model Specification  
The chapter adopts a dynamic specification to model the determinants of bank 
default risk (as specified in Equation 3.1). The dynamic setting is appropriate since 
Berger et al. (2000) argue that the risk-return profile of banks shows a tendency to persist 
over time, reflecting impediments to market competition and information opacity.  
RISKijt = β0 RISKijt-q + β1 INTEGjt + βk BANKk ijt + βm COUNTRYm jt + θi + γj + µt + εijt        (3.1) 
In this specification, the bank default risk of bank i in country j at year t is written 
as a function of its past level (RISKijt-q, with q being lag length), financial integration 
(INTEG), a vector of k bank-level variables reflecting the characteristics of each bank i 
(BANK), and a vector of m variables reflecting the macroeconomic condition relevant to 
all banks, including bank regulation and supervision for any given country j 
(COUNTRY). θi is the bank-specific fixed effect to control for unobserved factors that 
do not change over time for each bank. γj and µt are the country and time dummies, 
respectively; εijt is the error term. All explanatory variables enter the estimation of 
equations at the contemporaneous level based on the assumption that banks revise their 
targets during the estimation period (measured in years) in response to changes in their 
financial health as well as macroeconomic conditions. 
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To appropriately specify the lag order (q) in Equation 3.1, the moment selection 
criteria for GMM models developed by Andrews and Lu (2001) are employed. 
Specifically, the first-order dynamic panel (q=1) is the preferred model because it has the 
smaller Bayesian information criterion (BIC); the BIC value for the first- and second-
order panel model are -261.917 and -240.518, respectively.28 The first-order dynamic 
model of bank default risk is specified as in Equation 3.2. This specification is also in 
line with prior studies, such as Cubillas and González (2014), Agoraki et al. (2011), and 
Noman et al. (2018).  
RISKijt = β0 RISKijt-1+ β1 INTEGjt + βk BANKk ijt + βm COUNTRYm jt + θi + γj + µt + εijt       (3.2) 
3.3.2 Estimation Method 
The chapter employs the two-step system GMM developed by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) with finite-sample corrected standard errors 
as proposed by Windmeijer (2005). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) suggest employing the lagged first differences of the explanatory variables as 
instruments for the equation in levels and the lagged values of the explanatory variables 
in levels as instruments for the equation in differences.  
The system GMM helps to address several econometric issues. Specifically, the 
GMM provides an unbiased estimator for the dynamic panel data model with the 
presence of bank fixed effect. Due to the correlation between the fixed effects and the 
lagged dependent variable, the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is upward 
biased and inconsistent. The fixed effect (FE) method usually provides a downward-
biased estimator following Nickell’s (1981) finite-sample bias. More importantly, the 
GMM accommodates for possible endogeneity between bank default risk and other 
 
28 Additionally, in the second-order dynamic panel model, the signs of the lagged dependent variable are 




covariates in the model, which could affect the interpretation of the empirical results. For 
instance, contemporaneous bank-level regressors (BANKijt) are treated as being 
endogenous due to their simultaneous relationship with bank default risk. Among 
country-level regressors, financial integration (INTEGjt) and bank regulation and 
supervision variables are treated as being predetermined variables. To explain, a lower 
bank default risk (i.e. a stable financial system) in the recipient countries would attract 
higher foreign claims extended by international banks (Karolyi et al., 2018). Similarly, 
regulators could change their regulation and supervision to discipline bank risk-taking 
behaviour (Agoraki et al., 2011; Noman et al., 2018). Finally, other macroeconomic 
variables, time dummies, and country dummies are treated as exogenous variables.  
Before running the system GMM, a Fisher test developed by Maddala and Wu 
(1999) is used to check for the time series stationarity (T=17 years). The test is based on 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and could be used for unbalanced panel data. 
Additionally, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity is conducted to 
confirm the suspicion that bank-level control variables are endogenous.  
After running the system GMM, some post-diagnostic tests are also performed to 
make sure that the model is well specified and produces a consistent estimator.  First, the 
second-order (i.e. the AR(2)) Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test is used to detect the 
serial correlation of the residuals in the differenced equation. The AR(2) test has the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation.29 Second, the Hansen J-statistics tests the over-
identification and validity of the instruments under the null hypothesis that the 
‘instruments as a group are exogenous’. Third, the difference-in-Hansen test is also 
reported. This test is important but not often reported in publications (Roodman, 2009). 
 
29 By construction, the test for the first-order correlation (i.e. AR(1) process) in first differences usually 
rejects the null hypothesis. The expectation is that the AR(2) should be insignificant. 
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While the Hansen J-statistics tests for the joint validity of the full instrument set, the 
difference-in-Hansen checks the validity of the subset of instruments (specifically, the 
validity of differenced instruments for levels equation, and other sets of instruments for 
endogenous, predetermined, and exogenous explanatory variables).  
3.3.3 Variables and Data  
3.3.3.1 Bank default risk  
To measure bank default risk, the distance to default (z-score) is used. Z-score = 
(ROA+ CAP)/(Std.ROA), where ROA is the rate of return on assets, CAP is the equity 
capital to asset ratio, and Std.ROA is the standard deviation of ROA (Roy, 1952). To 
calculate the standard deviation of ROA, the three-consecutive-year moving window (i.e. 
year t-2, t-1, and t) rather than the full sample period is used.30 By its construction, Z-
score is interpreted as the number of standard deviations by which returns must decrease 
to wipe out all equity owned by the bank; Z-score can be viewed as the inverse of the 
probability of bank failure (Roy, 1952; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010). This means that a higher value of the Z-score suggests a lower exposure 
to default risk. As the distribution of the Z-score is highly skewed, following Laeven and 
Levine (2009), the natural logarithm of the Z-score is taken (LN(zscore)).  
3.3.3.2 Financial integration measures and data 
To address the first research question and H1, an overall measure of financial 
integration is constructed based on the foreign claims extended by international banks to 
 
30 The optimal length of ROA standard deviation’s window is not well  defined in the literature. Li et al. 
(2017) demonstrated the use of four- or five-year rolling window for New Zealand’s banks and suggested 
this window is long enough to capture change in bank risks. Bouvartier et al. (2018) report that the three-
year rolling window is the most popular option in the literature; furthermore, the three-year window 
outperforms the five-year one for the US and EU sample. Unfortunately, there has not been any discussion 
for the specific sample of Asian banks. The chapter follows Noman et al. (2018), which examines the 





the sampled (recipient) countries. Similar to Chapter 2, the chapter sourced these 
statistics from the CBS-IC and retained the computation procedure as described in 
Section 2.3.3.31 As these claims are extended by all lenders regardless of their nationality 
or methods of extension, the obtained value of claims after all these steps is regarded as 
the total foreign claims. The total foreign claims value is either scaled by the GDP of the 
corresponding sampled countries to construct the variable CLAIM (previously employed 
in Chapter 2) or transformed by taking the natural logarithm to construct an alternative 
measure of LN(claim). In short, both measures (CLAIM and LN(claim)) proxy for the 
total foreign claims on the sampled countries, which are extended by all lenders 
regardless of their nationality and methods of extension. Thus CLAIM and LN(claim) 
provide the baseline measure of INTEGjt in Equation 3.2. 
Question 2 and H2 test whether the source country of foreign claims matters in 
the impact of financial integration on bank default risk. To compute the foreign claims 
extended by Asian banks (or Asian claims, for short) and the foreign claims extended by 
non-Asian banks (or non-Asian claims, for short), the total foreign claims measure is 
classified by the nationality of the lenders.32 These statistics are then scaled by the GDP 
of the sampled countries (to construct ASIAN and NON_ASIAN, respectively) or 
transformed in a natural logarithm (to construct LN(asian) and LN(non_asian), 
respectively). Thus, these measures are alternative definitions of INTEGjt in Equation 
3.2. The break-down by nationality reflects the difference not only in geographic location 
 
31 Adding to the overall description provided in Section 2.3.3, Appendix B1 presents some caveats, which 
are helpful to further understand the structure of CBS with regard to its various reporting bases and types 
of reporting banks. 
32 The list of BIS-reporting countries is provided in Appendix B2. Based on the nationality of reporting 
banks, Asian source countries include Australia, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong SAR, India, Japan, (South) 
Korea, and Singapore. Non-Asian lenders mainly include European and North American advanced 
countries, such as the US, UK, Germany, France, etc. 
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but also in the source country characteristics, including culture and institutional quality 
(see Section 3.2).  
Question 3 and H3 examine the variation in the relationship between financial 
integration and bank default risk due to the difference in methods of extension of the 
foreign claims. The foreign claims could be classified as cross-border claims (i.e. claims 
extended from the banks’ headquarters and booked outside the recipient countries) or 
local claims (i.e. claims extended locally by international banks through the banks’ 
branches and subsidiaries in the recipient countries). The data for this break-down are 
sourced from the CBS-UR rather than the CBS-IC, as the latter does not provide a clear-
cut distinction between cross-border claims and local claims.33 In a similar approach to 
earlier, measures of cross-border claims and local claims are scaled by the GDP of the 
sampled countries (to obtain CROSS and LOCAL, respectively) or transformed in a 
natural logarithm (to obtain LN(cross) and LN(local), respectively). These provide the 
final definitions of INTEGjt in Equation 3.2. 
The difference in the available time periods and reporting basis between CBS-IC 
and CBS-UR prevents the analysis of local claims and Asian claims in a full parallel 
fashion. However, there is one scenario when local claims and Asian claims measure the 
same thing, which is when the majority of foreign affiliates/branches in the sampled 
countries are owned by Asian banks. To prove this is not the case, the database from 
Claessens and Van Horen (2015) on bank ownership is employed to examine the origin 
 
33 The CBS-IC reports the break-down of foreign claims into ‘international claims’ and ‘local claims in 
local currency’, in which international claims include both cross-border claims and local claim in foreign 
currency. In contrast, the CBS-UR separately reports cross-border claims and local claims. There are 
differences in the reporting basis of CBS-IC and CBS-UR. While CBS-IC looks at the immediate 
relationship between borrowers and lenders, CBS-UR tracks the counterparty who is ultimately responsible 
for servicing any outstanding obligations in the event of a default by the immediate borrower (Bank for 
International Settlement, 2015). Furthermore, CBS-UR is only available since 2005, while CBS-IC is 





of foreign banks in the sampled East Asian countries. First, the total number of foreign 
banks in these countries is computed. Then, the number of foreign banks owned by Asian 
BIS-reporting countries is calculated. In Korea, there are no foreign banks with origin 
from Asian BIS-reporting countries. The ratio of Asian foreign banks to total foreign 
banks varies among the rest of the group (as reported in Appendix B3). For instance, in 
Thailand, Indonesia, and China, nearly 50% of their foreign banks are Asian foreign 
banks, while in Hong Kong and Singapore, this figure is around 23%. In short, the data 
presented in Appendix B3 provide evidence that the two measures ‘local claims’ and 
‘Asian claims’ are distinctive but related measures of ‘closeness’ or ‘neighbours’.   
3.3.3.3 Control variables 
In line with the existing literature on the determinants of bank risks (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; and Beck et al., 2013), standard 
explanatory variables are included in Equation 3.2. The commonly used bank-level 
control variables include natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), equity to total assets 
ratio (CAP), ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans to proxy for credit risk 
(CRERISK), ratio of non-interest operating expenses to total assets to proxy for cost 
efficiency (COST), the share of non-interest income to total income to proxy for income 
diversification (INC_DIV), the ratio of demand deposits to total deposits to proxy for 
bank charter value34 (CHARTER), and a dummy variable to proxy for the foreign and 
domestic ownership of a bank (ODUM). Market concentration (CON), measured as the 
assets of the three largest banks to the total assets of all commercial banks in a country, 
is also included. Bank concentration may have a positive or a negative association with 
bank risk. In accordance with the ‘competition-stability’ hypothesis, the risk of bank 
 
34 Charter value reflects future economic rents that banks obtain from privileged access to markets 
protected from competition (Goyal, 2005). 
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insolvency increases in more concentrated markets (Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). 
However, as suggested by the ‘competition-fragility’ hypothesis (Beck et al., 2006), more 
intensive competition leads to lower net interest margins, eroding a major source of bank 
profits and inducing more risky behaviour. This translates into less concentrated banking 
systems being associated with bank behaviour that is more risk-taking.   
In addition to bank-level control variables and a competition variable, consistent 
with cross-country studies, such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Agoraki et al. 
(2011), and Wu et al. (2017), the model also includes the GDP growth rate (GDP), the 
inflation rate (IFL) and the interest rates (INT) to capture the impact of macroeconomic 
conditions on financial stability, as well as the level of financial development (PRICE) 
measured as the ratio of private sector credit to GDP, and a dummy to proxy for a bank 
crisis (CRISIS). Based on the deposit insurance database from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2014), a dummy variable is constructed to indicate the existence of an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme in a country (INS).  In theory, deposit insurance promotes financial 
intermediation and reduces the spill-over effects of bank runs by providing a safety net 
for depositors. However, empirical work by Laeven and Levine (2009) shows that the 
existence of deposit insurance coverage schemes reduces market discipline and 
encourages banks to take excessive risks (moral hazard). Finally, the model includes 
measures of bank regulation and supervision as other important determinants of bank risk 
(Laeven and Levine, 2009; Agoraki et al., 2011; and Beck et al., 2013). Three categories 
of bank regulation and supervision variables from Barth et al. (2013a) are included to 
proxy for (i) the restrictions on bank activities (ACT), (ii) the power of supervisory 
authorities to intervene in banks’ structure and operation (SUP), and (iii) the extent to 
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which banks are exposed to private monitoring and public supervision (PRIMON).35 The 
definitions and construction details for all variables are provided in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Definition and specification of variables 
Variables Definition Sources 
Dependent variable 
LN(zscore) 
Default risk = Natural logarithm of bank Z-score.  
Z-score = [ROA+ (Equity/total assets)]/ [Std. (ROA)].  





Bank-level variables  















Overhead cost = Total non-interest operating 














ROA Bank profitability= return on assets (%) Bankscope  
ROA_VOL 
Profitability volatility= Standard deviation of ROA 





Market concentration = Top 3 largest banks assets/ total 












35 A fourth category to proxy for the stringency of capital adequacy that is often referred to in the literature 
is capital regulation. This measure is not included in this study due to the relevant data being unavailable 
for most of the sampled countries. The variables’ construction follows Beck et al. (2006) and Houston et 
al. (2012). There are four rounds of the World Bank survey for regulation and supervision published in 
1999, 2002, 2006, and 2011. The 1999 survey is used for the period 1999–2001; the 2002 survey is used 
for 2002–2005; the 2006 survey is used for 2006–2010; and the 2011 survey is used for 2011–2014. 
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Financial integration variables  
CLAIM 












Foreign claims extended by non-Asian international 
banks/ GDP (%) 
BIS CBS-IC 
LN(asian) 
Natural logarithm of foreign claims extended by Asian 
international banks  
BIS CBS-IC 
LN(non_asian) 
Natural logarithm of foreign claims extended by non-
Asian international banks 
BIS CBS-IC 
CROSS 




Foreign claims extended via local affiliates of 
international banks/GDP (%) 
BIS CBS-UR 
LN(cross) 
Natural logarithm of foreign claims extended across 
border by international banks 
BIS CBS-UR 
LN(local) 
Natural logarithm of Foreign claims extended via local 
affiliates of international banks 
BIS CBS-UR 
Country-level control variables  
IFL 
Inflation rate = Annual % change of average consumer 





GDP GDP growth rate = Annual % change of GDP (%) GFD 
PRICRE 
Private credit to GDP = Bank credit to private sector/ 
GDP (%) 
GFD 






Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the year of 





Dummy variable to proxy for the deposit insurance 
coverage of a country. INS equals 1 when the country 
has explicit deposit insurance and other wise   
Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. 
(2014)  
ACT 
Overall restrictions on banking activities index 
measures the degree to which banks are allowed to 
engage in securities, insurance, real estate investment, 
and ownership of non-financial firms. Higher value 
indicates more restrictiveness. 
Barth et al. 
(2013a) 
SUP 
Supervisory power index measures whether the 
supervisory authorities have the authority to take 
specific actions to prevent and correct problems. Higher 
value denotes that supervisory agencies are authorised 
more oversight power. 





Private monitoring index measures the degree of private 
monitoring which requires banks to release accurate 
and comprehensive information to the public. Higher 
value indicates greater regulatory empowerment of the 
monitoring of banks by private investors. 
Barth et al. 
(2013a) 
 
3.3.4 Bank Sample 
The study examines an unbalanced sample of 2,280 commercial bank-year 
observations (or 393 banks) from eight countries in East Asia (China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand) over the period 
1999–2014. Bank-level data are obtained from Bankscope. Banks with less than three 
consecutive years of available financial data for all bank-specific variables are excluded. 
All M&As and bank failures during the sample period are accounted for in the dataset so 
that both active and inactive banks are included to avoid survivorship bias.36 The data are 
drawn from unconsolidated statements to reduce aggregation bias in the results 
(consolidated data are used if unconsolidated statements are unavailable). All bank-level 
data are winsorized at the top and bottom 0.5th percentile.  
3.4 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS  
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables included in the 
regression. The LN(zscore) of the sampled commercial banks has a mean value of 3.648 
and a standard deviation of 1.226. The wide range of LN(zscore) (ranging from -2.37 to 
7.89) highlights the substantial variation on the level of default risk across banks in the 
sampled period.  
With regard to the financial integration variables, the ratio of total foreign claims 
to GDP (CLAIM) has a mean value of 28.1% and a standard deviation of 38.2%. The 
 
36 Additionally, 10 negative observations of Z-score are dropped so that the natural logarithm of the 
variable is defined. Active banks make up 91.49% of the sample; 8.17% of banks in the sample are 
dissolved; 0.04% of banks are in bankruptcy; and 0.21% of sampled banks are in liquidation. 
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wide range of CLAIM partly reflects the different levels of financial integration among 
the sampled countries, as previously described in Section 2.4.  
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
       Mean         Std.         Min        Max        N 
LN(zscore) 3.648 1.226 -2.377 7.895 2,280 
CAP (%) 10.275 7.264 1.520 81.300 2,280 
ROA (%) 1.118 1.134 -8.970 8.840 2,280 
ROA_VOL 0.611 1.592 0.012 17.423 2,280 
CRERISK(%) 5.400 9.233 0.010 70.780 2,280 
INC_IV (%) 14.122 11.064 0.100 85.057 2,280 
COST (%) 1.942 1.600 0.050 23.423 2,280 
CHARTER (%) 33.983 26.322 0.153 100.000 2,280 
CON (%) 44.734 10.018 29.789 94.407 2,280 
IFL (%) 4.145 3.209 -3.953 20.489 2,280 
GDP (%) 12.934 10.453 -13.044 47.368 2,280 
PRICRE (%) 91.607 46.601 19.909 233.663 2,280 
INS 0.514 0.500 0.000 1.000 2,280 
INT (%) 3.068 3.521 -3.903 13.347 2,280 
ACT 8.627 2.409 3.000 12.000 2,141 
SUP 12.304 2.584 7.000 16.000 1,161 
PRIMON  9.427 1.070 7.000 11.000 1,846 
CLAIM (%) (*) 28.136 38.240 3.357 290.071 2,280 
LN(claim) 11.854 1.137 9.937 14.074 2,280 
ASIAN (%) 5.126 7.063 0.644 50.360 2,280 
NON_ASIAN (%) 16.230 26.975 1.718 189.181 2,280 
LN(asian) 10.111 1.095 8.021 12.217 2,280 
LN(non_asian) 11.165 1.055 9.452 13.219 2,280 
LOCAL (%) 14.388 27.132 1.446 186.572 1,710 
CROSS (%) 8.035 7.915 1.761 50.262 1,710 
LN(local) 11.201 1.039 8.842 13.206 1,710 
LN(cross) 11.192 1.104 9.187 13.135 1,710 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. There are 2,280 
bank-year observations (about 393 banks) for eight sampled countries (including China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Korea, Singapore, and Thailand) during 1999–2014. For the definition 
and construction of the variables, see Table 3.1. Mean refers to the average value for each variable. Std. 
refers to standard deviation. Min and Max are the minimum and maximum observations for each 
variable in the sample. N refers to the number of observations.  
(*): ASIAN and NON_ASIAN (similarly LOCAL and CROSS) do not add up to CLAIM. The deviation 
originates from the types of reporting banks from which the underlying statistics are aggregated. 
Specifically, in the case of CLAIM, there are three type of banks reporting to BIS, including (i) domestic 
banks (controlled by parent entities with the same country code as the reporting country); (ii) banks 
located in the reporting country, but controlled by parents entities located in non-reporting countries; 
(iii) banks controlled by parent entities located in the reporting country but not consolidated by their 
parent. In the case of ASIAN, NON_ASIAN, LOCAL and CROSS, reporting banks are only domestic 
banks. For further details, refer to Appendix B1. 
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Table 3.2 shows that NON_ASIAN with its mean value of 16.2% is higher than 
the mean value of ASIAN (5.1%). This is consistent with the observation that foreign 
claims on the sampled countries mostly come from non-Asian international banks, as 
depicted in Figure 3.2. LOCAL’s mean value of 14.3% is higher than CROSS’s value of 
8%. This is also consistent with the fact that local claims account for the major shares of 
total claims, as depicted in Figure 3.3.  
Table 3.3 reports the Pearson pairwise correlations. The correlation between Z-
score and financial integration is divergent across the measures. Z-score has a positive 
and significant correlation with both foreign claims extended by Asian lenders (ASIAN) 
and foreign claims extended via local affiliates (LOCAL). Further, the correlations in 
Table 3.3 also show that different measures of financial integration (i.e. CLAIM, ASIAN, 
NON_ASIAN, CROSS, LOCAL) are highly correlated. Due to their construction, each 
measure refers to a component of the total foreign claims. Notably, the bank regulation 
and supervision variables (i.e. ACT, SUP, PRIMON) have a negative and significant 
correlation with each of the financial integration measures. This is consistent with the 
findings of Houston et al. (2012) that international banks tend to transfer a large 
proportion of funds to countries with fewer regulations (see Section 3.2). Overall, the 
bank-level variables and macroeconomic variables are found not to be highly correlated 
with each other, implying that the joint inclusion of these variables is unlikely to lead to 
concerns about multi-collinearity (confirmed by the low VIF statistics of all models run, 












































































































Z-score 1.00                   
CAP 0.12** 1.00                  
CRERISK -0.03 0.17** 1.00                 
INC_DIV 0.01 0.22** 0.13** 1.00                
COST -0.04** 0.19** 0.23** 0.11** 1.00               
CHARTER 0.00 -0.09** -0.01 0.00 -0.25** 1.00              
CON -0.01 0.01 0.06** 0.12** -0.04** 0.30** 1.00             
IFL -0.04** 0.12** 0.09** -0.08** 0.32** -0.15** 0.09** 1.00            
GDP -0.04** -0.10** 0.00 -0.14** -0.04** 0.18** 0.02 0.28** 1.00           
PRICRE 0.06** -0.22** -0.25** -0.10** -0.54** 0.23** -0.08** -0.61 -0.10** 1.00          
INT 0.00 0.08** 0.14** 0.07** 0.15** -0.14** 0.14** 0.04** -0.43** -0.16**  1.00         
CLAIM 0.02 0.10** 0.02 0.31** -0.08** -0.02 0.50** -0.17** -0.24** 0.25**  0.15** 1.00        
ASIAN 0.05** 0.15** 0.03 0.30** -0.04 -0.04 0.62** -0.11** -0.26** 0.19**  0.18** 0.91** 1.00       
NON_ASIAN 0.00 0.08** 0.02 0.29** -0.08** 0.01 0.51** -0.15** -0.21** 0.24**  0.16** 0.99** 0.89** 1.00      
CROSS 0.05 0.09** -0.03 0.40** -0.02 -0.11** 0.62** -0.15** -0.27** 0.18**  0.19** 0.96** 0.87** 0.95**    1.00     
LOCAL 0.03** 0.08** -0.07** 0.33** -0.09** -0.11** 0.58** -0.18** -0.23** 0.31**  0.12** 0.99** 0.89** 0.98** 0.94**    1.00    
ACT -0.06** -0.17**  -0.16** -0.41** -0.22** 0.28** -0.09** 0.17** 0.45** 0.14** -0.40** -0.55** -0.49** -0.52** -0.64** -0.56** 1.00   
SUP -0.03** 0.17** -0.07** 0.02 0.08** -0.06** -0.02 0.29** 0.29** -0.30** -0.26** -0.05 -0.02 -0.07** -0.19** -0.15** 0.51** 1.0  
PRIMON -0.07** -0.18** -0.25** -0.24** -0.26** 0.23** -0.11** -0.15** 0.16** 0.28** -0.14** -0.26** -0.30** -0.24** -0.35** -0.31** 0.36** 0.04 1.0 
The table reports the Pearson rank correlation coefficients among variables. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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3.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Section 3.5.1 first establishes the baseline result on the impact of financial 
integration on bank default risk and thus addresses H1 (see Section 3.2). The two 
following sections explore the variation of this impact that can be attributed to the source 
country (Asian claims versus non-Asian claims, as articulated in H2) and the methods of 
extension (cross-border claims versus local claims, as per H3). Finally, Section 3.5.4 
presents some robustness tests. 
3.5.1 The Impact of Financial Integration on Bank Default Risk 
3.5.1.1 Validity of the system GMM estimators  
Table 3.4 reports the system GMM estimates of Equation 3.2 to test H1. Several 
pre- and post-estimation tests are also reported at the end of this table.37 With regard to 
pre-diagnostic tests, the DWH test for endogeneity confirms the endogenous relationship 
between bank-level covariates (including CAP, CRERISK, INC_DIV, COST, 
CHARTER, and CON) and the dependent variable.38 Additionally, the VIFs value 
implies that the models are free from a multi-collinearity problem.   
With regard to post-estimation tests, the AR(2) test is statistically insignificant, 
confirming the absence of the second-order serial correlation. As reported in Section 
3.3.1, the one-year lag (i.e. L.LN(zscore)) is long enough to capture the persistency in 
 
37 With regard to the (unreported) unit root test, the null of non-stationary is rejected at the 1% level for all 
variables used in the regression and is rejected at the 5% level for financial integration variables in natural 
logarithm form (i.e. LN(Asian), LN(non-Asian) and LN(local) and LN(cross)). SIZE is dropped from the 
baseline regression due to its unit root. Nevertheless, the inclusion of SIZE in the regression does not 
change the result; the result is available upon request.  
38 The DWH test is conducted at the level equation and under the null hypothesis that the endogenous 
regressors may be actually treated as exogenous variables. The one-year lagged differences of the 
dependent variable and the suspicious regressors are used as instrumental variables.  
As CAP is a component to compute bank default risk, the inclusion of CAP in the model could lead to the 
concern of endogeneity. Appendix B5 presents findings when CAP is excluded from the model. The results 
remain similar to the baseline’s one.  
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bank default risk. Taking these results together, the second and further lags of the 
dependent variable are valid instruments for the GMM.    
The high p-values of the Hansen J-statistics and the difference-in-Hansen tests 
suggest that the full set of instruments as well as each sub-set of instruments (i.e. for the 
level equation, the lagged dependent variable, the endogenous, pre-determined, and 
exogenous explanatory variables) are valid.  As the two tests may be weakened by the 
proliferation of instruments (Roodman, 2009), the rule of thumb that the number of 
instruments is less than the number of groups (banks) is also maintained. This is obtained 
by restricting the number of lags in the instrument specification up to the second and 
third lags (for a detailed list of instruments, please refer to the note of Table 3.4).  
The dynamic specification in the model is not rejected, given the significant effect 
of the lagged dependent variable across each of the models. The lagged dependent 
variable has its coefficient of 0.423 for model (1) and 0.425 for model (2). These 
coefficients from the GMM estimate are in between the range calculated by FE (0.26) 
and OLS methods (0.51) (both not reported). This additionally ensures the efficiency of 
the system GMM estimates (Roodman, 2006).   
It is noteworthy that the number of observations used in the system GMM (836 
observations) is substantially lower than the original bank-year observations (2,280 
observations, as reported in Section 3.3.4). This is mostly due to the simultaneous 
inclusion of three regulation variables (i.e. ACT, SUP, PRIMON), which are not 
available for all observations. As a robustness check, two models, in which SUP (i.e. the 
variable with the lowest available observations) and both three variables are dropped 
from the regression, respectively, are reported in Appendix B4. The system GMM 
specification as well as the impact of financial integration on bank default risk remain 
similar to the ones reported in Table 3.4. However, the coefficient of the lagged 
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dependent variable is 0.53, which falls out of the (unreported) possible range between 
the FE and OLS estimates. This would be a sign of model misspecification, which is 
justifiable, as bank regulation and supervision have been found to be among the most 
important determinants of bank default risk (as in Laeven and Levine, 2009; Agoraki et 
al., 2011). Therefore, the chapter proceeds with the regression with the inclusion of all 
three regulation variables, as reported in Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4:  The impact of financial integration on bank distance to default 
 
        (1)       (2) 
L.LN(zscore) 0.423*** 0.425*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
CLAIM 0.046*  
  (0.02)  
LN(claim)  1.924*** 
  (0.66) 
CAP 0.063*** 0.060*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
CRERISK -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
INC_DIV -0.024** -0.021* 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
COST -0.112 -0.087 
 (0.09) (0.10) 
CHARTER 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
CON 0.075** 0.052* 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
IFL -0.034 -0.029 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP -0.037** -0.041** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
PRICRE -0.044** -0.028** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
INS -0.933* -0.514 
 (0.52) (0.44) 
INT -0.049* -0.061** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
ACT 0.163 0.291** 
 (0.10) (0.13) 
SUP 0.219** 0.115 
 (0.11) (0.10) 
PRIMON 0.639** 0.337* 
 (0.26) (0.18) 
ODUM 0.015 0.020 
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 (0.10) (0.11) 
CRISIS -1.389** -1.741** 
 (0.70) (0.70) 
Constant -6.383* -25.450*** 
 (3.58) (8.78) 
#Obs.       836      836 
# Banks       202      202 
# IV       100      100 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.342 0.288 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.602 0.476 
Diff-In-Hansen test (p value):   
  GMM instruments for level equation 0.698 0.417 
  GMM instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable 0.696 0.619 
  GMM instruments for endogenous variables 0.486 0.186 
  GMM instruments for predetermined variables 0.275 0.192 
  IV instruments for exogenous variables 0.579 0.287 
Mean (maximum) VIF 3.65 (6.63) 3.86 (6.72) 
DWH test for endogeneity (p-value) 0.00 0.00 
The table reports the impact of financial integration on bank default risk from Equation 3.2: 
RISKijt =  β0 RISKijt-1+ β1 INTEGjt + βk BANKk ijt + βm COUNTRYm jt + θi + γj + µt + εijt 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score to proxy for bank default risk. Financial 
integration is proxied via the ratio of foreign claims to GDP (CLAIM) or the natural logarithm of foreign 
claims (LN(claim)). For the definition and construction of other control variables, see Table 3.1.  Bank 
FE, country and time dummies are included, but not reported to save space. 
All models are estimated by the system GMM. For the dependent variable and endogenous bank-level 
control variables, their second and third lagged values are used as instruments in the transformed 
equation; the first lag of their differenced values are used as instruments in the level equation. For the 
predetermined variables (including financial integration and regulation variables), their first and second 
lagged values are used as instruments in the transformed equation; their differenced values are used as 
instruments in the level equation. For exogenous variables (including other country-level control 
variables, time and country dummies), their differenced values are used as instruments in the 
transformed equation; their level values are used as instruments in the level equation. The system GMM 
is run by the xtabond2 Stata syntax written by Roodman (2006). Collapse option is used in specifying 
instruments for the endogenous and predetermined variables. As there are gaps in the sample panel, the 
forward orthogonal deviations transform (orthogonal option) is used instead of first differencing to 
maximise the sample size. Twostep along with the robust option are used to obtain the finite sample 
corrected two-step covariance matrix following Windmeijer (2005) correction. Small option is to adjust 
the estimates for small-sample and report t-statistics instead of z-statistics.  
Insignificant value of AR(2) tests confirm the absence of the serial correlation in the second order. 
Similarly, insignificant value of Hansen J-statistics test and Difference-in-Hansen test ensures the 
validity of the instruments. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
3.5.1.2 The impact of financial integration on bank default risk  
Table 3.4 shows that the coefficients of financial integration (measured by 
CLAIM and LN(claim), respectively, in models 1 and 2) are positive and significant. 
This implies that financial integration is associated with the increase in bank Z-score (or 
reduction in bank default risk) and is consistent with H1. With regard to the economic 
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impact, take Column 1 as an example, a 1-percentage-point increase in CLAIM is 
associated with an approximately 4.6% (0.046*100) increase in ZSCORE.39 Overall, the 
evidence points to the benefit of financial integration in lowering individual bank default 
risk for the recipient countries. This result is consistent with the monitoring channel of 
international banks, which is found to drive the association between heightened cross-
border banking flows and lower systemic risks (Karolyi et al., 2018). Further, the finding 
also supports the competition channel, which predicts that foreign banking claims would 
engender healthy competition among different providers of funds, thus leading to lower 
risk-taking behaviour (Agénor, 2001; Faia and Ottaviano, 2017). Overall, the results 
strongly support H1.  
Not reported bank and year fixed effects capture a significant fraction of the 
overall explanatory power of Z-score. The only bank-level variables that have a 
significant impact on Z-score are equity capital ratio (CAP) and income diversification 
(INC_DIV). Banks with a lower level of equity capital to buffer against return volatility 
have higher risk of default. Similarly, due to the greater reliance on non-interest income, 
banks are exposed to more volatile activities or expand to risky non-traditional activities, 
reducing bank stability. The finding is congruent with the work by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010).   
 At the country level, the positive coefficient of CON implies that market 
concentration helps to lower bank default risk, which is in line with the ‘competition-
fragility’ hypothesis postulated by Beck et al. (2006) (see Section 3.3.3.3). The negative 
 
39 As the sampled countries are different in their levels of financial integration, the interpretation is more 
meaningful in the context of specific countries. For instance, take China as an example, where a one-
standard-deviation increase in CLAIM (from its mean level of 7% to 10%) is translated into an increase of 
13% in Z-score. In the case of Singapore, a one-standard-deviation increase in CLAIM (from its mean 




and significant coefficient on financial development (PRICRE) suggests that banks take 
more risks in more financially developed countries. It is easier for firms to switch from 
bank-based to market-based funding in more financially developed markets (Beck et al., 
2013). Competitive pressure from stock market developments push banks to take more 
risks. Similarly, the negative and significant coefficient of economic growth (GDP) 
implies that banks take more risks in the period of economic expansion. Banks could 
relax their lending standards to satisfy the growing credit demand from the economy, 
likely leading to higher bank default risk (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006). The negative 
association between the interest rate (INT) and bank distance to default found for the 
sampled East Asian countries remains a puzzle. The result is not in line with the ‘search 
for yield’ motive, which predicts that the low (lending) interest rate induces banks to 
recklessly expand credit to generate more income (Rajan, 2006). All three categories of 
bank regulation and supervision are significantly and positively related to ZSCORE. 
Consistent with Agoraki et al. (2011) and Noman et al. (2018), banks in countries with 
stricter restrictions on bank activities (ACT), stronger private monitoring (PRIMON), 
and greater authority power (SUP) are characterized by a lower default risk profile. 
Finally, the negative bank crisis coefficient indicates that bank default risk is greater 
during periods of financial crisis.  
The next two sections explore H2 and H3 to see if the above results are driven by 
‘neighbours’ banks with information advantages, where the chapter takes two alternative 
definitions of ‘neighbours’ (see Section 3.1), namely regional banks or international 
banks with affiliate offices. 
3.5.2 The Impact of Asian Claims and Non-Asian Claims on Bank Default Risk 
 Table 3.5 reports the impact of Asian claims (ASIAN) and non-Asian claims 
(NON_ASIAN). According to H2, foreign claims extended by Asian lenders should 
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significantly lower bank default risk in recipient countries. Based on the results reported 
in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3.5, the significant and positive ASIAN and LN(Asian) 
coefficients provide evidence to support this hypothesis. In fact, the magnitude of the 
ASIAN coefficient is much larger than the CLAIM coefficient reported in Table 3.4. 
Given a 1-percentage-point increase in ASIAN, the coefficient in Column 1 of Table 3.5 
predicts a 7.1% (0.071*100) increase in Z-score for the recipient country.  
Consistent with H2, only the Asian claims contribute to the higher stability of 
banks in the recipient countries, as evidenced by the non-significant coefficients of 
NON_ASIAN and LN(non_asian) in Columns 2 and 4. The result supports the argument 
that the Asian claims are linked to lower information asymmetry, as regional banks 
possess information advantages, facilitating closer recipient country bank monitoring 
(Mian, 2006; Claessens and Van Horen, 2014b). Acharya and Naqvi (2012) posit that the 
influx of foreign capital creates excess liquidity in the recipient banking system, which 
induces bank risk-taking behaviour. However, this is not the case for the East Asian 
sampled countries. As seen in Figure 3.2, the level of Asian claims increases gradually 
over time. In other words, regional claim receipts do not lead to an excessive and sudden 
liquidity in the recipient countries’ banking systems. 
The impacts of other control variables are similar to the baseline result reported 








Table 3.5: The impact of Asian claims and non-Asian claims on bank distance to 
default 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.LN(zscore) 0.460*** 0.434*** 0.439*** 0.429*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
ASIAN 0.071**    
  (0.03)    
NON_ASIAN  0.013   
  (0.03)   
LN(asian)   0.824**  
   (0.38)  
LN(non_asian)    0.618 
    (0.40) 
CAP 0.052** 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.049** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
CRERISK -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
INC_DIV -0.014 -0.021** -0.014 -0.025** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
COST -0.089 -0.123 -0.086 -0.119 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
CHARTER -0.004 0.002 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CON 0.016 0.047 0.032 0.061* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
IFL -0.050 -0.041 -0.063* -0.036 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
GDP -0.033** -0.025 -0.028** -0.028* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
PRICRE -0.019 -0.017 -0.010 -0.018 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
INS -0.445 -0.580 -0.312 -0.324 
 (0.45) (0.50) (0.44) (0.45) 
INT -0.037 -0.034 -0.039 -0.041 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
ACT 0.077 0.064 0.142 0.168* 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
SUP 0.082 0.147 0.097 0.162 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) 
PRIMON 0.212 0.378 0.202 0.373* 
 (0.18) (0.27) (0.16) (0.22) 
ODUM 0.040 0.014 0.004 0.028 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
CRISIS -0.211 -0.631 -0.848 -1.480* 
 (0.48) (0.81) (0.53) (0.87) 
Constant 0.246 -3.777 -10.069** -16.984** 
 (3.02) (4.17) (4.70) (8.33) 
#Obs.    836      836    836    836 
# Banks    202      202    202    202 
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# IV    100      100    100    100 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.308 0.397 0.347 0.381 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.643 0.655 0.665 0.37 
Diff-In-Hansen test (p value):     
GMM instruments for level equation 0.492 0.761 0.697 0.276 
GMM instruments for the lagged 
dependent var. 0.887 0.795 0.815 0.728 
GMM instruments for endogenous 
var. 0.281 0.716 0.252 0.595 
GMM instruments for predetermined 
var. 0.572 0.339 0.483 0.171 
IV instruments for exogenous var. 0.330 0.665 0.375 0.201 
The table reports the impact of different forms of financial integration on bank default risk. The total 
foreign claims are classified by lenders’ nationality. In Columns 1 and 2, ASIAN and NON_ASIAN are 
the foreign claims extended by international banks whose nationality are Asian and non-Asian, 
respectively; these statistics are then scaled by GDP of the sampled countries. As a robust check, the 
natural logarithm of these statistics (i.e. (LN(asian) and LN(non_asian)) are constructed and presented 
in Columns 3 and 4. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score to proxy for bank default 
risk. Other control variables definition and the system GMM specification remain unchanged (as 
reported in Table 3.4). The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
3.5.3 The Impact of Local Claims and Cross-border Claims on Bank Default Risk 
Table 3.6 reports the significant and positive coefficients of local claims 
regardless of its measures (i.e. LOCAL in Column 1 or LN(local) in Column 3, though 
in the latter case it is only marginally significant). The coefficients for cross-border 
claims are insignificant in both models reported in Columns 2 and 4. The result indicates 
that local claims extended via foreign affiliates rather than across borders help to lower 
recipient country bank default risk. In fact, the magnitude of the LOCAL coefficient is 
much larger than the CLAIM coefficient reported in Table 3.4. Given a 1-percentage-
point increase in LOCAL, the coefficient in Column 1 predicts a 10.1% (0.101*100) 
increase in the Z-score for the recipient country. Overall, this finding strongly supports 
H3 and confirms the link between lower information asymmetry and local affiliates–
based lending.   
As seen in Figure 3.3, foreign affiliates based in the sampled countries account 
for a significant share of the total foreign claims. These foreign affiliates are funded 
primarily by local deposits (Cerutti, 2015). In addition, many economies in the East Asian 
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region have run persistent current account surpluses over the years (Didier et al., 2017). 
Taken together, the foreign capital sourced within the East Asian region is more stable, 
as the claims are originally sourced from domestic deposits and from countries with 
persistent capital account surpluses. These facts provide further evidence in favour of the 
positive association between local claims and bank stability.  
Table 3.6:  The impact of local claims and cross-border claims on bank distance to 
default 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.LN(zscore) 0.464*** 0.455*** 0.445*** 0.451*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
LOCAL 0.101**    
  (0.04)    
CROSS  0.046   
  (0.05)   
LN(local)   1.438*  
   (0.78)  
LN(cross)    0.213 
    (0.54) 
CAP 0.036* 0.033 0.039* 0.028 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
CRERISK 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.006 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
INC_DIV -0.018* -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
COST -0.132 -0.105 -0.111 -0.108 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
CHARTER -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CON 0.035 0.059 0.027 0.034 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) 
IFL 0.005 -0.028 0.012 -0.041 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
GDP -0.042** -0.031* -0.039* -0.024 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
PRICRE -0.052*** -0.036* -0.025 -0.023 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
INS -0.499* 0.388 0.233 -0.496** 
 (0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) 
INT -0.041 -0.027 -0.033 -0.015 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
ACT -0.071 0.032 0.176 0.137 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) 
SUP 0.360 0.322 0.318 0.337 
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 (0.25) (0.25) (0.33) (0.30) 
PRIMON 0.807 0.762 0.911 0.907 
 (0.70) (0.74) (0.94) (0.88) 
ODUM 0.137 0.142 0.113 0.143 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Constant -15.697* -4.613 -22.26** -7.781 
 (8.53) (6.40) (10.91) (8.64) 
#Obs.     615    615    615   615 
# Banks     156    156   156   156 
# IV     80    80   80   80 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.103 0.150 0.186 0.239 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.509 0.415 0.420 0.289 
Diff-In-Hansen test (p value)     
GMM instruments for level equation 0.716 0.847 0.724 0.804 
GMM instruments for the lagged dependent 
var.  0.583 0.523 0.387 0.575 
GMM instruments for endogenous bank-level 
var. 0.228 0.492 0.130 0.159 
GMM instruments for predetermined var. 0.884 0.536 0.829 0.357 
IV instruments for exogenous var. 0.886 0.550 0.860 0.474 
The table reports the impact of different forms of financial integration on bank default risk. The total 
foreign claims are classified by the methods of extension. In Columns 1 and 2, LOCAL and CROSS are 
the foreign claims extended by international banks via their foreign affiliates or across borders; these 
statistics are then scaled by GDP of the sampled countries. As a robust check, the natural logarithm of 
these statistics (i.e. (LN(local) and LN(cross)) are constructed and presented in Columns 3 and 4. The 
examination period is 2005–2014 due to the availability data. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of Z-score to proxy for bank default risk. Other control variables definition and the system 
GMM specification remain unchanged (as reported in Table 3.4). The robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
   
  In short, the findings in Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 complement and further elucidate 
the findings in Section 3.5.1. They show that the positive association between financial 
integration (measured via the total foreign claims) and Z-score is driven by claims 
extended by Asian banks and local claims, as distinct from non-Asian claims and cross-
border claims, respectively. The policy implication of these results is discussed in Section 
3.6. Prior to this, the robustness of the above results is further explored with alternative 





3.5.4 Robustness Tests  
Several robustness tests are conducted. First, an alternative measure of bank risk, 
namely volatility in bank profit as measured by the standard deviation of ROA over the 
three-year window (ROA_VOL) is employed.40 The result is reported in Table 3.7. As 
seen in Column 1, financial integration (CLAIM) helps to lower bank profit volatility 
(ROA_VOL). Consistent with the earlier findings, the effect is present when claims are 
extended by Asian lenders (ASIAN) or via local affiliates (LOCAL). This result 
reinforces the findings in Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. Additionally, Table 3.7 also reports a 
positive association between higher rates of inflation, economic growth rates, and greater 
financial development and profit volatility (ROA_VOL). Bank regulation and 
supervision help to reduce profit volatility via effective private monitoring and 
supervisory power exercised by local authorities.  
Table 3.7: The impact of financial integration on bank profit volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.ROA_VOL 0.391*** 0.399*** 0.397*** 0.429*** 0.431*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLAIM -0.023**     
  (0.01)     
ASIAN  -0.031**    
   (0.01)    
NON_ASIAN   -0.020   
   (0.01)   
LOCAL    -0.026*  
    (0.02)  
CROSS     -0.000 
     (0.01) 
CAP -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 0.001 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
CRERISK -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.020 -0.015 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
INC_DIV 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
COST -0.035 -0.025 -0.028 0.014 0.011 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
40 The result is also unchanged when the measure is the natural logarithm of ROA_VOL. The result is 
provided in Appendix B6. 
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CHARTER -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
CON -0.026* -0.005 -0.022 0.006 0.006 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
IFL 0.063** 0.054* 0.060* -0.011 0.003 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
GDP 0.031*** 0.023** 0.026*** 0.011** 0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
PRICRE 0.029** 0.016** 0.020** 0.018** 0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
INS 0.390 0.190 0.255 -0.038 -0.077 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.21) (0.14) (0.10) 
INT 0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ACT -0.079 -0.036 -0.053 -0.017 -0.023 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) 
SUP -0.141*** -0.081* -0.129** -0.235** -0.167** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) 
PRIMON -0.310** -0.165* -0.238* -0.568** -0.399** 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.28) (0.20) 
ODUM -0.078 -0.068 -0.087 -0.062 -0.045 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) 
CRISIS 0.622 0.134 0.516   
 (0.49) (0.35) (0.50)   
Constant 2.364* 0.520 2.248 7.647** 3.197* 
 (1.34) (1.24) (1.65) (3.86) (1.71) 
#Obs.   836    836   836   615   615 
# Banks   202    202   202   156   156 
# IV   100    100   100   80   80 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.844 0.719 0.946 0.840 0.758 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.460 0.764 0.454 0.711 0.654 
Diff-In-Hansen test  
for level equation (p value) 0.591 0.577 0.192 0.807 0.589 
The table reports the impact of financial integration on bank profit volatility (ROA_VOL). Financial 
integration is measured by the ratio of total foreign claims to GDP (CLAIM); ASIAN and NON_ASIAN 
(the foreign claims extended by international banks whose nationality are Asian and non-Asian, 
respectively); LOCAL and CROSS (the foreign claims extended by international banks via their foreign 
affiliates or across borders). Other control variables definition and the system GMM specification remain 
unchanged (as reported in Table 3.4). The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Second, a sub-sample of the low-integration group of countries is utilised to 
ensure that the original analysis was not biased by the presence of financial centres (i.e. 
Hong Kong and Singapore). The low-financial-integration sub-sampling is reported in 
Table 3.8. Again, the results are fully consistent with the previous results and H1, H2, 
and H3. In fact, the impact of financial integration on bank default risk becomes stronger 
in this sub-sampling, as the magnitude of the CLAIM, ASIAN, and LOCAL coefficients 
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are higher than their baseline’s. This implies that countries with a lower level of financial 
integration are benefiting more from the receipt of foreign banking claims. This further 
supports the evidence documented in Chapter 2 that financial integration is more 
beneficial (in terms of efficiency improvement) for the low-integration group of countries 
(see Section 2.5.3). 
Table 3.8:  Low-financial-integration countries sub-sampling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.LN(zscore) 0.421*** 0.464*** 0.433*** 0.465*** 0.463*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLAIM 0.065**     
  (0.03)     
ASIAN  0.073**    
   (0.03)    
NON_ASIAN   0.018   
   (0.05)   
LOCAL    0.132***  
    (0.04)  
CROSS     0.062 
     (0.05) 
CAP 0.060*** 0.046** 0.056*** 0.023 0.023 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
CRERISK -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 0.000 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
INC_DIV -0.023* -0.012 -0.017 -0.014 -0.008 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
COST -0.132 -0.107 -0.111 -0.077 -0.057 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
CHARTER 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CON 0.066* 0.022 0.024 0.021 0.081** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
IFL -0.050 -0.054 -0.073** 0.025 -0.026 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
GDP -0.035** -0.032* -0.023 -0.038* -0.040** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
PRICRE -0.050** -0.026 -0.017 -0.067*** -0.048* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
INS -0.662 -0.435 -0.301 0.712* 0.515 
 (0.58) (0.55) (0.54) (0.40) (0.38) 
INT -0.055* -0.055* -0.043 -0.033 -0.051 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
ACT 0.221* 0.055 0.027   
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.13)   
SUP 0.171 0.077 0.105 0.482* 0.313 
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 (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.25) (0.27) 
PRIMON 0.623** 0.287 0.230 1.275** 0.756 
 (0.28) (0.21) (0.26) (0.64) (0.70) 
ODUM -0.082 -0.076 -0.071 0.069 0.089 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) 
CRISIS -1.256* -0.141 -0.044   
 (0.71) (0.50) (0.88)   
Constant -5.482 -0.040 -0.480 -17.275* -11.552 
 (3.86) (3.06) (4.36) (9.18) (10.78) 
#Obs.   796     796  796   575   575 
# Banks   188     188  188   142   142 
# IV     98       98    98     78     78 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.398 0.432 0.466 0.116 0.155 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.438 0.444 0.364 0.314 0.199 
Diff-In-Hansen test for 
level equation (p 
value) 0.396 0.502 0.638 0.288 0.487 
This table reports the impact of financial integration on bank distance to default on the sample of 
countries with a low level of financial integration (i.e. the whole sample excludes Hong Kong and 
Singapore). Financial integration is measured by the ratio of total foreign claims to GDP (CLAIM); 
ASIAN and NON_ASIAN (the foreign claims extended by international banks whose nationality are 
Asian and non-Asian, respectively); LOCAL and CROSS (the foreign claims extended by international 
banks via their foreign affiliates or across borders). In Columns 4 and 5, ACT is dropped because of 
collinearity. Other variables definition and the system GMM specification remain unchanged (as 
reported in Table 3.4). The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.     
  
Third, only domestic banks are sampled to ensure that the prior findings are not 
driven by the entry (or presence) of foreign banks in the recipient countries. The is a real 
concern, as foreign banks own better risk management, thus having a lower level of 
default risk (Wu et al., 2017). Their entry or presence would thus lower the overall risk 
of banks, but this does not necessarily mean that domestic bank risk management 
improves. To address this concern, regression on only domestic banks are run. The 
domestic sub-sampling is reported in Table 3.9. Overall, the main findings remain 
qualitatively unchanged from the baseline results. Financial integration measures, such 
as CLAIM, ASIAN, and LOCAL, are positively associated with bank distance to default. 
More interestingly, the coefficients of CLAIM and ASIAN are marginally significant 
while LOCAL is highly significant and large. The result further implies that the local 
claims induce the strongest response from the domestic banks. This is sensible since the 
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foreign affiliates of international banks established in host countries would directly 
compete with the domestic banks in the local markets for extending loans and raising 
deposits. Additionally, higher bank costs are associated with higher default risk in the 
domestic banks’ sampling.  
Table 3.9: Domestic banks sub-sampling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.LN(zscore) 0.426*** 0.451*** 0.424*** 0.404*** 0.416*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
CLAIM 0.041*     
  (0.02)     
ASIAN  0.062*    
   (0.04)    
NON_ASIAN   0.027   
   (0.04)   
LOCAL    0.150***  
    (0.05)  
CROSS     0.065 
     (0.07) 
CAP 0.049 0.042 0.046 0.013 0.016 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
CRERISK -0.009 -0.006 -0.014 0.019 0.001 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
INC_DIV -0.022* -0.020 -0.021 -0.019* -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
COST -0.183* -0.161 -0.170* -0.100 -0.061 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
CHARTER -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.010 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
CON 0.032 -0.006 0.024 -0.024 0.005 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
IFL -0.038 -0.036 -0.034 0.075 -0.002 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
GDP -0.018 -0.015 -0.007 -0.024 -0.008 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
PRICRE -0.031 -0.014 -0.011 -0.071*** -0.043* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
INS -0.717 -0.310 -0.405 0.014 0.002 
 (0.81) (0.76) (0.85) (0.40) (0.46) 
INT -0.005 0.004 0.010 0.040 0.044 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
ACT 0.148* -0.016 -0.024 -0.142 0.011 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.21) (0.28) 
SUP 0.228 0.250*** 0.187 0.601** 0.210** 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.16) (0.27) (0.10) 
PRIMON 0.341 0.059 0.206 1.079 0.912 
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 (0.31) (0.24) (0.35) (0.80) (0.97) 
CRISIS -0.752 0.198 -0.463   
 (0.87) (0.79) (1.11)   
Constant -2.032 2.411 -1.400 -22.050** -4.819 
 (3.62) (3.57) (4.74) (8.63) (8.34) 
#Obs.   521    521  521    366   366 
# Banks   142    142  142      99     99 
# IV     99      99    99      79     79 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.799 0.854 0.818 0.263 0.194 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.852 0.891 0.813 0.447 0.273 
Diff-In-Hansen test for 
level equation (p value) 0.710 0.695 0.664 0.133 0.223 
This table reports the impact of financial integration on bank distance to default on the sample of 
domestic banks (ODUM=0). Financial integration is measured by the ratio of total foreign claims to 
GDP (CLAIM); ASIAN and NON_ASIAN (the foreign claims extended by international banks whose 
nationality are Asian and non-Asian, respectively); LOCAL and CROSS (the foreign claims extended 
by international banks via their foreign affiliates or across borders). Other variables definition and the 
system GMM specification remain unchanged (as reported in Table 3.4). The robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.    
  
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
The chapter considers a country receiving foreign claims from international banks 
to examine the impact of financial integration on its bank default risk. The key finding is 
that financial integration lowers recipient countries’ bank default risk. The result is 
primarily driven by the foreign claims extended by Asian lenders and the foreign claims 
extended via local affiliates. The findings remain robust when an alternative measure of 
bank risk (i.e. profit volatility) is employed or a different sub-sampling strategy is 
conducted. Overall, the result provides empirical support for the positive effect of 
financial integration and international banking capital on bank stability.  
From a practical perspective, the findings suggest some preference about the 
forms of financial integration may be beneficial for East Asian recipient countries. 
Specifically, these countries should favour either the foreign claims extended by Asian 
lenders or foreign claims extended via local branches of international banks established 
in their countries. The former is synonymous with the promotion of intra-regional 
financial integration. This implication is meaningful because intra-regional finance still 
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lags behind trade, both in terms of the level of integration and the benefits of risk-sharing 
(Ng and Yarcia, 2014). The latter implies that where foreign claims come from outside 
East Asia, policy makers should encourage presence through local affiliates, as this has 
an equivalent impact. These two options of the ‘neighbouring’ foreign claims are 
complementary, providing recipient countries’ policy makers with flexibility in their 




APPENDIX B1: SOME CAVEATS ABOUT BIS CONSOLIDATED BANKING 
STATISTICS (CBS)  
CBS provides the credit exposures (termed as ‘foreign claims’) of banks 
headquartered in 31 BIS-reporting (source) countries to over 200 counterparties 
(recipient) countries on bilateral basis. CBS are structured on the nationality (not the 
location) of reporting banks. 
Take Singapore as an example of a country reporting to BIS. There are four types 
of reporting banks located in Singapore:  
(i) domestic banks (controlled by parent entities with the same country code as 
the reporting country), for instance: OCBC Bank, United Overseas Bank, etc.;  
(ii) banks located in the reporting country, but controlled by parent entities 
located in non-reporting countries, for instance: an affiliate of Bank of China 
(China has not reported to BIS); 
(iii) banks located in the reporting country, but controlled by parent entities 
located in reporting countries; for instance: an affiliate of HSBC (UK has 
reported to BIS); 
(iv) banks controlled by parent entities located in the reporting country but not 
consolidated by their parent. 
These reporting banks will report their claims extended to counterparties in a 
recipient country (i.e. the sampled East Asia). In the case of the total foreign claims data 
(to construct CLAIM), three types of reporting banks, including (i), (ii), and (iv) are 
considered. The third category banks are excluded, as the affiliates of HSBC will be 
consolidated by their parent bank in the UK and reported under the UK’s foreign claims.  
When foreign claims are broken down by lenders’ nationality (to construct 
ASIAN and NON_ASIAN), only the first type of reporting bank (i.e. domestic banks) is 
considered. This is to clarify that the affiliates of distant international banks set up in 
Singapore (such as an affiliate of HSBC in Singapore) are not considered to construct 
Asian claims. The claims extended by an affiliate of HSBC in Singapore will later be 
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consolidated by their parent bank HSBC (UK); the claims then become non-Asian 
claims.  
When foreign claims are broken down by methods of extension (to construct 
LOCAL and CROSS), only the first type of reporting bank (i.e. domestic banks) is 
considered. Specifically, United Overseas Bank (Singapore) sets up its branch in China 
and extends claims to counterparties in China via this branch; this is the case of local 
claims. Alternatively, United Overseas Bank (Singapore) books its claims outside China 
(by either extending from its head office in Singapore or from its branch located in 
another country); this is the case of cross-border claims. 
 With regard to the reporting basis of Immediate Counterparty (IC) and Ultimate 
Risk (UR), the former considers parties directly involved in lending contracts, while the 
latter takes into account the credit risk transferring from one counterparty to another via 
collaterals or guarantees. For example, a Singapore bank extends a loan to a company in 
China and the loan is guaranteed by a Hong Kong bank. On an IC basis, the Singapore 
bank would report the loan as a claim on China. On a UR basis, the loan would be 
reported as a claim on Hong Kong instead. Further, it is worth noting that there are 













APPENDIX B2: LISTS OF BIS-REPORTING COUNTRIES  
Country  Asian lenders 
Consolidated Banking Statistics (CBS) 
Immediate Counterparty (IC) Ultimate Risk (UR) 
Australia v Q4 2003 Q4 2004 
Austria  Q4 1983 Q4 2005 
Belgium  Q4 1983 Q4 2004 
Brazil  Q4 2002 ... 
Canada  Q4 1983 Q1 2005 
Chile  Q4 2002 Q4 2004 
Chinese Taipei v Q4 2000 Q4 2004 
Denmark  Q4 1983 ... 
Finland  Q4 1985 Q1 2005 
France  Q4 1983 Q4 2004 
Germany  Q4 1983 Q4 2004 
Greece  Q4 2003 Q4 2004 
Hong Kong SAR v Q4 1997 Q3 2015 
India v Q4 2001 Q1 2005 
Ireland  Q4 1983 Q4 2004 
Italy  Q4 1983 Q3 2004 
Japan v Q4 1983 Q4 2004 
(South) Korea v Q4 2011 Q4 2013 
Luxembourg  Q4 1983 ... 
Mexico  Q4 2003 ... 
Netherlands  Q4 1983 Q4 2004 
Norway  Q2 1994 Q4 2004 
Portugal  Q4 1999 Q4 2004 
Singapore v Q4 2000 Q1 2005 
Spain  Q4 1985 Q2 2005 
Sweden  Q4 1983 Q2 2005 
Switzerland  Q4 1983 Q2 2005 
Turkey  Q4 2000 Q4 2004 
United Kingdom  Q4 1983 Q4 2004 




APPENDIX B3: THE RATIO OF ASIAN FOREIGN BANKS TO TOTAL 
FOREIGN BANKS IN THE EAST ASIAN SAMPLED COUNTRIES (%) 
 
 
This figure presents the ratio of Asian foreign banks to total foreign banks in East Asian 
countries (%). The denominator is the total number of foreign banks in these sampled 
countries. The numerator is the number of foreign banks owned by Asian BIS-reporting 
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APPENDIX B4: MODEL SPECIFICATION WITHOUT REGULATION AND 
SUPERVISION VARIABLES  
 
(1) (2) 
L.LN(zscore) 0.533*** 0.531*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
CLAIM 0.016** 0.012* 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
CAP 0.045*** 0.038** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
CRERISK -0.004 0.000 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
INC_DIV -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
COST -0.108 0.050 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
CHARTER 0.007 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
CON -0.018 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
IFL -0.030* -0.002 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
GDP -0.013** 0.026** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
PRICRE -0.000 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
INS 0.274* -0.083 
 (0.16) (0.14) 
INT -0.013 0.007 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
ACT 0.117**  
 (0.06)  
PRIMON -0.053  
 (0.06)  
ODUM -0.020 0.100 
 (0.09) (0.10) 
CRISIS 0.287 0.260 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Constant -0.102 -2.652** 
 (1.19) (1.15) 
#Obs.      1425            1740 
# Banks      349            393 
# IV       97             91 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.333 0.188 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.772 0.164 
Diff-In-Hansen test (p value):   
  GMM instruments for level 0.97 0.712 
  GMM instruments for the lagged dependent variable 0.816 0.344 
  GMM instruments for endogenous bank-level 
variables 0.346 0.106 
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  GMM instruments for predetermined variables 0.727 0.634 
  IV instruments for exogenous variables 0.708 0.216 
This table reports the robustness to Table 3.4. To maintain the number of bank sample observations, 
SUP (with the lowest number of available observations), then all regulation variables (ACT, SUP, and 
PRIMON) are dropped. Other variables and the system GMM specification remain unchanged from the 
baseline model. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 





APPENDIX B5: MODELS WITHOUT CAPITAL RATIO (CAP) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.LN(zscore)  0.498*** 0.536***  0.506*** 0.499*** 0.494*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLAIM  0.042*     
  (0.03)     
ASIAN  0.086***    
   (0.03)    
NON_ASIAN   -0.005   
   (0.03)   
LOCAL    0.113***  
    (0.04)  
CROSS     0.040 
     (0.05)  
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 836 836 836 615 615 
# Banks 202 202 202 156 156 
# IV 97 97 97 77 77 
AR(2) test  0.384 0.347 0.469 0.113 0.161 
Hansen-J test  0.247 0.605 0.47 0.627 0.425 
Diff-In-Hansen 
test for GMM 
instruments 0.248 0.427 0.581 0.863 0.823 
This table reports the robustness test on the exclusion of capital ratio (CAP) from the model. Other 
variables definition and the system GMM specification remain unchanged (as reported in Table 3.4). 
The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 












APPENDIX B6: TAKING NATURAL LOGARITHM OF PROFIT 
VOLATILITY 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
L.lnROA_vol  0.463***  0.484***  0.493***  0.420***  0.433*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
CLAIM -0.035*     
  (0.02)     
ASIAN  -0.060
**    
   (0.03)    
NON_ASIAN   -0.037   
   (0.03)   
LOCAL    -0.092
***  
    (0.03)  
CROSS     -0.020 
     (0.04) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
#Obs. 836 836 836 615 615 
# Banks 202 202 202 156 156 
# IV 100 100 100 80 80 
AR(2) test 0.101 0.122 0.112 0.161 0.183 
Hansen test 0.28 0.402 0.226 0.378 0.191 
Diff-in-Hansen test  
for GMM 
instruments 0.635 0.951 0.682 0.34 0.153 
This table takes the natural logarithm of profit volatility (i.e. LN(ROA_VOL)) rather 
than taking the standard deviation of profitability (i.e. ROA_VOL) as in Table 3.7. 
Other variables definition and the system GMM specification remain unchanged (as reported in Table 
3.7). The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 





CHAPTER 4: THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON BANK 
PERFORMANCE AND THE MODERATING ROLE OF 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION  
4.1 INTRODUCTION  41 
Asia has been one of the most disaster-prone regions in the world, as measured by total 
economic damage reported in Figure 4.1. The region has been affected by numerous 
destructive natural disasters during the last few decades. Examples include the Indian 
Ocean tsunami in 2004, the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, and the Haiyan cyclone in 2013. 
These disasters have had large economic and social impacts on the affected countries. 
Over the past 20 years, Asia has borne almost half of the estimated global economic cost 
of natural disasters, roughly $53 billion annually (Asian Development Bank, 2014). 
Within East Asia, Indonesia, China, and the Philippines stand out as highly vulnerable to 
disasters (Noy, 2015). This is particularly concerning because there is now evidence that 
climate change is altering the frequency and severity of natural hazards. According to the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014), more frequent and intense heat 
waves and an increase in heavy rain events are expected in Asia. If realised, these 
projections herald severe consequences for East Asia because climate change will 




An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the New Zealand Finance Colloquium (Lincoln 





(Source: Compiled from EM-DAT) 
Figure 4.1: Total economic damage of natural disasters (in US$ billions) per 
continent during 1990–2014 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the potential impact of natural disasters 
on banks in East Asia. The findings of this study are critical to the East Asian countries 
because banks provide an important source of finance for the post-disaster recovery 
process. Bank deposits serve as an ex-ante source for disaster mitigation; deposits can be 
withdrawn once the natural disaster strikes to repair and rebuild the damages caused by 
the disaster (Skidmore, 2001). Further, with credit supply in the form of outright lending 
or additional credit commitments, banks are better able than markets and insurance 
providers to cater for firms’ preferences around financial flexibility (Gorbenko and 
Strebulaev, 2010; Bos and Li, 2017). Indeed, in developing countries, where insurance 
coverage is non-existent or deficient, the role of banks in the reconstruction process 
becomes more important (Nguyen and Wilson, 2018). However, if banks are strongly 
affected by disasters (perhaps as a result of the magnitude of the disaster or its 
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limited. Given the importance of banking to the economy, this chapter assesses the 
impact of disasters on various aspects of bank performance.  
Foreign capital is another possible source of finance for ex-post recovery (Noy, 
2009). Historically, inflows of remittances and foreign aid have played an important role 
in supporting the recovery process, while private foreign capital (such as bank lending 
and equity) seems to experience ‘capital flight’ following natural disasters (Yang, 2008; 
David, 2011). Evidence of private foreign capital withdrawal post-disasters contrasts 
with the fact that foreign banking claims on East Asia have been growing substantially 
during 1999–2014 (as shown by Figure 3.1). Hence, there is an outstanding question 
concerning the moderating role of foreign banking capital on commercial bank 
performance following a natural disaster 
This chapter examines the impact of natural disasters on a broad range of bank 
performance measures. Further, it investigates the moderating effect of financial 
integration on the relationship between natural disasters and bank performance. Finally, 
it explores whether the moderating role of financial integration varies by the type of 
integration. Chapter 3 showed that foreign banking claims from ‘neighbours’ have a 
beneficial (i.e. lowered) impact on bank default risk. This chapter re-investigates this 
effect more broadly in the context of natural disasters and bank performance.  
Specifically, first the chapter asks: “How do natural disasters affect various 
measures of bank performance, namely deposits ratio, liquidity, credit risk, profitability, 
and default risk?” Cross-country analyses are rare in the existing literature addressing 
this question.42 Discernible prior studies include Klomp (2014) and Brei et al. (2019), 
 
42 Most studies focus on the response of banks around an event window for a specific disaster in one 
country. For example, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2009) study the impact of earthquakes in California (US); 
Berg and Schrader (2012) study volcanic eruption in Ecuador; Hosono et al. (2016) study the 1995 Kobe 
earthquake; and Nguyen and Wilson (2018) study the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Thailand. These 
studies generally document the limited access to bank credit and credit contraction in the affected areas 
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both of which examine the country-level impact of disasters on the aggregated measures 
of bank performance. Studying the impact of large-scale world-wide natural disasters on 
financial stability during the period 1997–2010, Klomp (2014) documents the increase 
in the likelihood of a bank’s default. Unfortunately, the study neither provides the 
specific evidence for the East Asian region, nor controls for the impact of the Asian 
financial crisis. Furthermore, Klomp (2014) only focuses on the impact of disasters on 
bank default risk while other studies (such as Collier et al. 2013, Noth and Schüwer 2018, 
and Brei et al. 2019) demonstrate the realized impact of disasters on other aspects of bank 
performance. For instance, investigating the impact of hurricanes on the East Caribbean 
banking industry during the period 2001–2012, Brei et al. (2019) report a reduction in 
the deposits ratio as well as the other liabilities ratio, suggesting a negative funding shock 
to banks. Therefore, it is worth investigating the impact of disasters on various aspects 
of banks performance in addition to stability. In short, this chapter augments prior studies 
by examining the impact of all disaster events on various measures of bank-level 
performance in the disaster-prone region of East Asia during 1999–2014, the period 
following the Asian financial crisis.  
Second, the chapter explores the moderating role of financial integration and asks: 
“How does financial integration moderate the impact of natural disasters on bank 
performance?” The literature provides opposing predictions on the moderating role of 
financial integration on the relationship between natural disasters and bank performance. 
On the one hand, foreign capital could help to ease financial constraints in host 
economies by providing access to alternative sources of external financing and 
 
following disasters. In contrast, Schüwer et al. (2018) find that independent banks located in the affected 
areas by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 increase their risk-based capital ratios and new lending to affected 
firms. Similarly, studying the impact of the 2013 Elbe flooding in Germany, Koetter et al. (2019) report 
that the credit supply increases among local banks that provide recovery lending to affected customers. 
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compensating for the volatility of domestic credit (Allen et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
the likelihood of associated international capital outflows (Yang, 2008; David, 2011) 
could amplify the impact of disasters on banks. Given these opposing predictions, 
establishing which of the effects dominates is an empirical question of interest to 
academic researchers and policy makers alike. To date, there are no empirical studies that 
examine the moderating role of financial integration on the relationship between natural 
disasters and bank performance. This chapter addresses that gap in the literature by using 
the ratio of the foreign claims of international banks to GDP to proxy for the level of 
financial integration (the same measure of CLAIM employed in Chapters 2 and 3), and 
then investigates the significance of the interactions between financial integration and 
natural disasters.  
The third research question states: “Do the foreign claims from ‘neighbours’ 
moderate the impact of natural disasters on bank performance differently from more 
distant sources of capital?” Since natural disasters may destroy information on 
borrowers and collateral values, lending could be more resilient in the case of lenders 
who possess informational advantages (Chavaz, 2014; Cortés and Strahan, 2017). 
Chapter 3 confirmed that types of financial integration differ on their information 
asymmetry. This chapter decomposes the measure of the total foreign claims based on 
lenders’ nationality and methods of extension to investigate the moderating role of each 
type of financial integration on banks performance following natural disasters. Consistent 
with Chapter 3, this chapter repeats two definitions of ‘neighbours’ lenders: (i) banks 
from other Asian countries and (ii) foreign bank presence via a full affiliate office in the 
recipient countries. Due to its close proximity to borrowers, Asian (regional) foreign 
banks face less information asymmetry than non-Asian (distant) lenders (Mian, 2006; 
Claessens and Van Horen, 2014b). Further, in comparison with cross-border claims, the 
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local claims extended via an affiliate presence involve some forms of foreign direct 
investment in the host country’s financial sector (García-Herrero and Martínez Pería, 
2007), which serves as a way to acquire ‘local’ knowledge. The informational advantages 
predict that Asian and local claims are more resilient during natural disasters than their 
counterparts. This advantage helps to alleviate the consequences of disasters. Despite this 
expectation being highly intuitive, there is no empirical evidence testing the differential 
impact of these types of foreign banking claims in the context of natural disasters. The 
chapter addresses this gap in the literature.  
The chapter constructs an unbalanced sample of commercial banks from seven 
countries in East Asia (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, 
and Thailand) during the period 1999–2014. A dynamic panel data model of bank 
performance ratios is constructed to reveal the short-term and contemporaneous response 
of banks toward disasters. The two-step system GMM developed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is used to estimate this dynamic relationship. Data 
for disaster damage are sourced from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT). The 
ratio between the total economic loss caused by all natural disasters in a particular 
country and a given year to the country’s previous year GDP is constructed to proxy for 
the magnitude of damage of each disaster. As in Chapter 3, data are sourced from the 
CBS report published by BIS to construct the financial integration measures. 
Specifically, to address question 1 and 2, the chapter constructs the overall measure of 
financial integration based on the total foreign banking claims data. To address question 
3, the chapter proxies different types of financial integration via the components of 
foreign bank claims classified by lenders’ nationality and methods of extension.  
 The chapter finds that natural disasters significantly lower bank deposits ratio. 
However, bank liquidity, credit risk, profitability, and default risk are not affected by 
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disasters. With regard to the moderating role of financial integration, the total foreign 
banking claims help to alleviate the decline in bank deposits in the aftermath of disasters. 
These results indicate that bank deposits and foreign banking claims serve as sources of 
funds for post-disaster recovery. Together with other sources, such as bank credit, 
government support, remittance, and foreign aid, they provide multiple channels for 
households and firms to obtain immediate access to finance, which is critically important 
to their disaster recovery. 
The moderating role of financial integration is present in the case of foreign 
claims extended by Asian lenders (but not in the case of non-Asian counterparts). The 
moderating role is not present in either local claims or cross-border claims. These results 
highlight the resilience of ‘neighbouring’ claims extended by Asian lenders during local 
shocks, and provide rigorous evidence (in addition to that provided in Chapter 3) to 
support intra-regional financial integration. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the related 
literature and introduces our hypotheses. The methodology is presented in Section 4.3. 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 present the descriptive and empirical results, respectively. Section 
4.6 provides the conclusion and implications. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
With regard to the first research question, the existing literature generally 
confirms the negative impact of disasters on various aspects of bank performance. One 
potential impact of disasters is the lowering of deposits ratios and bank liquidity. In an 
investigation of how people cope with unexpected losses caused by the 1995 Hanshin-
Awaji earthquake, Sawada and Shimizutani (2008) conclude that dis-savings were 
utilized to compensate for the loss to assets, while borrowing was used extensively to 
repair damage to housing. Given this household response, tightening bank liquidity is 
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expected in the aftermath of disasters. This argument has been empirically validated for 
the case of commercial banks in the Eastern Caribbean islands. Following hurricane 
strikes, these banks faced deposits withdrawal and experienced a negative funding shock 
(Brei et al., 2019).   
Natural disasters could also increase bank credit risk due to the deterioration in 
the payment capabilities of affected borrowers (Klomp, 2014). The shortage of funding 
and the increase in credit losses would reduce profitability. As empirically shown by 
Noth and Schüwer (2018), the occurrence of natural disasters in the US during 1994–
2012 is associated with a higher non-performing assets ratio and lower profitability for 
two years following a natural disaster.  
More seriously, natural disasters could affect bank stability. Using a simulation 
approach, Collier et al. (2013) find that natural catastrophes could become a systemic 
risk because of declining capital ratios, reduction in equity, and decrease in loan 
origination immediately following a disaster. An empirical cross-country analysis by 
Klomp (2014) suggests that large-scale natural disasters increase the likelihood of a 
bank’s default in emerging countries during the examined period of 1997–2010. 
Additionally, Brei et al. (2019) also report the significant decline in bank distance to 
default as a consequence of hurricane strikes on the East Caribbean islands. As noted in 
Section 4.1 (see also Figure 4.1 and Noy, 2015), East Asia is a disaster-prone area. Based 
on this and the preceding discussion, Hypothesis 1 (H1) states: “Natural disasters 
negatively affect bank performance measures such as deposits ratio, liquidity, credit risk, 
profitability, and default risk”. 
The second question examines the moderating role of financial integration on the 
relationship between disasters and bank performance. On the one hand, generally, foreign 
capital can ease financial constraints in host economies by providing access to alternative 
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sources of external financing and compensating for the volatility of domestic credit 
(Allen et al., 2011). Additionally, the lending behaviour of foreign banks has been shown 
to be more resilient during local shocks (De Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006; Arena et al., 
2006), as they have access to liquidity and capital injections from their parent banks 
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012). Therefore, in the aftermath of natural disasters, at the 
country level, the availability of foreign funds helps to speed up the replenishment of 
capital stock, allowing countries to quickly respond to the shocks (Noy, 2009; 
Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014). From a bank’s perspective, it can increase its 
international borrowings to meet the increase in credit demand and disaster relief. 
On the other hand, a likelihood of severe outflows of international capital, 
especially banking flows, after a disaster can exacerbate the adverse impact of disasters 
on bank performance. Empirical evidence establishing the volatile response of 
international banking flows towards exogenous shocks includes findings that bank 
lending flows are more volatile than equity and FDI flows during financial shocks 
(Levchenko and Mauro, 2007; Eichengreen et al., 2018). In the aftermath of natural 
disasters, Yang (2008) and David (2011) consistently find that private flows (such as 
bank lending and equity) seem to experience ‘capital flight’ in contrast to the inflows of 
foreign aid and remittances.  
However, no study has directly examined how foreign capital moderates the 
impact of disasters on bank performance. Noy (2009) finds that capital account openness 
moderates the impact of natural disasters on economic growth. The results show that 
countries with a less open capital account are better able to endure natural disasters (Noy, 
2009). This follows from the fact that countries with capital account restrictions are less 
vulnerable to ‘capital flight’ following a natural disaster event. 
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Given these findings, it is clear that there are two competing arguments for the 
moderating effect of foreign capital on bank performance. On balance, considering the 
weight of the empirical and theoretical literature, Hypothesis 2 (H2) states: “Greater 
financial integration alleviates the consequences of natural disasters on bank 
performance.” 
 The third question investigates the moderating role of each type of financial 
integration. The occurrence of natural disasters may destroy information on borrowers 
and collateral values. Banks that have an advantage in generating tacit information can 
process this soft information so that they can better distinguish between good and bad 
credit prospects following a disaster, and can therefore maintain or even increase their 
lending to (selected) affected customers. Several studies, such as Chavaz (2014) and 
Cortés and Strahan (2017), conclude that this informational advantage belongs to the 
local and small banks. As explained in Chapter 3, the informational advantage arguably 
belongs to the ‘neighbours’ foreign banks, which could be either (i) banks from other 
Asian countries or (ii) foreign bank presence via a full affiliate office in the recipient 
countries. In the former case, the information advantage of regional lenders results from 
their familiarity with the cultural, legal, political, and economic environments of the 
recipient countries (Mian, 2006; Claessens and Van Horen, 2014b). In addition to 
regional specific knowledge, the information advantage is inherent to the local business 
relationship (Buch et al., 2012) since Asian international banks follow the footsteps of 
domestic corporate customers going abroad to set up their foreign branches (Molyneux 
et al., 2013). In the latter case, the local claims extended via an affiliate presence of an 
international bank involves some form of foreign direct investment in the host country’s 
financial sector (García-Herrero and Martínez Pería, 2007), which could be synonymous 
with ‘local’ knowledge acquisition. Additionally, the local claims are funded primarily 
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by local deposits (Cerutti, 2015); hence, the local claims could be less volatile than cross-
border counterparts. In short, the Asian claims and local claims are expected to be more 
resilient during natural disasters. Accordingly, the two following hypotheses are 
developed. Hypothesis 3 (H3) states:  “Foreign claims extended by Asian lenders, as 
distinct from non-Asian lenders, alleviate the consequences of natural disasters on bank 
performance”, and Hypothesis 4 (H4) states: “Foreign claims extended via local 
affiliates of international banks, as distinct from cross-border claims, alleviate the 
consequences of natural disasters on bank performance.”  
4.3 METHODOLOGY, VARIABLES, AND DATA 
4.3.1 Model Specification 
Consistent with Chapter 3, this chapter develops a dynamic panel model to 
examine the impact of natural disasters on bank performance (H1) as given by Equation 
(4.1). The dynamic panel data model is estimated to examine the impact of disasters on 
economic growth (Noy, 2009; McDermott et al., 2013) and on the performance of 
financial institutions (Klomp, 2014 and 2018).  
Yijt = β0Yijt-1+ β1DAMAGEjt + β2INTEGjt + βkBANKkijt + βmCOUNTRYmjt+ θi+ γj+ µt+ εijt   (4.1)                                                                                                    
In this specification, Yijt is the dependent variable (DEPO deposits ratio, LIQ 
liquidity, CRERISK credit risk, ROA profitability, and LN(zscore) distance to default) 
for bank i in country j at time t.  Yijt  is written as a function of its past level (Yijt-1), 
disaster damage (DAMAGE), financial integration (INTEG), a vector of k bank-level 
variables reflecting the characteristics of each bank i (BANK), and a vector of m country-
level variables reflecting the macroeconomic condition relevant to all banks including 
bank regulation and supervision for any given country j (COUNTRY). θi is the bank-
specific fixed effect to control for unobserved factors that do not change over time for 
each bank. γj and µt are the country- and time- dummy variables, respectively; εijt is the 
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error term. The coefficient of interest is β1 reflecting the relation between bank response 
and contemporaneous shocks from disasters occurring in year t. 
Another popular method is the distributed lags models (as employed in Noth and 
Schüwer, 2018, and Brei et al., 2019), in which several lags of disaster damage are 
included in the model. The distributed lag model aims to account for the lagged effect of 
disasters and the fact that it might take time until banks experience the entire effect. With 
the design of the dynamic panel data (shown in Equation 4.1), the lagged dependent 
variable already contains the entire history of other independent variables, including the 
impact of past disasters. Additionally, the distributed lags model only includes several 
lags of disaster impact, so that it is not possible to examine the moderating role of other 
factors (such as financial integration) on the impact of disasters on bank performance. 
Therefore, the chapter intentionally uses the dynamic panel data model to investigate the 
three research questions. 
To study the moderating role of financial integration on the relationship between 
natural disasters and bank performance (H2), the chapter retains the model and variables 
specification in Equation (4.1), and includes the interaction term created by multiplying 
the measures of financial integration and disasters impact: 
Yijt = β0Yijt-1 + β1 DAMAGEjt + β2 INTEGjt + β3 DAMAGEjt * INTEGjt + βk BANKkijt + βm 
COUNTRYmjt + θi + γj + µt + εijt         (4.2)                                                                                                                                                                                                           
To test H3 and H4, Equation (4.2) is estimated with the specific measure for each 
type of foreign banking claim replacing the aggregate measure INTEG (i.e. ASIAN, 
NON_ASIAN, LOCAL, and CROSS as previously employed in Chapter 3). 
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4.3.2 Estimation Method 
 The empirical analysis employs the two-step system GMM developed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) with finite-sample corrected 
standard errors as proposed by Windmeijer (2005). The specification about the variables’ 
exogeneity remains unchanged from Chapter 3. For instance, contemporaneous bank-
level regressors (BANKijt) are treated as being endogenous. Financial integration 
(INTEGjt) and bank regulation and supervision variables are treated as being 
predetermined.  Disaster damage (DAMAGEjt) is treated as an exogenous variable, as 
the occurrence of natural disasters are exogenous shocks to bank performance. Finally, 
other macroeconomic variables, time dummies, and country dummies are treated as 
exogenous variables. 
The same procedure of pre- and post-tests is carried out as in the previous chapter. 
These tests include a Fisher test for the time series stationarity, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
(DWH) test for endogeneity of bank-level control variables, the second-order Arellano-
Bond (i.e. the AR(2)) autocorrelation test, the Hansen J-statistics test for the joint validity 
of the full instrument set, and the difference-in-Hansen test for the validity of the subset 
of instruments.  
4.3.3 Variables and Data 
4.3.3.1 Disaster damage’s measure and data 
Data for disaster damage are sourced from EM-DAT, which are collected by the 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED).43 The EM-DAT database 
 
43 The EM-DAT database distinguishes between four broad groups of natural disasters: (1) hydrological 
disasters, including floods and wet mass movements; (2) meteorological disasters concerning storms and 
hurricanes; (3) geophysical disasters, including earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions; and (4) 
climatic disasters, including extreme temperatures, droughts, and wildfires. The inclusion criteria for the 
events dataset is that 10 or more people were killed, 100 or more people were affected, an official state of 
emergency was declared, or a call for international assistance was made.  
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has a world-wide coverage; the earliest events were reported from 1900. This explains 
why it has been the most popular source of data for disaster damage to date in the 
literature (Noy, 2009). 
The EM-DAT database publishes three measures of disaster damage, which could 
serve as proxies for the magnitude of the disaster. They are (i) the number of people 
killed, (ii) the number of affected population, and (iii) the amount of direct damage 
(measured in US dollars). The chapter uses the last measure, specifically the economic 
loss caused by all disaster events. When damages from all events are aggregated, the 
measure could reflect both the magnitude and the frequency of disasters.44 The economic 
loss, then, is aggregated at the country level and annual level. Finally, following Noy 
(2009), the disaster damage variable (DAMAGE) is constructed as the ratio of the total 
economic loss to the country’s prior-year GDP. In short, DAMAGE represents the total 
economic loss caused by all disasters in a particular country, in a given year, and scaled 
by the country’s prior-year GDP.  
It is noteworthy that the EM-DAT database suffers from measurement errors and 
endogeneity concerns. The database does not provide the full universe of disaster events 
(Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014); this could be due to the poor technology available to 
collect and record information about disaster events (Cavallo et al., 2013). Therefore, the 
measurement error is more pronounced in the earlier years of data availability. As the 
chapter samples disasters since 1999, this concern is alleviated. Besides, the ex-post 
measure of economic loss could be endogenous to other country control variables, such 
 
44 Some papers only sample large-scale events, but the threshold to define the ‘large’ magnitude is quite 
subjective. For instance, Klomp (2014) defines a large-scale event as one in which economic loss is greater 
than 1% GDP or 0.5% banking assets size. Cavallo et al. (2013) define a ‘large’ disaster with its damage, 
measured in terms of people killed as a share of population, being two standard deviations greater than the 
world pooled mean for the sampled period. Thus, to avoid the subjectivity in defining large-scale disasters, 
the chapter samples all events reported by the EM-DAT database.  
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as inflation or economic growth (Noy, 2009; Klomp, 2014). The chapter employs the 
system GMM, which uses the valid internal instrument variables, and could relieve this 
endogeneity concern.45  
4.3.3.2 Financial integration variables  
Similar to Chapter 2 and 3, this chapter sources data to construct financial 
integration measures from the CBS report published by the BIS. To address research 
questions 1 and 2 (as well as H1 and H2), the chapter sources data on the foreign claims 
extended by international banks to the sampled (recipient) countries from the CBS-IC. 
This statistic is then scaled by the GDP of the corresponding sampled countries to 
construct the overall measure of financial integration (CLAIM). CLAIM was previously 
employed in Chapter 2 and 3 (see Section 2.3.3 and 3.3.3).  
To test H3, the moderating role of the foreign claims classified by lenders’ 
nationality, the chapter draws on data on the Asian claims and non-Asian claims from 
the CBS-IC report. H4 investigates the foreign claims broken down by the methods of 
extension using data for local claims and cross-border claims sourced from the CBS-UR. 
These statistics are then scaled by the GDP of the sampled countries to construct 
variables, namely ASIAN, NON_ASIAN, LOCAL, and CROSS, respectively (see 
Section 3.3.3). 
4.3.3.3 Bank-level variables  
The chapter examines the impact of natural disasters on several aspects of bank 
performance, specifically deposits ratio (DEPO), liquidity (LIQ), credit risk (CRE), 
 
45 An absolute solution to the endogeneity concern is using an index of disaster intensity, which is 
constructed from the physical characteristics of the disaster. A notable example is the Ifo Geological and 
Meteorological Events (Ifo-GAME) database of disaster events (including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, 
storms, floods, droughts, and extreme temperature) and their physical intensities index. However, the data 
are only publicly updated to 2010. Moreover, the aggregated disaster index at country and year level only 
represents the physical magnitude of the single largest event of each type of disaster (not for all disasters).  
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profitability (ROA), and default risk (LN(zscore)). In line with the existing literature on 
the determinants of bank risks and profitability (such as Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Laeven and Levine, 2009; Ghosh, 2015; and Brei et al., 2019), standard explanatory 
variables are included in Equation (4.2). For instance, Athanasoglou et al. (2008) found 
that higher capitalization, lower credit risk, higher operating efficiency, and lower market 
concentration are associated with higher banks profitability. Additionally, macro-
economic factors such as inflation rate and interest rate positively affect banks 
profitability. Findings from Ghosh (2015) suggest several internal determinants of bank 
credit risks such as bank size, capitalization, cost efficiency, loans to assets ratio, and 
income diversification. Laeven and Levine (2009) emphasize the importance of 
controlling for deposit insurance coverage as well as bank regulation and supervision 
scheme on studying determinants of banks default risks. Table 4.1 provides  the detailed 








46 Some banks may have insurance (and/or re-insurance) contracts to protect their business against the 
adverse impact of natural disasters. As data on the bank-level insurance coverage are not available, the 
paper could not directly control for the potential mitigating effect of insurance on the relationship between 
disasters and bank performance. Besides, GDP per capital is often included in the economic growth and 
natural disaster literature (Felbermayr and Gröschl, 2014) since this variable proxies for economic 
development and is highly correlated to the country-level insurance penetration data and government 
spending, which could affect the ex-post recovery process. However, the chapter could not include this 
variable (in the form of natural logarithm of GDP per capital), as the variable contains unit roots in its time 




Table 4.1: Definition and specification of variables  
Variables Definition Data Source 
Dependent Variable 
DEPO 





ROA Profitability = Net Income/ Total assets (%) Bankscope  
CRERISK 








Natural logarithm of bank Z-SCORE. Z-SCORE is 
equal to [ROA+ (Total Equity/Total assets)]/ [Std. 
(ROA)]. The Std. (ROA) is calculated over a three-




Bank-level control variables 















Overhead cost = Total non-interest operating 















Market concentration = Top 3 largest banks assets/ 








Variables of interest 
DAMAGE 
Economic loss caused by all disasters = Economic 
losses of all events in one country in a given year/ a 
counry’s last year GDP 
EM-DAT 
CLAIM 
Foreign claims of international banks to GDP of a 
country (%) 
BIS CBS-IC  
ASIAN 
Foreign claims extended by international banks in 





Foreign claims extended by international banks in 
non-Asian countries/ GDP(%) 
BIS CBS-IC 
CROSS 
Foreign claims extended across border by 
international banks/GDP (%) 
BIS CBS-UR 
LOCAL 
Foreign claims extended via foreign branches of 
international banks/GDP (%) 
BIS CBS-UR 
Country control variables 
IFL 
Inflation rate = Annual % change of average 





GDP GDP growth rate = Annual % change of GDP (%) GFD 
PRICRE 
Private credit to GDP =Bank credit to private 
sector/ GDP (%) 
GFD 






Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the year 





Dummy to proxy for the deposit insurance coverage 
of a country. INS takes a value of 1 when the 
country has explicit deposit insurance and 0 
otherwise   
Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. 
(2014)  
ACT 
Overall restrictions on banking activities index 
measures the degree to which banks are allowed to 
engage in securities, insurance, real estate 
investment, and ownership of non-financial firms. 
Higher value indicates more restrictiveness. 
Barth et al. 
(2013a) 
SUP 
Supervisory power index measures if the 
supervisory authorities have the authority to take 
specific actions to prevent and correct problems. 
Higher value denotes that supervisory agencies are 
authorised more oversight power. 
Barth et al. 
(2013a) 
PRIMON 
Private monitoring index measures the degree of 
private monitoring which requires banks to release 
accurate and comprehensive information to the 
public. Higher value indicates greater regulatory 
empowerment of the monitoring of banks by private 
investors. 
Barth et al. 
(2013a) 
4.3.4 Bank Sample  
The sample of banks and countries is similar to Chapter 3’s, except that Singapore 
is excluded due to no recorded natural disasters. The final (unbalanced) sample contains 
2,219 commercial bank-year observations (379 banks) from seven countries in East Asia 
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(China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, and Thailand) over the 
period 1999–2014. Other procedures to obtain and clean the financial data remain 
unchanged from Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3.4). 
4.4 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables included in the 
regression. The measures of bank performance LN(zscore), CRERISK, LIQ, ROA, and 
DEPO report a wide range of values, highlighting the substantial variation in 
performance across banks in the sampled period. 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics  
 Mean Std. Min Max N 
LN(zscore) 3.642 1.228 -2.377 7.895 2,219 
LIQ (%) 31.197 22.592 4.230 133.590 2,219 
CRERISK (%) 5.399 9.171 0.010 70.780 2,219 
ROA (%) 1.115 1.132 -8.970 8.840 2,219 
DEPO (%) 69.547 15.732 14.374 93.270 2,219 
CAP (%) 10.204 7.214 1.520 81.300 2,219 
INC_DIV (%) 13.722 10.456 0.100 69.444 2,219 
COST (%) 1.962 1.614 0.050 23.423 2,219 
CHARTER 32.692 24.891 0.153 100.000 2,219 
LOANS (%) 53.927 16.407 0.493 99.210 2,219 
CON (%) 43.599 7.274 29.789 78.151 2,219 
IFL (%) 4.204 3.218 -3.953 20.489 2,219 
GDP(%) 13.068 10.443 -13.044 47.368 2,219 
PRICRE (%) 91.278 47.153 19.909 233.663 2,219 
INT (%) 3.016 3.524 -3.903 13.347 2,219 
ACT 8.687 2.416 3.000 12.000 2,080 
SUP 12.261 2.612 7.000 16.000 1,126 
PRIMON 9.437 1.085 7.000 11.000 1,785 
DAMAGE (%) 0.464 1.521 0.000 17.053 2,219 
CLAIM (%) 25.043 33.933 3.357 290.071 2,219 
ASIAN (%) 4.431 0.644 5.762 50.360 2,219 
NON_ASIAN  14.148 1.718 24.155 189.181 2,219 
LOCAL (%) 13.071 1.446 25.906 186.572 1,673 
CROSS (%) 7.443 1.761 6.891 50.262 1,673 
The table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. There are 2,219 
bank-year observations (about 379 banks) for seven sampled countries (including China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, and Thailand) during 1999–2014. For the definition and 




The ratio of disaster loss to GDP (DAMAGE) has a mean of 0.46 and standard 
deviation of 1.52. Figure 4.2 is the scatter plot between the number of disasters (i.e. a 
proxy of frequency) and the disasters damage (i.e. a proxy of magnitude). Taken together, 
it is clear that the majority of events have a small-scale impact, with economic losses 
being lower than 1% GDP. Figure 4.3 graphs DAMAGE for each sampled country. 
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand experienced more damaging disasters, 
while Korea, Hong Kong, and Malaysia suffered losses to a lesser extent.   
 
Figure 4.2: Frequency and magnitude of the sampled disasters in East Asia during 
1999–2014  
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Table 4.3 reports the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients. DAMAGE is 
negatively correlated with deposits ratio (DEPO), liquidity (LIQ), and charter value 
(CHARTER). The negative association is early evidence that deposit withdrawal and 
tightened liquidity are a consequence of disasters. DAMAGE is positively correlated 
with bank z-score, equity ratio (CAP), and loans to assets ratio (LOANS). The association 
may be evidence of an increase in equity capital to buffer against loss caused by disasters 
to protect bank stability and increase credit supply to support the recovery process. There 
is an insignificant correlation between DAMAGE and credit risk (CRERISK) and 
profitability (ROA). A formal examination of the impact of disasters is provided in the 
empirical analysis, below. Overall, the bank-level variables and macroeconomic 
variables are found not to be highly correlated with each other, implying that the joint 
inclusion of these variables is unlikely to lead to concerns about multi-collinearity 

















































































































Z-score  1.00                    
LIQ -0.02  1.00                   
CRERISK -0.23**  0.17**  1.00                  
ROA  0.11**  0.14** -0.17**  1.00                 
DEPO -0.01 -0.27** -0.07** -0.03  1.00                
CAP  0.15**  0.42**  0.18**  0.20** -0.46**  1.00               
INC_DIV -0.03  0.25**  0.15**  0.16** -0.23**  0.25**  1.00              
COST -0.18**  0.07**  0.23**  0.03  0.05**  0.21**  0.11**  1.00             
CHARTER  0.09**  0.14** -0.02  0.04**  0.09** -0.13** -0.08** -0.25**  1.00            
LOANS -0.01 -0.57** -0.06**  0.00  0.01  0.00 -0.21**  0.12** -0.21**  1.00           
CON -0.12**  0.08**  0.09**  0.02  0.17** -0.03 -0.05**  0.00  0.16** -0.04**  1.00          
DAMAGE  0.05** -0.07** -0.04 -0.04 -0.14**  0.05**  0.03 -0.05 -0.11**  0.09** -0.03  1.00         
CLAIM  0.01**  0.13**  0.00  0.03 -0.06**  0.09**  0.26** -0.06** -0.20** -0.08  0.29**  0.05**  1.00        
IFL -0.16**  0.18**  0.07**  0.18**  0.11**  0.15** -0.08**  0.30** -0.12** -0.03**  0.22** -0.06** -0.14**  1.00       
GDP -0.07**  0.07** -0.01  0.06**  0.12** -0.09** -0.14** -0.06**  0.22** -0.11  0.09** -0.01 -0.23**  0.26**  1.00      
PRICRE  0.19** -0.18** -0.26** -0.19** -0.09** -0.24** -0.11** -0.54**  0.24**  0.01** -0.14**  0.15**  0.27** -0.61** -0.10**    1.00     
INT -0.05**  0.02  0.12* -0.01 -0.01  0.08**  0.06**  0.15** -0.18**  0.01  0.11** -0.10**  0.11**  0.05** -0.43** -0.17**  1.00    
ACT -0.03 -0.06** -0.16** -0.01  0.11** -0.16** -0.42** -0.24**  0.36**  0.04  0.02 -0.03 -0.55**  0.16**  0.45** 0.14** -0.40** 1.00   
SUP  0.00  0.17** -0.07**  0.14**  0.00  0.19** -0.02  0.10** -0.11**  0.00 -0.15**  0.02 -0.12**  0.31**  0.31** -0.32** -0.28** 0.52** 1.00  
PRIMON 0.00 -0.22** -0.26** -0.15** -0.01 -0.19** -0.24** -0.26**  0.27**  0.25** -0.12**  0.02 -0.27** -0.15**  0.16** 0.29** -0.13** 0.37** 0.04 1.00 
The table reports the Pearson rank correlation coefficients among variables. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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4.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
4.5.1 Impact of Natural Disasters on Bank Performance Ratios  
Table 4.4 reports the impact of natural disasters on various measures of bank 
performance to test H1. Several pre- and post-estimation tests are also reported at the end 
of this table.47 With regard to pre-diagnostic tests, the DWH test for endogeneity 
confirms the endogenous relationship between bank-level covariates and the dependent 
variable. With regard to the post-estimation tests, the AR(2) test is statistically 
insignificant, confirming the absence of the second-order serial correlation. The high p-
values reported for the Hansen J-statistics and the difference-in-Hansen tests suggest that 
the full set of instruments as well as each subset of instruments are valid (for a detailed 
list of instruments, please refer to the note in Table 4.4).48 
Moving to the impact of disasters on bank performance, as seen in Column 1 of 
Table 4.4, disasters significantly lower deposits ratio. The result is consistent with 
evidence of deposit withdrawal in the small Eastern Caribbean islands following disasters 
reported by Brei et al. (2019).  The finding implies that depositors in East Asian countries 
withdraw cash from banks to cope with losses. Skidmore (2001) reports that there is a 
higher propensity to save money in disaster-vulnerable countries. This is certainly the 
case for the sample of East Asian countries in this study; many of which have experienced 
substantial losses from disasters (as shown in Figure 4.1). Deposit withdrawals triggered 
by catastrophic events is a form of self-insurance and is essential in countries where the 
 
47 With regard to the (unreported) unit root test, the null of non-stationary is rejected at the 1% level for all 
variables used in the baseline regression. SIZE is dropped from the regression due to the presence of a unit 
root.  
48 In the case of liquidity (LIQ), credit risks (CRERISK), profitability (ROA), and default risk (LN(zscore)) 
being the dependent variable, regulation and financial integration are treated as pre-determined variables 
(this is similar to Chapter 3). However, in the case of deposits ratio (DEPO) in the first column, the Hansen 
test and difference-in-Hansen test indicate that regulation and financial integration should be treated as an 
exogenous variable. Appendix C1 reports the results when these variables are treated as pre-determined 
ones. In this specification, the Hansen test and the difference-in-Hansen test are both lower, while the 
number of instruments is higher than the baseline. All other results are quantitatively similar. Therefore, 
the baseline results report when these variables are treated as exogenous. 
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insurance markets cannot provide a sufficient level of protection against possible disaster 
losses (Nguyen and Wilson, 2018). In terms of economic impact, a 1-percentage-point 
increase in DAMAGE is associated with a 0.7-percentage-point decrease in deposits 
ratio.49  
Columns 2 to 5 of Table 4.4 report no significant impact of disasters on liquidity 
(LIQ), credit risk (CRERISK), profitability (ROA), and default risk (LN(zscore)).50 This 
is contrary to the prior evidence of a lower profitability and credit quality in the US 
sample (Noth and Schüwer, 2018), a tightened liquidity in the Caribbean sample (Brei et 
al., 2019), and a higher bank default risk in the world-wide sample (Klomp, 2014). This 
result should be interpreted with caution. In the context of the dynamic model, the result 
indicates that these ratios do not show a contemporaneous response toward natural 
disasters.51 Furthermore, the regression approach provides an assessment of an overall 
condition, i.e. central tendency or ‘on average’. In this sense, the negative impact will 
not be detected unless all banks (or a large number of them) are impacted.  
The specific context of the East Asian sample could partly explain this result. As 
seen in Figure 4.2, the majority of disasters have a small-scale impact, with DAMAGE 
 
49 The interpretation is more meaningful in the context of specific disasters. For instance, the Sichuan 
earthquake in 2008 (China) with reported DAMAGE of 3.1% GDP is associated with a 2.17-percentage-
point reduction in the deposits ratio. The Haiyan cyclone in 2013 (the Philippines) with DAMAGE of 4.9% 
results in a reduction of 3.5 percentage points in the deposits ratio. The 2011 flooding in Thailand with 
resulting DAMAGE of 17% leads to a reduction of 12.7 percentage points in the deposits ratio. 
50 As CAP and ROA are components to compute bank default risk. The inclusion of these two variables in 
the model of bank default risk could lead to the concern of endogeneity. Appendix C2 provides the result 
when these two variables are excluded from the regression; the finding remains unchanged.  
51 It could be a case of delayed impact as it may take time for a bank to experience the full impact of 
disaster damage. Though not central to the chapter’s analysis, the chapter further investigates the one-year 
lagged impact of disasters on bank performance in Appendix C3. As seen in Panel A, the finding is robust 
in the case of credit risk, profitability, and stability; these measures do not response both to the 
contemporaneous as well as one-year lagged impact of disasters. The response of deposits ratio toward the 
contemporaneous impact of disasters remains unchanged. More interestingly, in the period following 
disasters, deposits ratio rebounds; this finding suggests that households may deposit their insurance 
payment, aid, or remittances into banks, leading to an increase in bank deposits. Due to deposits growth or 
the extension of recovery loans, banks liquidity declines in this period; this finding also confirms the 
evidence of the delayed impact of disasters on bank liquidity.    
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being lower than 1% GDP. The statistically insignificant impact of DAMAGE reported 
in Table 4.4 may be attributed to the small scale of the disasters not affecting the majority 
of the sampled banks. Klomp (2014) also reports an insignificant impact of disasters on 
bank default risk in his robustness test when all disaster events (regardless of magnitude) 
are sampled. Additionally, with regard to the frequency of disasters, if there are few 
large-scale events recorded for the sampled countries, disasters are also not likely to 
affect the majority of the sampled banks.52   
The Asian banking system has undergone important reforms following the Asian 
financial crisis (Asian Development Bank, 2008). Examining the period of 1999–2014, 
the chapter possibly captures the positive impact of these reforms via the banking 
system’s resilience against disasters. Additionally, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 find that 
financial integration has helped to improve bank cost efficiency and lower distance to 
default. This improvement would also contribute to the resilience of the sampled 
commercial banks.  
Natural disasters result in spatially correlated losses if a bank’s lending portfolio 
is geographically and economically concentrated (Brei et al., 2019). It has been shown 
that banks that belong to a geographically diversified banking group are better able to 
withstand the adverse impact of disasters (Koetter et al., 2019). Thus, the insignificant 
impact of disasters on several bank ratios may be due to bank lending diversification (by 
sectors and regions) and its contribution to the resilience of the majority of East Asian 
 
52 Providing the impact of large-scale disasters on bank performance ratios, Appendix C4 confirms this 
argument. When only large-scale events (i.e. events with economic loss being greater either than 1% GDP 
or 0.5% banking assets size, in line with Klomp’s (2014) definition) are sampled, the number of disasters 
falls from 1,319 events to 26 events over the period of 1999–2014. The robustness result is quantitatively 
similar to the baseline one reported in Table 4.4, in which only the deposits ratio is significantly and 
adversely affected.  
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commercial banks against the impact of natural disasters. Overall, H1 is accepted for the 
deposits ratio only. 
Table 4.4: Impact of disasters on bank performance ratios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
DEPO LIQ CRERISK ROA 
LN 
(zscore) 
L.Y 0.694*** 0.443*** 0.683*** 0.303*** 0.408*** 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) 
DAMAGE -0.720** -0.207 -0.171 0.060 0.034 
  (0.28) (0.35) (0.15) (0.04) (0.03) 
CLAIM -0.195 -0.237 -0.122 0.072** 0.079*** 
 (0.21) (0.27) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) 
CAP 0.197* 0.582** -0.218* 0.018 0.061*** 
 (0.12) (0.27) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) 
CRERISK 0.108* 0.229*  -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.06) (0.13)  (0.01) (0.01) 
INC_DIV -0.079 0.199 0.192* 0.008 -0.023* 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) 
COST -0.579 -0.033 -0.021 -0.131 -0.167** 
 (0.72) (1.06) (0.34) (0.15) (0.08) 
ROA 2.414** -0.438 0.749  0.105 
 (1.00) (1.83) (0.79)  (0.10) 
LOANS 0.013 -0.638*** 0.115** 0.012  
 (0.07) (0.18) (0.05) (0.01)  
CHARTER   0.113** 0.007 0.006 
   (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) 
CON -0.606 -0.254 -0.242 0.131* 0.087* 
 (0.44) (0.37) (0.22) (0.07) (0.05) 
IFL -0.055 0.643 0.226 0.035 -0.025 
 (0.24) (0.47) (0.18) (0.04) (0.04) 
GDP -0.090 0.359* 0.034 -0.009 -0.028* 
 (0.09) (0.19) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) 
PRICRE 0.191 0.410* 0.035 -0.055* -0.052** 
 (0.12) (0.23) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) 
INT -0.025 0.736** 0.136 -0.020 -0.041* 
 (0.18) (0.30) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) 
INS 9.344*** 8.890* -0.178 -1.441* -0.553 
 (2.81) (4.61) (2.02) (0.77) (0.54) 
ACT 0.592 1.798 -1.044 0.164 0.306** 
 (1.32) (1.48) (0.80) (0.15) (0.15) 
SUP -0.627 -3.538** 0.705 0.193 0.139 
 (0.57) (1.46) (0.48) (0.15) (0.12) 
PRIMON -3.862 -2.880 -0.188 0.728 0.790** 
 (2.62) (2.58) (1.63) (0.45) (0.35) 
ODUM -3.645** -0.868 -0.224 -0.160 -0.087 
 (1.52) (1.80) (0.79) (0.20) (0.11) 
CRISIS 5.849 12.165 6.968 -2.761* -1.695* 
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 (8.09) (7.91) (5.05) (1.49) (1.01) 
Constant 69.839 46.556 4.606 -12.158 -8.760 
 (44.76) (38.20) (24.88) (7.45) (5.36) 
#Obs. 810 810 810 810 810 
# Banks 194 194 194 194 194 
# IV 95 103 103 103 103 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.196 0.876 0.168 0.101 0.504 
Hansen-J test (p 
value) 
0.653 0.164 0.862 0.494 0.465 
Diff-In-Hansen test  
(p value): 
     
 GMM instruments for 
level 
0.620 0.161 0.742 0.763 0.368 
 GMM instruments for 
the lagged dependent 
var. 
0.673 0.128 0.89 0.689 0.633 
 GMM instruments for 
endogenous bank-level 
var. 
0.684 0.129 0.756 0.609 0.375 
 GMM (IV) 
instruments for 
regulation and financial 
integration var. 
0.796 0.38 0.827 0.318 0.512 
 IV instruments for 
other exogenous var. 
 
0.664 0.256 0.935 0.742 0.444 
DWH endogeneity 
test 












The table reports the impact of disasters on various bank ratios as in Equation 4.1: 
Yijt = β0 Yijt-1 + β1 DAMAGEjt + β2 INTEGjt + βk BANKkijt + βm COUNTRYmjt+θi + γj + µt + εijt   
The dependent variables are ratios of deposits (DEPO), liquidity (LIQ), credit risk (CRERISK), and 
distance to default (LN(zscore)). Disaster damage is proxied via the ratio of economic loss to a country’s 
previous year GDP (DAMAGE). For the definition and construction of other control variables, see Table 
4.1.  Bank fixed effect, country and time dummies are included, but not reported to save space. 
All models are estimated by the system GMM. For the dependent variable and endogenous bank-level 
control variables, their second and third lagged values are used as instruments in the transformed 
equation and the first lag of their differenced values are used as instruments in the level equation. 
Financial integration (CLAIM) and regulation variables (ACT, SUP and PRMON) are treated as pre-
determined variables in all the cases except for deposits ratio (DEPO) in Column 1, where they are 
treated as exogenous variables. For these pre-determined variables, their first and second lagged values 
are used as instruments in the transformed equation; their differenced values are used as instruments in 
the level equation. Other variables (including disaster damage (DAMAGE) and other country-level 
control variables) are treated as exogenous ones. Accordingly, their differenced values are used as 
instruments in the transformed equation; their level values are used as instruments in the level equation. 
The system GMM is run by the xtabond2 Stata syntax written by Roodman (2006). Collapse option are 
used in specifying instruments for the endogenous and predetermined variables. As there are gaps in the 
sample panel, the forward orthogonal deviations transform (orthogonal option) is used instead of first 
differencing to maximise the sample size. Twostep along with the robust option is used to obtain the 
finite sample corrected two-step covariance matrix following Windmeijer (2005) correction. Small 
option is to adjust the estimates for small-sample and report t-statistics instead of z-statistics.  
Insignificant value of AR(2) tests confirm the absence of the serial correlation in the second order. 
Similarly, insignificant value of Hansen J-statistics test and difference-in-Hansen test ensures the 
validity of the instruments. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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The impact of other determinants on deposits ratio (DEPO) are presented in 
Column 1. Specifically, banks operating in countries with explicit deposit insurance 
schemes (INS) and with higher equity ratio (CAP), higher profitability (ROA), and higher 
credit risk (CREISK) attract higher deposits. As seen from Column 2, a higher loans to 
assets ratio (LOANS) together with greater ability by supervisory agencies (SUP) to 
exercise oversight, results in lower bank liquidity (LIQ). Conversely, the combination of 
higher real interest rates (INT) and a greater equity ratio (CAP) improves bank liquidity. 
There is also marginal evidence that deposit insurance (INS) and economic growth 
(GDP) improve bank liquidity. The model estimated for bank credit risk (CRERISK) is 
reported in Column 3. Greater proportions of loans to assets (LOAN) and customer 
demand deposits to assets (CHARTER) significantly increase bank credit risk. There is 
also marginal evidence that higher equity ratio (CAP) reduces credit risk, whereas bank 
income diversification (INC_DIV) increases credit risk. The estimated model reported in 
Column 4 shows that greater financial integration (CLAIM) improves bank profitability 
(ROA). There is some evidence that private sector bank credit (PRICRE) and deposit 
insurance (INS) reduce bank profitability and greater market concentration (CON) 
increases bank return on assets. The results of other determinants on bank distance to 
default (LN(zscore)), reported in Column 5, are congruent to those reported in Chapter 
3; notably, financial integration significantly lowers bank default risk. 
4.5.2 The Moderating Role of Financial Integration and Its Components  
Table 4.5 first establishes the baseline result on the moderating role of financial 
integration to address H2 (see Section 4.2). Tables 4.6 and 4.7 explore the variation of 
this moderating role that can be attributed to the lenders’ nationality (Asian claims versus 
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non-Asian claims, as articulated in H3) and the methods of extension (local claims versus 
cross-border claims, as per H4).53  
As seen in Table 4.5, the coefficient of the interaction term between CLAIM and 
DAMAGE is significant and positive, indicating that the total foreign banking claims 
help to alleviate the bank deposits decline during the aftermath of disasters.54 The result 
implies that foreign banking claims serve as an alternative source of finance (in addition 
to bank deposits) to support the post-disaster recovery of households and firms. This 
implication seems to contradict the result of Noy (2009) in the context of economic 
growth. Noy (2009) reports that countries with a less open capital account are less 
vulnerable to ‘capital flight’ following disasters, and therefore better able to endure 
natural disasters. However, this is not true for the sampled East Asian countries in this 
study. This suggests that mild-impact disasters have not triggered foreign capital 








53 In Table 4.5-4.7, the interaction terms are created by multiplying the measures of financial integration 
and disasters damage. To ease the concern of multi-collinearity, it is suggested that these variables should 
be demeaned before their relevant interaction terms are created. Either approach provides similar findings 
with the significance level of all the interaction terms being unchanged. The results from demeaning option 
is provided in Appendix C5. 
54 As seen in Panel B of Appendix C3, this finding also holds in the presence of the one-year lagged impact 
of disasters.  
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Table 4.5: The moderating of financial integration on the impact of disasters on 
the deposits ratio 
       (1) 




  (1.68) 
CLAIM -0.599** 
  (0.26) 
DAMAGE_CLAIM 0.243*** 








































# Banks 194 
# IV 96 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.191 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.738 
Diff-In-Hansen test (p value):  
  GMM instruments for level 0.816 
  GMM instruments for the lagged dependent variable 0.791 
  GMM instruments for endogenous bank-level variables 0.717 
  IV instruments for regulation and financial integration  0.905 
  IV instruments for other exogenous variables 0.751 
The table reports the moderating role of financial integration (CLAIM) on the impact of disasters on 
bank deposits ratio as in Equation 4.2: 
Yijt = β0 Yijt-1 + β1 DAMAGEjt + β2 INTEGjt + β3 DAMAGEjt * INTEGjt + βk BANKkijt + βm 
COUNTRYmjt + θi + γj + µt + εijt 
The dependent variables is the ratio of customers deposits to total assets (DEPO). Disaster damage is 
proxied via the ratio of economic loss to a country’s last year GDP (DAMAGE). Other variables and 
the system GMM specification remain unchanged (as reported in Table 4.4). The robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.   
  Table 4.6 reports evidence of the moderating effect of foreign claims extended by 
Asian and non-Asian lenders.  The significant negative coefficient for ASIAN reported 
in Column 1 shows that Asian claims significantly lower bank deposits ratio. However, 
there is no relationship for non-Asian claims (Column 3). This is feasible, as banks could 
source their funds via inter-bank borrowing from Asian foreign banks in addition to retail 
deposits. This finding also reinforces the argument (postulated in Section 3.2) that 
competition pressure is more pronounced when foreign claims are extended from 
regional Asian lenders compared with the distant non-Asian counterparts. Column 2 of 
Table 4.6 reports evidence of the moderating impact of ASIAN claims on the impact of 
natural disasters (H3). The coefficient for the interaction term between ASIAN and 
DAMAGE is significant and positive. This is in contrast to the insignificance of non-
Asian claims reported in Column 4. The significant Asian interaction term suggests that 
Asian claims help to alleviate the decline in bank deposits ratio following disasters. The 
result lends support to H3 and favours the ‘neighbouring’ claims extended by the Asian 




Table 4.6: The moderation of Asian and non-Asian claims 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
       DEPO    DEPO DEPO DEPO 
L.Y 0.717*** 0.709*** 0.694*** 0.695*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
DAMAGE -1.075*** -3.725** -0.552*** -1.573 
 (0.31) (1.53) (0.21) (0.98) 
ASIAN -0.809*** -0.698**   
 (0.30) (0.29)   
DAMAGE_ASIAN  0.294*   
  (0.16)   
NON_ASIAN   0.229 0.061 
   (0.32) (0.44) 
DAMAGE_NONASIAN    0.121 
    (0.11) 
CAP 0.210* 0.196* 0.188 -0.181 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
CRERISK 0.104 0.100 0.132** 0.138** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
INC_DIV -0.079 -0.070 -0.130 -0.128 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) 
COST -0.618 -0.672 -0.696 -0.632 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.72) (0.74) 
ROA 2.413** 2.437** 2.162** 2.037** 
 (1.01) (1.01) (1.00) (0.97) 
LOANS 0.000 -0.007 0.012 0.020 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CON -0.595* -0.538 -0.134 -0.139 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.43) (0.47) 
IFL -0.090 -0.191 0.059 0.090 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.26) (0.26) 
GDP -0.084 -0.106 -0.123 -0.126 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
PRICRE 0.230*** 0.184*** 0.025 0.047 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.13) 
INT 0.046 0.005 -0.017 -0.027 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) 
INS 10.292*** 9.809*** 8.186*** 7.693*** 
 (2.26) (2.18) (2.09) (2.09) 
ACT 0.759 0.672 1.964* 1.697 
 (0.89) (0.90) (1.16) (1.28) 
SUP -0.332 -0.202 -0.329 -0.296 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.56) (0.57) 
PRIMON -4.321** -3.862** -1.153 -1.446 
 (1.94) (1.86) (2.33) (2.63) 
ODUM -3.509** -3.859*** -3.569** -3.582** 
 (1.38) (1.44) (1.54) (1.49) 
CRISIS 5.219 5.455 -4.034 -2.843 
 (5.57) (5.63) (8.19) (9.51) 
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Constant 62.440* 61.556* 20.276 23.182 
 (35.15) (34.71) (45.35) (50.33) 
#Obs. 810 810 810 810 
# Banks 194 194 194 194 
# IV 95 96 95 96 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.184 0.172 0.107 0.120 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.648 0.665 0.628 0.590 
Diff-In-Hansen test  
 (p value): 
    
GMM instruments for level 0.747 0.804 0.605 0.674 
GMM instruments for the 
lagged dependent var. 
0.453 0.510 0.550 0.527 
GMM instruments for 
endogenous bank-level var. 
0.73 0.869 0.637 0.626 
IV instruments for 
regulation and financial 
integration var. 
0.768 0.664 0.945 0.874 
IV instruments for other 
exogenous var. 
0.761 0.791 0.625 0.521 
This table reports the moderating role of Asian claims (ASIAN) and non-Asian claims (NON_ASIAN) 
on the impact of disasters on bank deposits ratio (DEPO). Other variables and the system GMM model 
specification remain unchanged from Table 4.4. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
Table 4.7 reports the result when the total foreign banking claims are classified 
into local claims and cross-border claims.  Comparing the coefficients for LOCAL and 
CROSS in Columns 1 and 3, local claims significantly lower the bank deposits ratio, 
while cross-border claims do not. This again reinforces the argument (presented in 
Section 3.2) that local claims exert higher competitive pressure than cross-border claims. 
The coefficient for the interaction term between LOCAL and DAMAGE reported in 
Column 2 is positive as expected; however, the standard error is quite large, making the 
coefficient insignificant. This could be due to the lack of variation in the response of local 
claims to natural disasters. The coefficient of the interaction term between CROSS and 
DAMAGE given in Column 4 is also insignificant. Overall, the evidence on the 





Table 4.7: The moderation of local claims and cross-border claims  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  
DEPO DEPO DEPO DEPO 
L.Y 0.726*** 0.725*** 0.678*** 0.684*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
DAMAGE -0.972* -3.782* -0.529 -0.765 
 (0.52) (2.10) (0.45) (3.59) 
LOCAL -0.787* -0.971**   
 (0.45) (0.48)   
DAMAGE_LOCAL  0.189   
  (0.14)   
CROSS   -0.084 -0.196 
   (0.43) (0.41) 
DAMAGE_CROSS    0.026 
    (0.61) 
CAP 0.284* 0.288* 0.246 0.255 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
CRERISK 0.081 0.082 0.140 0.126 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) 
INC_DIV 0.037 0.038 -0.048 -0.035 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
COST -0.284 -0.330 -0.515 -0.518 
 (0.85) (0.85) (0.82) (0.87) 
ROA 1.588 1.614 1.495 1.392 
 (1.51) (1.52) (1.41) (1.43) 
LOANS 0.077 0.078 0.057 0.060 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
CON -0.820 -0.750 -0.408 -0.538 
 (0.54) (0.51) (0.53) (0.60) 
IFL -0.371 -0.389 -0.156 -0.159 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) 
GDP 0.087 0.055 -0.038 -0.048 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.13) 
PRICRE 0.348* 0.357* 0.150 0.146 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.14) 
INT 0.341 0.303 0.023 0.021 
 (0.44) (0.43) (0.35) (0.41) 
INS 8.883 8.379 8.978 9.697 
 (6.35) (5.85) (6.05) (6.41) 
SUP 0.336 0.524 -0.354 0.068 
 (3.16) (2.91) (2.60) (3.17) 
PRIMON -3.307 -3.240 -3.710 -3.237 
 (7.22) (6.80) (6.12) (6.51) 
ODUM -2.785 -2.886* -2.934 -2.832 
 (1.74) (1.74) (1.81) (1.75) 
Constant 153.036** 170.570** 50.412 57.369 
 (69.21) (74.43) (39.56) (41.44) 
#Obs. 589 589 589 589 
# Banks 148 148 148 148 
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# IV 74 75 74 75 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.208 0.209 0.179 0.18 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.656 0.674 0.555 0.552 
Diff-In-Hansen test (p value):     
GMM instruments for level 0.883 0.888 0.789 0.868 
GMM instruments for the lagged 
dependent var. 
0.515 0.543 0.339 0.317 
GMM instruments for 
endogenous bank-level var. 
0.966 0.970 0.931 0.941 
IV instruments for regulation and 
financial integration var. 
0.591 0.802 0.573 0.570 







This table reports the moderating role of local claims (LOCAL) and cross-border claims (CROSS) on 
the impact of disasters on bank deposits ratio (DEPO). The examined period is 2005–2014. Other 
variables and the system GMM model specification remain unchanged from Table 4.4; ACT and CRISIS 
is dropped due to collinearity. The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
4.6 CHAPTER SUMMARIES  
The chapter adds to the literature on the impact of natural disasters on bank-level 
performance using cross-country evidence from East Asia. Specifically, natural disasters 
significantly lower the bank deposits ratio, suggesting that depositors withdraw cash 
from banks to cope with disaster losses. However, bank liquidity, credit risk, profitability, 
and default risk are not affected by disasters. A conservative interpretation of disaster 
insignificance in the context of the dynamic panel data model is that bank liquidity, credit 
risk, profitability, and default risk are not contemporaneously related to natural disasters. 
This may be explained by the small-scale damages of most disasters, the resilience, and 
the lending diversification of the sampled banks.  
 With regard to the moderating role of financial integration, total foreign banking 
claims help to alleviate the bank deposits decline in the aftermath of disasters. The 
moderating role of financial integration is found to be present in the case of foreign claims 
extended by Asian lenders (but not for non-Asian lenders). There is no evidence of a 
moderating role for either local claims or cross-border claims. This may be due to the 
lack of variation in the response of these types of claims to disasters.  
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The chapter has implications in terms of managing the impact of natural disasters 
on banks in the context of financial integration. The results highlight that bank deposits 
and foreign banking claims (specifically Asian claims) serve as sources of funds to 
support the post-disaster recovery. Together with other sources, such as bank credit, 
government support, remittance, and foreign aid, these provide multiple channels for 
households and firms to obtain the relatively immediate access to finance, which is 
fundamentally important for disaster recovery.  
As the occurrence of natural disasters may destroy information on borrowers and 
collateral values, information advantage is crucial for lenders to maintain their credit 
supply. This makes disasters a special context to test the preference of the two definitions 
of ‘neighbours’ banking, which may have this informational advantage, i.e. being either 
(i) banks from other Asian countries or (ii) a foreign banks presence via a full affiliate 
office in the recipient countries. The results highlight the resilience of the foreign claims 
extended by Asian lenders in the event of local shocks, which is not present for the case 
of the foreign claims extended via local affiliates of foreign banks. This further supports 
the evidence documented in Chapter 3 of support for intra-regional financial integration 
in East Asia.  
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APPENDIX C1: ROBUSTNESS TO TABLE 4.4- DEPOSITS RATIO  
(Regulation and financial integration variables are treated as pre-determined variables) 
            (1) 




  (0.28) 
CLAIM -0.298 








































# Banks 194 
# IV 103 
AR(2) test (p value) 0.190 
Hansen-J test (p value) 0.588 
Diff-In-Hansen test (p value):  
  GMM instruments for level 0.939 
  GMM instruments for the lagged dependent variable 0.588 
  GMM instruments for endogenous bank-level variables 0.815 
  GMM instruments for regulation and financial integration variables 0.779 
  IV instruments for exogenous variables 0.513 
This table reports the impact of disasters on bank deposits ratio when regulation and financial integration 
variables are treated as predetermined variables to evoke their GMM-style instrument in the system 





















APPENDIX C2: EXCLUSION OF CAPITAL RATIO AND PROFITABILITY 
FROM THE MODEL OF BANK DEFAULT RISK 
 (1) 
L.LN(zscore)  0.490*** 
 (0.05) 
CLAIM  0.069** 
  (0.03) 
DAMAGE  0.022 
 (0.03) 
Other control variables Yes 
No. of obs 810 
No. of banks 194 
No. of IV   97 
AR(2) test 0.404 
Hansen test 0.189 
Diff-in-Hansen test for GMM instrument 0.159 
This table presents finding when capital ratio (CAP) and profitability (ROA) are excluded from the 
regression of bank default risk to ease the concern of endogeneity. Other variables and the system GMM 
specification remain unchanged (as reported in Table 4.4). The robust standard errors are reported in 





















APPENDIX C3: THE LAGGED EFFECT OF DISASTERS DAMAGE 
Panel A: The one-year lagged impact of disasters on bank performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 DEPO LIQ CRERISK ROA LN(zscore) 
L.Y  0.719*** 0.446*** 0.681*** 0.304*** 0.411*** 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) 
DAMAGE -0.830*** -0.330 -0.167 0.040 0.029 
  (0.27) (0.34) (0.16) (0.04) (0.03) 
L.DAMAGE 0.710** -0.458* -0.021 -0.014 0.007 
 (0.33) (0.28) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) 
CLAIM -0.045 -0.391 -0.099 0.053 0.071** 
 (0.20) (0.25) (0.18) (0.03) (0.03) 
CAP -0.221** 0.617** -0.210* 0.021 0.061*** 
 (0.11) (0.27) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) 
CRERISK 0.096 0.226*  -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.06) (0.13)  (0.01) (0.01) 
INC_DIV -0.094 0.195 0.192* 0.010 -0.025* 
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) 
COST -0.549 -0.009 -0.032 -0.139 -0.180** 
 (0.68) (1.03) (0.33) (0.14) (0.08) 
ROA 2.148** -0.467 0.690  0.109 
 (0.97) (1.82) (0.82)  (0.10) 
LOANS   0.113
** 0.010 0.006 
 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) 
CHARTER 0.002 -0.643*** 0.114** 0.012  
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.05) (0.01)  
CON -0.486 -0.445 -0.220 0.085 0.077 
 (0.41) (0.34) (0.26) (0.08) (0.05) 
IFL -0.218 0.731 0.247 0.023 -0.032 
 (0.23) (0.48) (0.18) (0.04) (0.03) 
GDP -0.134 0.369* 0.031 -0.007 -0.028* 
 (0.09) (0.19) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) 
PRICRE 0.126 0.462** 0.021 -0.044 -0.051** 
 (0.13) (0.22) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) 
INT -0.031 0.706** 0.136 -0.016 -0.044* 
 (0.16) (0.29) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) 
INS 9.754*** 8.374* -0.470 -1.197 -0.584 
 (2.37) (4.53) (2.05) (0.79) (0.56) 
ACT 1.586 0.613 -0.983 0.064 0.257 
 (1.31) (1.56) (1.01) (0.15) (0.16) 
SUP -0.904** -3.020** 0.743 0.189 0.153 
 (0.44) (1.44) (0.50) (0.15) (0.12) 
PRIMON -2.940 -4.048 -0.082 0.477 0.749** 
 (2.53) (2.57) (1.86) (0.46) (0.38) 
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ODUM -3.179** -1.125 -0.230 -0.191 -0.091 
 (1.36) (1.80) (0.78) (0.19) (0.11) 
CRISIS 3.303 16.383** 6.481 -1.882 -1.440 
 (7.77) (7.42) (5.53) (1.54) (1.07) 
Constant 52.832 70.209* 3.053 -7.647 -7.573 
 (43.12) (36.52) (28.22) (7.56) (5.64) 
No. of obs 810 810 810 810 810 
No. of banks 194 194 194 194 194 
No. of IV 96 104 104 104 104 
AR(2) test 0.393 0.827 0.163 0.119 0.561 
Hansen test 0.681 0.197 0.884 0.517 0.45 
Diff-in-Hansen 
test for GMM IV. 0.792 0.144 0.761 0.742 0.377 
This table presents the one-year lagged impact of disasters damage on various measures of banks 
performance. The model is presented as follows: Yijt = β0 Yijt-1 + β1 DAMAGEjt + β2 L.DAMAGEjt + β3 
INTEGjt + βk BANKkijt + βm COUNTRYmjt+θi + γj + µt + εijt   
Other variables and the system GMM specification remain unchanged (as reported in Table 4.4). The 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
Panel B: The moderation of financial integration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DEPO DEPO LIQ LIQ 
L.Y 0.720*** 0.730*** 0.439*** 0.441*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
DAMAGE -5.619*** -0.577** -0.876 -0.411 
  (2.12) (0.25) (2.94) (0.33) 
L.DAMAGE -0.579 2.208* 2.156 1.479 
  (1.64) (1.15) (3.37) (2.71) 
CLAIM -0.375 0.232 -0.358 -0.381 
  (0.31) (0.15) (0.40) (0.27) 
DAMAGE#CLAIM 0.199**   0.021   
  (0.08)   (0.12)   
L.DAMAGE#CLAIM 0.040 -0.048 -0.095 -0.071 
  (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.10) 
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of obs 810 810 810 810 
No. of banks 194 194 194 194 
No. of IV   98   97 106 105 
AR(2) test 0.25 0.417 0.827 0.816 
Hansen test 0.751 0.531 0.201 0.208 
Diff-in-Hansen test for 
GMM instruments 0.859 0.800 0.138 0.148 
This table reports the moderation of CLAIM on the one-year lagged impact of disasters on bank deposits 
ratio and liquidity. The interaction terms are created by multiplying the measures of integration and one-
year lagged impact of disasters. Other variables and the system GMM specification remain unchanged 
(as reported in Table 4.4). The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 




APPENDIX C4: IMPACT OF LARGE-SCALE DISASTERS ON BANK 
PERFORMANCE RATIOS  
 (1) (3) (4) (5) (2) 
 DEPO LIQ CRERISK ROA LN(zscore) 
L.Y 0.694*** 0.443*** 0.683*** 0.305*** 0.407*** 
 (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) 
DAMAGE -0.781** -0.226 -0.169 0.057 0.039 
  (0.30) (0.36) (0.15) (0.04) (0.03) 
CLAIM -0.230 -0.232 -0.122 0.066** 0.082*** 
 (0.22) (0.28) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) 
CAP -0.199* 0.583** -0.221* 0.016 0.061*** 
 (0.12) (0.26) (0.13) (0.02) (0.02) 
CRERISK 0.107 0.230*  -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.06) (0.13)  (0.01) (0.01) 
INC_DIV -0.077 0.196 0.192* 0.009 -0.024* 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) 
COST -0.579 -0.002 -0.030 -0.104 -0.170** 
 (0.72) (1.07) (0.34) (0.15) (0.09) 
ROA 2.426** -0.451 0.745  0.103 
 (1.01) (1.82) (0.78)  (0.10) 
LOANS 0.013 -0.640*** 0.117** 0.009  
 (0.07) (0.18) (0.05) (0.01)  
CHARTER   0.114
** 0.004 0.006 
 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) 
CON -0.660 -0.247 -0.237 0.112 0.092* 
 (0.45) (0.38) (0.22) (0.07) (0.05) 
IFL -0.065 0.655 0.230 0.033 -0.024 
 (0.24) (0.47) (0.18) (0.04) (0.04) 
GDP -0.090 0.356* 0.036 -0.003 -0.028* 
 (0.09) (0.18) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) 
PRICRE 0.210 0.404* 0.036 -0.045* -0.054** 
 (0.13) (0.23) (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) 
INT -0.022 0.730** 0.141 -0.011 -0.042* 
 (0.18) (0.29) (0.12) (0.03) (0.02) 
INS 9.784*** 8.836* -0.168 -1.183 -0.599 
 (2.96) (4.65) (1.94) (0.74) (0.54) 
ACT 0.446 1.740 -1.029 0.162 0.318** 
 (1.37) (1.48) (0.80) (0.15) (0.15) 
SUP -0.655 -3.492** 0.689 0.132 0.144 
 (0.58) (1.44) (0.47) (0.14) (0.12) 
PRIMON -4.256 -2.835 -0.184 0.612 0.828** 
 (2.74) (2.63) (1.62) (0.43) (0.36) 
ODUM -3.637** -0.855 -0.216 -0.126 -0.085 
 (1.50) (1.80) (0.79) (0.20) (0.11) 
CRISIS 7.147 12.095 6.924 -2.406* -1.810* 
 (8.46) (8.14) (5.03) (1.43) (1.02) 
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Constant 76.020 46.703 3.992 -10.236 -9.348* 
 (46.46) (39.49) (24.86) (7.01) (5.40) 
#Obs. 810 810 810 810 810 
# Banks 194 194 194 194 194 
# IV 95 103 103 103 103 
AR(2) test 
(p value) 0.195 0.88 0.166 0.193 0.519 
Hansen-J test 
(p value) 0.640 0.167 0.855 0.307 0.472 
Diff-In-
Hansen test for 
level equation  
(p value): 0.607 0.164 0.737 0.698 0.368 
This table reports the impact of large-scale disasters on bank performance measures. A large-scale 
disaster is an event in which economic loss is greater than 1% of GDP or 0.5% of the banking assets 
size. Other variables and the system GMM specification remain unchanged (as reported in Table 4.4). 
The robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 





APPENDIX C5: DEMEANING VARIABLES BEFORE CREATING 
INTERACTION TERMS 
Panel A: The moderation of CLAIM on the impact of disasters on deposits 
 (1) (2) 
L.DEPO       0.694***       0.722*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
DAMAGE_de    -0.720** -0.181 
 (0.28) (0.32) 
CLAIM_de -0.195 -0.133 
 (0.21) (0.19) 
DAM#CLAIM_de        0.404
*** 
  (0.14) 
Panel B: The moderation of Asian and non_Asian claims 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.DEPO       0.717***       0.715***       0.694***       0.685*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
DAMAGE_de     -1.075***   -1.246*      -0.552***    -0.522** 
 (0.31) (0.68) (0.21) (0.22) 
ASIAN_de     -0.809*** -0.970   
 (0.30) (0.59)   
DAM#ASIAN_de     0.077
*   
  (0.04)   
NON_ASIAN_de     0.229   0.318 
   (0.32) (0.30) 
DAM#NONASIAN_de      0.244 
    (0.16) 
Panel C: The moderation of local and cross-border claims 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.DEPO       0.726***       0.723***       0.678***       0.700*** 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
DAMAGE_de   -0.972* -0.409  -0.529  -0.794 
 (0.52) (0.60) (0.45) (0.49) 
LOCAL_de   -0.787* -0.466   
 (0.45) (0.48)   
DAM#LOCAL_ de    0.279   
  (0.23)   
CROSS_de    -0.084  -0.266 
   (0.43) (0.44) 
DAM#CROSS_de     -1.009 
    (0.75) 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
This chapter first summarises key findings, contributions, and limitations of the 
three essays, then it highlights their practical implications and outlines potential avenues 
for future studies.   
5.1 KEY FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND LIMITATIONS  
The thesis comprises three empirical essays to examine the impact of financial 
integration on the banking sector, with a focus on the level and type of financial 
integration. The first essay, presented in Chapter 2, explores how financial integration 
affects bank cost efficiency. Sampling commercial banks from nine East Asian countries 
over the period 1997–2014, this essay consistently reports the non-monotonic impact of 
financial integration on bank cost efficiency. Specifically, financial integration initially 
contributes to the improvement in cost efficiency, but eventually this reverses and 
financial integration reduces bank cost efficiency. Turning points of the non-
monotonicity occur when more than 40% of banks are foreign and the foreign claims of 
international banks exceed 100% of GDP. In the sub-sample of low-integration countries, 
the turning point of the foreign banks ratio is 40% and the foreign banking claims ratio 
is 55%. 
With regard to academic contribution, Chapter 2 is the first study to apply the 
non-monotonic efficiency effect model developed by Wang (2002) to the relationship 
between financial integration and bank cost efficiency. Hitherto, this relationship was 
assumed to be accurately captured by monotonic efficiency effect models. Indeed, the 
model’s unique ability of modelling a non-monotonic relationship provides new insight 
into the existing relationship between variables, which is informative for the purpose of 
policy analysis. These examples are the non-monotonic impact of financial integration 
and credit risk on bank cost efficiency (presented in Section 2.5.2.1 and 2.5.2.2, 
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respectively) as well as the impact of regulation on both the level and the variance of 
inefficiency (as presented in Section 2.5.4).  
However, one limitation of Wang’s (2002) model should be acknowledged. 
Existing models analysing the determinants of the inefficiency term, including Wang 
(2002) as well as the most popular model of Battesse and Coelli (1995), suffer from this 
limitation. Specifically, these models confound the time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity and inefficiency terms. Accordingly, the estimated inefficiency captures 
the effect of bank-specific heterogeneity in addition to inefficiency; in other words, the 
estimated inefficiency would be higher than the true inefficiency (Chen et al., 2014). 
Several studies, such as Goddard et al (2014), Chen et al. (2014), and Belotti and Ilardi 
(2018), have attempted to disentangle the heterogeneity and inefficiency effect. 
However, due to the complexity of the SFA and ML methods, to date no model can 
estimate both the true inefficiency term and the determinants of inefficiency in a single-
step procedure. As a non-monotonic efficiency effect model would provide new insight 
into the existing relationship, further development of the SFA framework which 
accommodates both the true modelling of the inefficiency term and its determinants in a 
panel data context is needed.  
Presented in Chapter 3, the second essay investigates the impact of financial 
integration on recipient country bank default risk and, critically, whether that relationship 
is moderated by the type of financial integration. Findings from the dynamic system 
GMM show that financial integration lowers bank default risk in the recipient countries. 
The impact is primarily driven by the foreign claims extended by Asian lenders and the 
foreign claims extended via local affiliates. This result confirms the preferential impact 
of foreign banking claims from ‘neighbours’, namely either banks from other Asian 
countries or foreign bank presence via a full affiliate office in the recipient countries. 
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These ‘neighbouring’ lenders possess informational advantages and assert competitive 
pressure, resulting in the effective monitoring and disciplining of the loan relationship.  
The second essay is the first study to decompose the measure of total foreign 
claims based on lenders’ nationality and methods of extension in the context of bank 
default risk. By doing so, the essay sheds light on the existing limited and conflicting 
results (i.e. Dinger and Kaat 2017; Karolyi et al. 2018) in the literature as to whether 
financial integration has a positive or negative effect on bank default risk. Furthermore, 
this essay makes the definition of ‘closeness’ or ‘neighbours’ more specific from the 
viewpoint of the recipient countries, directly contributing to the literature on the distance 
constraint between providers and users of funds (i.e. Brennan and Cao, 1997; Petersen 
and Rajan, 2002; and Knyazeva and Knyazeva, 2012).  
The employment of the BIS CBS database has revealed the latest development 
and changes in the nature of financial integration in East Asia, particularly in terms of 
lenders’ nationality and methods of claims extension. However, as the database was 
originally designed with a lender perspective in mind, it is subject to some limitations. 
First, China has recently emerged as an important financial hub (in addition to Hong 
Kong, Japan, and Singapore), channelling funds both inter- and intra-regionally (Asian 
Development Bank, 2018). The majority of Asian countries, including China, have not 
reported their foreign claims to BIS CBS. Therefore, the analysis so far might under-
estimate the value of foreign claims with intra-regional origin. An increase in the number 
of emerging Asian lenders reporting to BIS in the future would facilitate better 
monitoring of intra-regional claims, as well as their impact on the bank stability of the 
recipient countries. Second, the data to construct the measures of total foreign claims, its 
decomposition by lenders’ nationality, and methods of extension rely on different 
reporting bases (see Appendix B1). This prevents comparative and parallel analysis of 
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these measures. Therefore, if data on lenders’ nationality could be broken down further 
by their methods of extension (i.e. Asian claims extended locally or across border), or 
vice versa, a more detailed analysis could be provided. In short, this calls for improving 
the scope of data collection and harmonization of reporting basis so that BIS CBS could 
closely capture changes in the international banking markets. 
Presented in Chapter 4, and motivated by the devastating impact of natural 
disasters, the third essay analyses the impact of natural disasters on several measures of 
commercial bank performance and how financial integration moderates this relationship. 
By doing so, this essay contributes to the limited cross-country literature on the impact 
of natural disasters with evidence from East Asia. Specifically, the essay finds that 
natural disasters significantly lower the deposits ratio but have no contemporaneous 
relationship with liquidity, credit risk, profitability, and default risk. The resilience of the 
sampled East Asian banking system would partly follow from the financial reforms and 
regulation improvement after the Asian financial crisis as well as the efficiency and 
stability benefits obtained from financial integration (as found in the first two essays). 
The third essay is also the first study to examine the moderating role of financial 
integration on the relationship between natural disasters and bank performance. The 
essay shows that foreign banking claims, specifically those extended by regional Asian 
lenders, help to alleviate the deposits decline in the aftermath of natural disasters. The 
results highlight the role of commercial bank deposits and foreign banking claims as 
sources of finance for post-disaster recovery. Together with other sources, such as bank 
credit, government support, remittance, and foreign aid, these provide multiple channels 
for households and firms to obtain a relatively immediate access to finance, which is 
fundamentally important for disaster recovery.  
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Some words about the limitations of the final essay are warranted. Due to data 
limitation, this essay could not track the specific locations of banks and match these to 
the affected areas by disaster events for the sampled banks. Therefore, the essay could 
not employ other estimation techniques, such as difference-in-difference (as employed 
in Nguyen and Wilson, 2018; Schüwer et al., 2018), to compare the response of affected 
and unaffected banks around the event window of a disaster. The availability of such 
geographically defined data would allow the analysis to test if a bank’s financial 
condition is significantly different after a disaster in a much more precise manner. 
5.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER STUDIES  
The thesis is motivated to address the long-standing policy question of “How can 
a country maximize the benefits and mitigate the costs of financial integration?” By 
incorporating the latest trend of reversal and regionalization, as well as the emerging role 
of the East Asian region in the international banking landscape, the thesis suggests that 
policy makers need to find their answers by considering the level of financial integration 
and the type of financial integration. 
 More specifically, the first essay (Chapter 2) helps policy makers to decide on the 
degree to which their countries should become financially integrated. The non-monotonic 
impact of financial integration on bank cost efficiency implies that financial integration 
is a good thing, but only up to a point. In the financial globalization context, this essay 
provides empirical evidence to support more nuanced policy toward the full capital 
financial liberalization adopted by some multinational organisations, such as the IMF. 
Being specific to the context of ongoing further and deeper financial integration in East 
Asia, policy makers should be aware that an ‘optimal’ level of financial integration exists. 
Some countries with their level of integration being close to or above the optimal point 
are recommended to take a cautious approach toward further connectedness. Others, 
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notably China, Vietnam, Thailand, and the Philippines, would benefit from additional 
financial integration. 
The second essay (Chapter 3) helps policy makers to design their countries’ 
integration policy. To maintain or improve the financial stability of their banking 
systems, they should favour either the foreign claims extended by Asian lenders or 
foreign claims extended via local branches of international banks established in their 
countries. The former option is synonymous with the promotion of intra-regional 
financial integration. The latter option implies that where foreign claims come from 
outside East Asia, policy makers should encourage presence through local affiliates, as 
this has an equivalent impact. In short, these two options of ‘neighbouring’ foreign claims 
are complementary, providing recipient countries’ policy makers with flexibility in their 
choice of preferred form of financial integration.   
The third essay (Chapter 4) further highlights the differential impact of different 
types of financial integration in the context of natural disasters. The essay confirms the 
resilience of the foreign banking claims extended by Asian lenders in the event of local 
shocks, which is not present for the case of local claims. Accordingly, policy makers in 
East Asia have additional evidence to support intra-regional financial integration; this 
recommendation is also robust during the episodes of local shocks.  
Overall, the thesis generally points to the beneficial impacts of financial 
integration in terms of bank efficiency and stability. Furthermore, the thesis emphasizes 
the importance of considering the level and nature of financial integration to obtain such 
benefits.  As there have not been many existing studies specifically focusing on the level 
and forms of financial integration, further studies could be conducted following these 
two avenues. For example, future research could explore whether the non-monotonicity 
also holds in the relationship between financial integration and bank profit efficiency. 
177 
 
Further, the differential impact of foreign banking claims on bank stability classified by 
the sectors funded in the recipient countries (i.e. financial institutions, government, 
private sector) is also worthy of examination. These studies would develop the current 
understanding of the impact of the level and nature of financial integration on the 
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